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BAYES' LAW, SEQUENTIAL UNCERTAINTIES, AND
EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT CASES
Neal C. Stout*
Peter A. Valberg**
Judges are the gatekeepers of evidence. Arguably, the most difficult duty for a judicial gate-
keeper is to screen the reliability of expert opinions in scientfic fields such as medicine that
are beyond the ken of most judges. Yet, judges have a duty to scrutinize such expert opin-
ion evidence to determine its reliability and admissibility. In toxic tort cases, the issue of
causation-whether the alleged exposures actually caused the plaintiffs injury-is nearly
always the central dispute, and determining admissibility of expert causation opinion is a
daunting challenge for most judges. We present a comprehensive review of the courts'
strug&les with the screening of scientific evidence in such cases. In addition, we prpose an
approach to the screening of causation opinions based on probability science and logic.
Central to this approach is Bayes'Law, a statistical tool that courts can use to analyze the
extrinsic reliability of proffered causation testimony. We explain Bayes'Law and illustrate
its potential application for evaluating the reliability of medical and scientific causation
testimony.
All evidence is probabilistic. There are uncertainties attending all testimony, not only be-
cause the honesty or objectivity of witnesses may be doubtfl, but also because even honest
and unbiased witnesses may be mistaken in their perceptions. Reliability of causation evi-
dence depends on both sensitiity and specificity of the tests used to determine causation.
Hhly sensitie tests of causation reflect an ability to identify a high percentage of those
with the agent-induced disease, whereas highly specific tests of causation reflect an ability
to reject a high percentage of those who have the disease, but not induced by the agent at is-
sue. Accoding to Bayes'Law, the reiability of causation opinion depends not only on the
sensitivity and specificity of the tests employed by the causation expert, but also on the base-
rate of the agent-induced disease in the population. Bayes' Law dictates that the lower the
rate of the agent-induced disease in the population, the less reliable the opinion that the
agent at issue in fact caused the plaintiffs disease given certain levels of sensitivity and
specificity. The base-rate problem and its effect on reliability of causation opinions are over-
looked by judges when scrutinizing the reliability of proffered causation evidence. In this
Article, we encourage courts to consider a Bayes' Law approach to screen out, at an early
stage, those claims of injury lacking reliable evidence that an injury was more likely than
not caused by exposures to toxic agents.
* In private practice and admitted to the bars in Illinois and Missouri; B.S., DePaul
University, 1973; M.P.H., University of Michigan School of Public Health, 1977; J.D., Wash-
ington University, 1990; Certified Industrial Hygienist (ret.); Member of the Missouri and
Illinois bars.
** Principal in Environmental Health at Gradient Corporation, Cambridge, MA; A.B.
(summa cum laude), Taylor University, 1964; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1970; M.S., Harvard
School of Public Health, 1976; Faculty Member, Amherst College, 1969-76; Faculty Member,
Department of Environmental Health, Harvard School of Public Health, 1978-2000.
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The goal of our Article is to provide a framework that helps the gatekeeper to screen out
toxic tort claims insuffiently substantiated by the underlying scientific and medical data,
and allow the factflnder to decide only those toxic tort claims for which there is reliable and
relvant scientific supportfor each link of the causal chain, frm subject exposure to the in-
jury Scientific substantiation of each causal link determines the reliability of an experts
opinion that the exposure more liky than not caused the plaintiffs injury.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Toxic tort" is the label applied to negligence cases in which the
plaintiffs allege that exposure to harmful agents, usually chemicals,
caused the onset of disease, injury, or even death in others1 As in the
norm in negligence cases, a toxic tort plaintiff has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant's negligence caused the injury or illness. The
standard of proof is the typical "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard applied in civil cases.2 In a toxic tort case, the plaintiff must
1. The phrase "toxic tort" is not amenable to precise definition, due to the fact that
the term "toxic" is difficult to define. Nevertheless, we offer a practical, perhaps overly sim-
ple, definition. In this Article, "toxic tort" refers to personal injury cases in which the
plaintiffs claim that exposures to chemicals or radiation caused personal injury. Hearing loss
claims based on alleged exposures to noise fit this definition, but generally are not consid-
ered toxic tort cases. We discuss in this Article the so-called "trauma cancer" cases which are
not strictly toxic torts, but nevertheless display features of generic toxic tort cases, most no-
tably a chronic-type injury with a latency period between first exposure and disease onset. See
infra note 202.
In the remainder of this Article, we use the phrase "plaintiff's injury" to include injuries,
diseases, and illnesses incurred not only by the plaintiffs themselves, but also by others, usu-
ally decedents or infants. Likewise, the phrase "plaintiff's exposures" encompasses exposures
of others for whose injuries the plaintiffs seek recovery.
2. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., 184 E3d 1300, 1306 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("The
burden of laying the proper foundation for the admission of the expert testimony is on the
party offering the expert, and the admissibility must be shown by a preponderance of the evi-
dence." (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.10 (1993))). "In a
negligence action, plaintiff has the burden to prove that defendant was negligent by producing
evidence that will permit the trier of fact to conclude that it is more likely than not that defen-
dant's negligence caused plaintiff's injuries, without any presumption of law one way or
another." 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 715 (2000) (citing Vito v. Sargis & Jones, Ltd., 672 A.2d 129
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996), affd, 695 A.2d 191 (Md. 1997), & Anglin v. Kleeman, 665 A.2d
747 (N.H. 1995)). In most jurisdictions, the standard of proof on the issue of causation is
that the defendant's conduct "more likely than not" was a substantial factor in producing
the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 919 E2d 308 (5th Cir. 1990);
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Chaney v. Smithkline Beck-
man Corp., 764 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1985); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Or. 1996); Reynard v. NEC Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1500 (M.D. Fla. 1995). A party proves a
fact by a preponderance of evidence if "the scale tips, however slightly, in favor of the party
with the burden of proof." E.g., Ostrowski v. Ad. Mut. Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 187 (2d Cir.
1992) (quoting LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERALJURY INSTRUCTIONS 73.01, at
73-74 (1992)). Viewed from the perspective of the party not bearing the burden of proof,
the "preponderance standard is ... a tie-breaker dictating that when the evidence on an
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establish that exposures to the toxic agent more likely than not caused
the injury.
Whether the harmful agent caused the injury or disease is the cen-
tral issue in most toxic tort cases. Several factors often obscure the
causal pathway between the putative exposures and the diagnosed ill-
ness. First, in contrast to injuries caused by sudden and traumatic events
(for example, a broken leg caused by a fall from a ladder), injuries
caused by exposure to toxic agents often develop over long periods of
time.4 The extended period from exposure to injury obscures the
causal relationship, if any, between the exposure and the injuries. In
addition, seldom is the injury uniquely traceable to the subject of expo-
sure. In most toxic exposure cases, the injury at issue is one that occurs
in the general population and has many possible causes, complicating
the task of proving a causal link between the suspected toxic agent and
the disease.5 To make matters worse, the diagnosis of the disease is
sometimes in controversy. Even the allegation of exposure to the agent
may be at issue, or at least the duration and intensity of the exposure.
Finally, and perhaps most basic, the question of whether the agent is
capable of causing the claimed injury is disputable. A circuitous causal
chain characterizes "generic" toxic tort cases.6
issue is evenly balanced, the party with the burden of proof loses." United States v. Gigante,
39 F.3d 42,47 (2d Cir. 1994).
3. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1262 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (concluding that toxic tort plaintiffs were required to "offer evidence that causation
was more than [fifty] percent probable"); see also Dukes v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 934 F. Supp. 939,
944 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (observing that a plaintiff in a Federal Employers Liability Act case in-
volving toxic exposure has a lower burden of proof of causation than a plaintiff in a
common law negligence case, but "the plaintiff still bears the burden of presenting evidence
from which a jury could conclude a 'probable' or 'likely' causal relationship [between the
exposure and the injury] as opposed to merely a 'possible' one" (quoting Edmonds v. Ill.
Cent. Gulf R.R., 910 F.2d 1284, 1288 (5th Cir. 1990))).
4. Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort Suits, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1683, 1683 n.1 (citing StanleyJ. Levy, Radiation Litigation-The Emerging Tort
Field, 1981 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 568, 571 & n.3) ("The latency period for disease development
is more than [twenty] years for victims of radiation from atomic bomb tests; for daughters of
women taking DES [diethylstilbestrol], a full generation; for most cases of asbestos-related
mesothelioma, [twenty-five] years; for victims of hepatic angiosarcoma caused by exposure
to vinyl chloride, over [twenty years] .").
5. See United States v. Shonubi, 895 F Supp. 460, 517 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining
that proof of causation in toxic tort cases involving latent effects and no "signature" diseases
"is extremely difficult"); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards
of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 376 (1986) (noting diseases of inde-
terminate origin may remain latent for years, are associated with diverse risk factors, and
occur without any apparent cause); see also infra notes 315-318 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing so-called "signature" diseases).
6. See Note, Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science, 113 HARV. L.
R~v. 1467, 1472 (2000) (defining a "generic" toxic tort case as "a case in which a complicated
causal chain, a long latency period, or low levels of exposure render the argument for
SUMMER 2005]
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A toxic tort plaintiff often will need expert medical and scientific tes-
timony to establish the link between the subject exposure and the
injury.' A medical expert must usually conduct a "differential diagnosis"
to reliably diagnose the disease.' Then, the causation expert must be
able to show that a sufficient dose of the toxic agent at issue, and more
particularly the plaintiffs estimated dose, is capable of causing the dis-
ease in question (that is, general causation). Next, the causation expert
must conduct a quantitative causation analysis (sometimes called risk
analysis) to establish that the agent at issue is the most likely cause of
the disease or injury (specific causation).9 To conduct a valid causation
analysis, the expert must apply relevant medical, toxicological, and epi-
demiologic principles to the facts of the case, weighing alternative
potential causes of the injury to ident the most likely cause.'0
causation inherently weak"). Earlier, Troyen A. Brennan characterized "hazardous
substances" cases. Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific
Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 469, 501-02 (1988) ("First,
people are exposed to [hazardous substances] in a chronic and relatively low-dose fashion.
Second, exposed persons lack awareness of the toxic effect during the initial phase of the
exposure. Third, the exposure is followed by a latency period before the disease or injury
manifests itself. Fourth, the injury or disease at least produces chronic defects and is usually
irreversible. Fifth, the hazardous substance is not left in the body in a way that firmly links
the disease or injury with the substance. The paradigm of hazardous substances is the
occupational or environmental carcinogen. Substances such as teratogens, certain agents
that cause chronic lung disease, and heavy metals that produce neurological disease
exemplify these five characteristics of hazardous substances.") (citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., Savage v. Union Pac. R.R., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1030 (E.D. Ark. 1999)
("[T]he existence of a causal connection between exposure to a certain chemical and an
alleged injury requires specialized expert knowledge and testimony since such matters are
not within the common knowledge of lay persons."); Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp.
1310, 1319 (N.D. Ga. 1994) ("When medical causation is at issue, plaintiffs must prove cau-
sation to a 'reasonable degree of medical certainty.'" (quoting Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.,
615 E Supp 262, 295 (N.D. Ga. 1985))), rev'd on other grounds, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Sweeney v. Geon Co., No. 01-00-00315-CV, 2002
WL 58223, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App.Jan. 17, 2002) ("Where causation is not readily ascertainable
from general experience and common sense, proving causation requires expert testimony."
(citing Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1970))).
8. See infra Part VIII.D.3 (discussing differential diagnosis).
9. See infra notes 296-299 and accompanying text (discussing general and specific
causation).
10. A detailed description of causation analysis or risk analysis is beyond the scope of
this Article. Briefly stated, risk assessment involves quantitative estimates of the probability
that a certain level of exposure to a specific chemical will result in a specific disease end-
point. Of particular importance from a regulatory view is the degree of conservatism
included in dose-response estimates. Regulators develop exposure standards to protect pub-
lic health. As a consequence, regulators set exposure standards with a margin of safety and
use conservative risk assumptions that err on the side of over-predicting the probability of an
adverse outcome. Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,999 (Sept. 24,
1986); RICHARD WILSON & EDMUND A.C. CROUCH, RIsK-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 159-71 (2001);
see also Hans-Olov Adami & Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Concepts in Cancer Epidemiology and Etiol-
ogy, in TEXTBOOK OF CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY 87, 105 (Hans-Olov Adami et al. eds., 2002)
("Regulatory agencies and policy makers may recommend standards, set limits, or authorize
[VOL. 38:4
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Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) Rule 702," and
Daubert v. Merrle-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 and its progeny, if such prof-
fered medical/scientific causation opinion testimony is to be
admissible, then it must be reliable and relevant. Federal courts and
most state courts have a gatekeeping duty to bar unreliable opinion
evidence. To discharge this duty, courts hold preliminary hearings in
which causation experts, if challenged by the opposing party, must
demonstrate to the court that they derived their proffered conclusions
from accepted methods of science.' 3 A court exercising its gatekeeping
duty will bar any proffered opinion testimony that fails to meet general
standards of reliability and relevancy.14 The court will not allow the trier
of fact to consider opinion testimony the court has determined to be
unreliable or irrelevant.' 5
In this Article we discuss an issue that to our knowledge no court has
ever addressed when evaluating the reliability of an expert's proffered
causation testimony in a toxic tort case. Specifically, we contend that the
reliability of opinions as to the cause of a toxic tort plaintiffs injury
depends on two key quantitative factors: 1) the intrinsic accuracy of the
tests used by the experts to reach their opinions (that is, the sensitivity
and specificity of the tests); and 2) the extrinsic rate of the agent-
induced disease among those with the disease. More generally, we
contend that the reliability of disease-causation opinions depends in
part on what percentage of disease the subject agent causes among all
action even when the scientific evidence is weak. These decisions serve public health objec-
tives by introducing a wide safety margin, but they should never be confused with the
establishment of causation based on scientific considerations alone."). "[R]isk is generally a
function of exposure or dose.... [TJhe process or procedure used to estimate the likeli-
hood that humans or ecological systems will be affected adversely by a chemical or physical
agent under a specific set of conditions is called health risk assessment." Dennis J. Pausten-
bach, Primer on Human and Environmental Risk Assessment, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3, 4 (DennisJ. Paustenbach ed., 2002). For a discussion
of the controversies concerning risk analyses involving potential carcinogenic agents, see
generally JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK
(1988).
11. FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.").
12. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
13. FRE Rule 104 provides for pre-trial hearings to address questions concerning the
qualifications of opinion witnesses and the admissibility of evidence. FED. R. EVID. 104.
14. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
15. See infra Part VIII.A (discussing the so-called Daubert criteria that courts apply to
proffered scientific and technical testimony to determine its relevance and reliability, and,
consequently, its admissibility).
Toxic Tort Cases
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people with the disease. Other things being equal, the lower the rate of
the agent-induced disease among those with the disease, the less
reliable the proffered causation opinion will be. Stated positively, the
lower the rate of the agent-induced disease among those with the
disease, the more sensitive and specific the tests employed by the expert
need to be to achieve the level of reliability required for legal proof of
causation. As explained below, Bayes' Law provides the statistical tool
for analyzing the extrinsic reliability of proffered causation testimony.
The reliability of proffered expert medical testimony in a toxic tort
case involves issues other than the sensitivity and specificity of tests and
disease rates. For example, whether the subject agent is capable of caus-
ing the plaintiff's injury is often at issue. As mentioned above, it is the
plaintiff's burden to establish that the agent is capable of causing the
injury (general causation) as a prerequisite to establishing that the
agent caused the plaintiffs injury (specific causation). Another possible
uncertainty present in a toxic tort case concerns the plaintiffs specific
injury. The diagnosis of the disease may be an issue either because the
defendant challenges the medical expert's identification of what ails
the plaintiff, or because the diagnosed ailment may be one not gener-
ally recognized in the medical community.16 Further, the level of
exposure to the toxic agent, seldom known with certainty, must be es-
timated either using whatever data are available or, absent data, using
exposure models based on principles of dispersion, transport, chemis-
try, and industrial hygiene practice. 17 These exposure estimates likewise
involve uncertainties. When present in a toxic tort case, each of these
uncertainties compounds the overall uncertainty of a proffered opinion
that the agent caused the plaintiffs injury.
This Article first describes Bayes' Law and its bearing on the reliabil-
ity of causation testimony in toxic tort cases. Along the way, this Article
explains important principles of epidemiology and toxicology, the sci-
ences of disease that provide the tools to quantify risk as needed in the
proposed Bayesian analysis. Next, the Article discusses the impact of
other uncertainties attendant to expert opinion testimony in toxic tort
16. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 E Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (finding that no testimony regarding "multiple chemical sensitivity" could be admit-
ted because it is not a "physiological illness" generally accepted by the medical community).
17. For an example of an industrial hygiene expert's attempt, albeit unsuccessful, to
introduce into evidence his exposure model for the purpose of estimating the plaintiff's past
occupational exposures to benzene, see Castellow v. Chevron USA, 97 E Supp. 2d 780 (S.D.
Tex. 2000) (excluding the proffered exposure model testimony under Daubert). See also Leija
v. Marathon Oil, No. 96-617531 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2000) (excluding as unreliable ex-
pert's proffered skin absorption model for use in estimating plaintiff's benzene dose);
Austin v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 25 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. Ct. App. June 29, 2000) ("Guesses,
even if educated, are insufficient to prove the level of exposure in a toxic tort case." (quot-
ing Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999)).
[VOL. 38:4
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cases, exploring how these uncertainties combine to make the
proffered testimony less reliable. Finally, this Article suggests that judges
or their appointed special masters apply a Bayesian, probabilistic ap-
proach in toxic tort cases when evaluating the reliability of proffered
expert opinions pursuant to FRE Rules 104 and 702, and the holding in
Daubert. The goal is to allow the factfinder to decide only those toxic
tort claims for which there is reliable and relevant scientific support for
each link of the causal chain (from subject exposure to the injury). Sci-
entific substantiation of each causal link determines the reliability of an
expert's opinion that the exposure more likely than not caused the
plaintiffs injury.
II. WHAT Is BAYES' LAW? 1 s
All evidence is probabilistic. 9 There are uncertainties attending
all testimony, not only because the honesty or objectivity of witnesses
may be doubtful, but also because even an honest and unbiased wit-
ness may be mistaken in their perception. ° "No observation, test, or
18. We use the phrase Bayes' Law rather than Bayes' Theorem because all Bayesian and
non-Bayesian theoreticians agree on the formula derived by Bayes and discussed in this Article.
MASSIMO PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON RULE OUR
MINDS 106 (Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini & Keith Botsford trans., 1994). The theoreticians dis-
agree about the "amount of insight one gains from applying this formula to all actual cases of
induction." Id. at 107-08; see also United States v. Shonubi, 895 E Supp. 460, 485 (E.D.N.Y
1995) (stating that the problem for the courts is not whether Bayesian analysis is valid, but
rather how to make it comprehensible to the trier of fact); THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTI-
CAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 192 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL EVIDENCE] (explaining that the two most visible schools of statistical
inference are the Bayesian or "subjective" approach, and the frequentist or "objective" ap-
proach, the key difference between them being how they deal with the interpretation of
probability and the inferential process). The Bayesian subjectivist approach appears to be in
the ascendancy. See David Leonhardt, Subconsciously, Athletes May Play Like Statisticians, N.Y.
TIMEs,Jan. 20, 2004, at F1 (" 'In academia, the Bayesian revolution is on the verge of becoming
the majority viewpoint, which would have been unthinkable ten years ago,' said Bradley P.
Carlin, a professor of public health at the University of Minnesota and a Bayesian specialist.").
19. Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 247, 252 &
n,18 (1990) (citing Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Proc-
ess, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971)). The logical positivist-Alfred Ayer said that
"there are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain.
Empirical propositions are one and all hypotheses. . . ." ALFRED J. AVER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH
AND LOGIC 93-94 (1952).
20. See Kinsey v. State, 65 P.2d 1141, 1150 (Ariz. 1937) ("[A]II attacks [on the truthful-
ness of evidence] must be reduced to one of three classes: (a) Upon the honesty and
integrity of the witness; (b) upon his ability to observe accurately at the time the incident
occurred; and (c) upon his accuracy of recollection of the past events.").
Toxic Tort Cases
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study is ever infallible. So the question always lurks in the
background: How likely is it that this was the time the test or ob-
servation failed? The answer to that question, stated in terms of
probability, lies in the statistician's way of quantifying reliability."21
Two basic measures of a test's or an observation's inherent reli-
ability are "sensitivity" and "specificity."2 2 To understand these
terms it is helpful to keep in mind the following 2x2 grid, which
illustrates the possible results of a test for the presence of a disease
when applied to people known to be either diseased or disease-
free.
DISEASED DISEASE-FREE
Positive Test Result A C
True Positives False Positives
Negative Test Result B D
False Negatives True Negatives
"True Positives" (A) are those persons who have the disease, and
who test positive for the disease. "False Negatives" (B) are those
who have the disease, but who test negative for the disease. "False
Positives" (C) are those persons who are disease-free, but who test
positive for the disease. Finally, "True Negatives" (D) are those per-
sons who are disease-free, and who test negative for the disease.
Sensitivity is a measure of how well a diagnostic test detects the
disease among those who are known to have the disease. It is the
probability that a diseased person will have a positive test result.
23
Sensitivity is the "true positive rate" (TPR) of the diagnostic test.
2 4
It is equal to the number of "true positives" (that is, those with the
disease who test positive) divided by the total number tested who
have the disease (that is, "true positives" plus "false negatives"). In
terms of the 2x2 grid shown above:
Sensitivity = TPR = A / (A + B).
Conversely, specificity is a measure of how well the test indicates
that a person is free of the disease. It is defined as the probability
that a disease-free individual will have a negative test result.
2 5
21. KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWL-
EDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 113 (1997).
22. Id. (citing S.H. GEHLBACH, INTERPRETING THE MEDICAL LITERATURE (1993)).






Specificity is the "true negative rate" (TNR) of the diagnostic test.
26
Specificity is equal to the number of "true negatives" (that is, those
free of the disease who test negative) divided by the total number
tested who are disease-free (that is, "true negatives" plus "false
positives"). Again, in terms of the 2M2 grid shown above:
Specificity = TNR = D / (D + C).
Given the intrinsic sensitivity and specificity of the subject test,
what is the overall reliability of the results when the test is applied
to a population? That is, given a positive result, what is the prob-
ability that a person has the disease? Alternatively, if the result of
the test is negative, what is the probability that the tested person is
disease-free?27 Intuitively, one might think that the reliability of a
test result depends only on the sensitivity and specificity of the test.
If, for example, a test has a sensitivity of 98%, one may think that it
is 98% probable that a person with a positive test result has the dis-
ease. Similarly, if the test has a specificity of 97%, one may
conclude that a person who tests negative is 97% likely to be dis-
ease-free. This intuition is simple and straightforward, but wrong!
Consider an uncommon disease with a prevalence of 100 cases
out of 100,000 people; that is, in a sample of 100,000 people, 100
people are diseased and 99,900 people are disease-free. In such a
population, what is the result of giving 100,000 people a test with
"98% sensitivity" and "97% specificity"? Applying the proper analy-
sis described below, the prediction is that the test will identify 98
true positives, 2 false negatives, 96,903 true negatives, and 2,997
false positives. Hence, out of the 3,095 people with a positive test
result, a mere 1 in 30 (98/3,095) is in fact diseased! If treatment of
the disease is expensive or has serious side effects, a medical spe-
cialist would be ill-advised to treat the 3,095 "positives" based solely
26. Id.
27. A number of sources contain discussions of sensitivity and specificity in the context
of medical testing. See A.C. Equi et al., Use of Cough Swabs in a Cystic Fibrosis Clinic, 85 AR-
CHIVES OF DISEASES IN CHILDHOOD 438, 438-39 (2001) (demonstrating that cough swabs
taken from cystic fibrosis children have good sensitivity for detecting infection, but poor
specificity); S.H. Hussaini et al., The Predictive Value of Transabdominal Ultrasonography in the
Diagnosis of Biliavy Tract Complications After Orthotopic Liver Transplantation, 45 GUT 900 (1999)
(finding transabdominal ultrasonography had 77% sensitivity and 67% specificity for detect-
ing biliary tract complications after liver transplantation); Michael Urban et al., Efficacy of
Diagnosis of Mechanical Cholestasis by Magnetic Resonance Cholangiography, 26 WORLD J. SURGERY
353, 353 (2002) (finding magnetic resonance cholangiography has a sensitivity of 93% and a
specificity of 74% for detecting common bile duct stones).
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on this test result, despite the excellent sensitivity and specificity of
the test.
For comparison, consider a test with the same 98% sensitivity
and 97% specificity used to test for a common disease affecting
one out of two people (that is, 50,000 out of 100,000 people). Test-
ing a sample of 100,000 people from this population would identify
49,000 true positives, 1,000 false negatives, 48,500 true negatives,
and 1,500 false positives. In this case, of the 50,500 with positive
test results, 97% actually have the disease, while 98% of those with
a negative test result are in fact disease-free. Hence, focusing on
the intrinsic sensitivity of a test while ignoring the prevalence of
the disease may be a reasonable approximation of the reliability of
a positive test result for very common diseases, but not for un-
common diseases.
Bayes' Law provides the method needed to calculate the overall
reliability of a test result. Named for Thomas Bayes, the English
theologian and mathematician who discovered the law in the mid-
eighteenth century," Bayes' Law holds that the reliability of a test
depends not only on the intrinsic sensitivity and specificity of the
test, but also the prevalence (base rate)2 9 of the disease (or what-
ever parameter the test addresses) in the population. "Bayes'
theorem tells us how to combine information about sensitivity,
specificity, and base rates to arrive at an overall measure of the test,
called Predictive Value, that accords with the lay meaning of reliabil-
ity.""0 Bayes' Law, set out in encyclopedias, treatises on statistics,
and in manuscripts on inductive logic,1 is crucial for the correct
determination of the reliability of causation evidence. Yet this sim-
ple formula, "truly one of the most important discoveries of the
human mind,"02 is rarely encountered in case law addressing the
reliability of expert testimony.
Predictive value is the probability that a positive test result cor-
rectly indicates the presence of the disease. It is the proportion of
28. See THOMAS BAYES. AN ESSAY TOWARD SOLVING A PROBLEM IN THE DOCTRINE OF
CHANCES 5-6 (1763). This monograph is believed to be the first work to elucidate this rule.
29. "Base rates describe the frequency with which a relevant attribute occurs among
members of a reference population. A base rate may also be thought of as the probability
that a randomly selected member of a reference population will have the relevant attribute."
Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 19, at 247 n.2.
30. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 115.
31. PIATFELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 18, at 106.
32. Id.
33. KNAPP & MILLER, supra note 23, at 37. Actually, there is a "positive predictive value"
(PPV) and a "negative predictive value" (NPV). The PPV is the probability that a positive test
result accurately indicates the presence of the disease. Id. In contrast, the NPV is the prob-
ability that. a negative result accurately indicates the absence of disease. Id. at 38. Unless
otherwise indicated, this Article discusses the PPV.
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truly diseased persons in the population of persons receiving a
positive test result.34 In other words, Predictive Value is equal to the
number of true positives divided by the number of all persons who
test positive (that is, true positives plus false positives). Once again,
in terms of the 2x2 grid shown above:
Predictive Value = A / (A + C).
The predictive value is the reliability of a positive test result.
Sensitivity and specificity are, by definition, the outcomes of the
test on people whose disease status is known. Hence, these test pa-
rameters are independent of the base rate, or prevalence, of the
disease in the population. The sensitivity of a test is independent of
the base rate because all the persons under consideration when
calculating this parameter are known to have the disease. When
measuring sensitivity the question is: What percentage of diseased
people does the test correctly identify as diseased? It does not mat-
ter whether the base rate, or prevalence, of disease in the
population is 10%, 1%, or 0.01%. Likewise, the specificity of a test
does not depend on the base rate because all the persons under
consideration when calculating specificity are known to be free of
the disease. When measuring specificity, the question is what per-
centage of disease-free people does the test correctly identify as
disease-free? The base rate of the disease does not affect these pa-
rameters.
The predictive value of a test, on the other hand, is dependent
on the base rate of the disease. The predictive value takes into con-
sideration all those who test positive, which includes true positives
(A) who have the disease, and "false positives" (C) who are free of
the disease. As the prevalence of the disease in the population de-
creases, the number of disease-free persons tested will increase,
resulting in a greater opportunity for "false positives." Conse-
quently, the less common the disease is in the tested population,
the less reliable a positive test result will be. It follows that the reli-
ability of a positive result (that is, the probability that a positive test
result is a "true positive") is dependent on the prevalence of the
disease in the test population. The relationship between predictive
value and base rate is direct: as prevalence decreases, the predictive
value decreases; as prevalence increases, the predictive value in-
35creases.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 40.
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Richard Wilson, a professor of physics and an expert on risk as-
sessment, provides a simple and intuitive illustration of Bayes'
Law. A child who says "I saw a dog running down Fifth Avenue" is
very believable. If, however, the same child says "I saw a lion run-
ning down Fifth Avenue," the child in this instance is less
believable. Why? Even though the child's veracity and eyesight re-
main the same, his report of a lion is less believable because the
frequency of lions running down Fifth Avenue is much lower than
the frequency of dogs running down Fifth Avenue. Given the
child's report of a lion, one would seek further information (for
example, was a circus in town and did its truck crash; is there an
independent report of a lion escaping from the zoo?) before ac-
cepting the child's report of a lion on Fifth Avenue. While one may
rely on the child's report of a dog without further inquiry, the
child's report of a lion is not reliable, even though the child is
equally truthful and observant in both instances. One requires ap-
plication of a more sensitive and specific test (that is, further
inquiry) before one is convinced that there was in fact a lion on
Fifth Avenue.
Bayes' Law has real consequences. The hypothetical populations
considered above illustrate the effect that the base rate of the dis-
ease has on the predictive value of a diagnostic test. Now, consider
a real-life example. A published article reported the predictive
value of a Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) test applied to
the American population.37 As demonstrated in this study, the test
for HIV is highly sensitive and highly specific, but the test applied
to the general American population, in which the rate of the dis-
ease is low, produces a poor predictive value.
The screening test for HIV (the enzyme immunoassay test) has a
sensitivity of 98.3% and a specificity of 99.8%.38 What is its predic-
tive value when used to test the presence of HIV in the general
population of the United States? The answer to this question re-
quires knowledge of the base rate of HIV in the American
population, which is very low. Approximately one person in 3,000
has the virus.3 "9 Given this data, the authors calculated the predic-
tive value of this highly sensitive and specific test as applied to a
large population displaying this base rate of HIV infections. The
expected test results shown below are for a base population of
36. Daniel M. Karnmen et al., What Is the Risk of the Impossible?, 331AJ. FRANKLIN INST.
97,98 (1994).
37. See Paul D. Cleary et al., Compulsory Premarital Screening for Human Immunodeficiency
Virus, 258JAMA 1757, 1759-61 (1987); see also FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 116.
38. Cleary et al., supra note 37, at 1758.
39. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 116.
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3,825,368 people, in which there are 1,348 HIV-infected individu-
als, and 3,824,020 uninfected individuals.
HIV-INFECTED HIV-UNINFECTED
Positive Test Results A C
True Positives False Positives
1,325 persons 7,648 persons
Negative Test B D
Results False Negatives True Negatives
23 persons 3,816,372 persons
The sensitivity of the test is: A / (A + B) = 1,325 / (1,325 + 23) =
98.3%. The specificity is: D / (D + C) = 3,816,372 / (3,816,372 +
7,648) = 99.8%. Yet, despite the excellent sensitivity and specificity
of this test, the predictive value is poor when applied to the Ameri-
can population because of the low base rate. The predictive value
is: A / (A + C) = 1,325 / (1,325 + 7,648) = 14.8%. Thus, a person
drawn at random from the American population who tests positive
for HIV when subjected to the enzyme immunoassay test has less
40than a 15% probability of having the infection .
As Bayes' Law dictates, a higher rate of the tested disease in the
population enhances the predictive value of the HIV immunoassay
test. For example, applying this test to a high-isk population of
10,000 persons with an HIV infection rate of 10% (that is, 1000
persons in the population are infected) would yield the following
results:
40. The authors of this study estimated that in one year universal premarital screening
in the United States would detect less than one-tenth of one percent of HIV-infected per-
sons and would cost more than $100 million. Cleary et al., supra note 37, at 1757. Another
real-life example of Bayes' Law's impact in the reliability of test results is provided in the
Hussaini article. Hussaini et al., supra note 27, at 901-03. In that study, a diagnostic test
called transabdominal ultrasonography had 77% sensitivity and 67% specificity for detecting
biliary tract complications after liver transplantation. Id. Given these test parameters, the
authors calculated a predictive value positive of only 26%, assuming a prevalence rate of
12.8% biliary complications in the study population. Id. The predictive value negative, how-
ever, was 95% in the study population, leading the authors to conclude that a normal
transabdominal ultrasonography following liver transplantation makes the presence of bil-
iary complications unlikely. Id. See generally supra note 33 (explaining "negative predictive
value").
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INFECTED UNINFECTED
Positive Test Results A C
True Positives False Positives
983 persons 18 persons
Negative Test B D
Results False Negatives True Negatives
17 persons 8,982 persons
The predictive value of the test in this hypothetical population
is: A / (A + C) = 983 / (983 + 18) = 98.2%. Thus, increasing the
background rate from 0.035%, as in the general population, to
10%, as in this hypothetical at-risk population, improves the pre-
dictive value of the test from 15% to 98%.41
The general form of Bayes' Law avoids the difficulty of con-
structing the 2x2 grids and going through the reasoning and "back
calculating" as done above. The first step in deriving the general
form of Bayes' Law is to put the verbal reasoning ("predictive value
equals true positives divided by the sum of true plus false posi-
tives") into more precise mathematical terms.
In words, the predictive value of a test, when applied to a
population with a certain base rate of disease, equals the
number of true positives revealed by the test (which is given
by the base rate of the disease times the sensitivity of the test)
divided by the sum of this factor (the number of true positives
revealed by the test) plus the number of false positives re-
vealed by the test (the latter factor being given by the product
of the base rate of disease-free persons times [one minus the
specificity of the test]).
We can express the meaning of this verbiage more compactly in
symbols, using the following definitions. Let P(H) equal the nu-
merical probability that the hypothesis, H, is correct. For example,
in the hypothetical population with an HIV infection rate of 0.1
(10 percent), H is the hypothesis that an untested person has HIV,
and P(H) is 0.1. In Bayesian terms, P(H) is called the "prior prob-
ability." A positive test result is evidence, E. Let P(HIE) represent
the probability that the hypothesis is correct, given the evidence E.
In the hypothetical population, P(HIE) represents the probability
that a positive test result correctly indicates an HIV-infected per-
41. This method of calculating the predictive value of a test based on varying base rates is
called "back calculating." KNAPP & MILLER, supra note 23, at 39-40. That is, one "back calcu-
lates" the values in the 2 x 2 grid based on published values for sensitivity and specificity of the
subject test and the known prevalence of the test parameter in the population. Id.
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son. That is, P(HIE) is the test's reliability, or predictive value, that
we want to derive.
Now, let P(EIH) be the probability that E would be found if H is
true. In the hypothetical population, P(EIH) is the probability that
an HIV-infected person would have a positive result. In other
words, P(EIH) is the sensitivity of the test. Let P(-H) designate the
probability that the hypothesis is not true. For example, if the HIV-
infection rate is 0.1 as in our hypothetical population, P(-H) is 0.9,
the probability that an untested person is disease-free. Finally,
P(EI-H) is the probability that the evidence would be found even
though the hypothesis is wrong. P(EI-H) is the probability of false
positives, which equals one minus the specificity of the test. Given
these factors, the general form of Bayes' Law, which expresses the
same relationship as the verbal description above, is:
P(HIE) P(H) x P(E I H) 42
P(H) x P(E I H) + P(- H) x P(E I- H)
Applying this formula to the hypothetical population with an
HIV rate of 0.1 and subjected to the enzyme immunoassay test
cited above (sensitivity 98.3%; specificity 99.8%):
P(HIE) = (0.1 x 0.983) + [(0.1 x 0.983) + (0.9 x 0.002)],
which equals 0.982, as determined by the cumbersome "back calcu-
lating" method used above.
III. BAYES' LAW AND THE COURTS
43While the use of statistical evidence has burgeoned in courts,
the use of Bayes' Law in the judicial context is rare." Yet, Bayes'
42. To state Bayes' Law in words, see PIATrELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 18, at 108 ("The
probability that a hypothesis (in particular, a diagnosis) is correct, given the test, is equal to:
The probability of the outcome of the test (or verification), given the hypothesis (this is a
sort of inverse calculation with respect to the end we are seeking), multiplied by the prob-
ability of the hypothesis in an absolute sense (that is, independent of the test or verification)
and divided by the probability of the outcome of the test in an absolute sense (that is, inde-
pendent of the hypothesis or diagnosis).").
43. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 4.
44. See David H. Kaye & David A. Friedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FEDERAL JU-
DICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 132-33 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL] (observing that Bayesian analysis is rarely used in court,
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Law applies to tests and observations of all kinds, including the tes-
timony of witnesses in judicial proceedings. Foster & Huber
provide the following hypothetical:
Mrs. Smith witnesses an accident involving a taxi. Her eyesight
has been rigorously tested; the tests establish that she can
identify the color of a taxi correctly 80 percent of the time.
(In other words, she says "yellow" 80 percent of the times in
which the taxi really is yellow and 20 percent of the times
when it is some other color.) She testifies in court: "I saw the
taxi. It was yellow." How likely is it that she's right? The cor-
rect answer will almost never be "80 percent of the time."
... Assuming that Mrs. Smith has an 80 percent chance of
either correctly identifying a yellow taxi as yellow or correctly
identifying a not-yellow taxi as not yellow, and that 80 percent
of the taxis in the city are yellow, we find for a hypothetical
group of 100 reports by Mrs. Smith the results shown [in the
following grid:]
TAXI WAS TAXI WAS NOT
YELLOW YELLOW
Mrs. Smith says 64 taxis 4 taxis
yellow (true positives) (false positives)
Mrs. Smith says 16 taxis 16 taxis
not yellow (false negatives) (true negatives)
The report "it was yellow" will be correct 64 out of 68 times
(94 percent). Combining good (80 percent) eyesight with a
high background probability (80 percent) that a taxi is yellow
pushes the probability higher ... than one might suppose
from considering eyesight alone. If every taxi in the city is yel-
low, Mrs. Smith's "yellow taxi" call will be right 100 percent of
the time, even if Mrs. Smith is certifiably blind. But the num-
bers can go sour very fast. Suppose Mrs. Smith has the same
80 percent vision but she makes an "orange taxi" call. If 80
percent of the taxis in the city are in fact yellow, and 20 per-
cent are orange, Mrs. Smith's call will be wrong exactly half
the exception of which is paternity litigation, where genetic tests are used to determine
posterior "probability of paternity").
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the time (not just 20 percent of the time, as her vision alone
would suggest). If Mrs. Smith had 20 percent vision and "sees
an orange taxi" in a city in which only 20 percent of the taxis
are in fact orange, she will be wrong 94 percent of the time.45
A few courts have recognized the implications of the base-rate
problem on the reliability of test data. For example, in Gonzalez v.
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, a radio dispatcher and an in-
structor for a municipal bus service challenged the constitutionality
of random urine tests for drugs and alcohol conducted pursuant to
the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5331.46 The plaintiffs claimed that the tests amounted to an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 47 The district court granted the defendant
transportation authority's motion to dismiss, but the appellate court
reversed and remanded. 4' The appellate court found that the re-
cord on appeal lacked facts needed to determine whether the
search in this case was reasonable. 49 Among other criteria, Fourth
Amendment analysis requires a showing that the proposed invasive
test effectively accomplishes the governmental objective. ° In this
regard, the appellate court discussed the base-rate problem inher-
ent in random drug testing:
A more complete record can also illuminate another aspect of
efficacy, the Bayes' theorem problem that affects any random
test given to a low incidence population.... Suppose the
combination of errors in the tests ... cause an error rate such
that one person out of 500 gets a report of "dirty" urine when
it Was actually "clean." Suppose that there is a high rate of al-
cohol drug use among the employees ... and on any
particular day one worker in 10 has alcohol or drugs in his
blood. Then with a 1/500 false positive rate, out of 1,000 tests,
two will be positive even though the employee's urine was
clean, and 100 will be positive correctly. Only one of the posi-
tives out of every 51 is false. Fifty out of 51 are accurate. That
is a fairly effective test, in terms of reliability.
45. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 116-17 (citation omitted) (adapting the taxi-
cab hypothetical from a hypothetical by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman).
46. 174 F.3d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1999).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1024.
49. Id. at 1021.
50. Id. at 1022.
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But if the workers are generally "clean," the reliability of the
test goes way down. Suppose on a particular day only one
worker in 500 has ingested drugs or alcohol. Then with a
1/500 false positive rate, out of 1,000 tests, 2 will be correct
positives and 2 will be false positives. Half the employees who
get a "dirty" urinalysis are unjustly categorized. A positive re-
sult is as likely to be false as true on so clean a population,
even though the test is identical to the one that was quite ef-
fective for a population with a higher incidence of drug and
alcohol usage.5'
Bayesian analysis provides "[t]he most prominent general ac-
count of scientific reasoning .... Nevertheless, Bayesian analysis
has rarely made it to the courtroom, no doubt due in part to the
fact that "people do not naturally engage in Bayesian calculations
.... 03 It is time for courts to recognize Bayes' Law and require ex-
pert witnesses to apply this prominent scientific reasoning to
causation testimony in toxic tort cases.
IV. BAYES' LAW AND EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION
IN Toxic TORT CASES
"Statisticians understand this 'base-rate' problem very well. After
Daubert,5' judges must grasp it too. This is absolutely fundamental
to the evaluation of the reliability of a claim based on an observa-
tion or a test of any kind."55 This Article now turns to the
implications of Bayes' Law in the context of a toxic tort claim.
In a toxic tort case, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove that the
exposure more likely than not caused the injury.56 In most toxic
exposure cases, medical testimony is required to establish the link
51. Id. at 1023. Note that the court assumes in both scenarios--the "dirty" population
scenario and the "clean" population scenario-that the sensitivity of the drug test is 100%,
that is, that there are no "false negatives."
52. PHILIP KITCHER, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE WITHOUT LEGEND, OB-
JECTIVITY WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 291 (1993).
53. Id. at 292. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., admonished that in law "the man of
the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Oliver W. Holmes, The Path
ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
54. See infra Part VIII.A (discussing a court's gatekeeping duty to exclude unreliable
scientific and technical opinions following the Daubert decision and its federal court and
state court progeny).
55. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 121.
56. See cases cited supra note 3.
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between the exposure and the injury. To meet the plaintiffs bur-
den of proof, the medical expert must be able to offer reliable and
relevant testimony that the exposure more likely than not caused
the plaintiff's injury.
Most diseases, however, also occur in the general population
among those who were not exposed to a particular toxic agent.
With few exceptions, the mere fact that the disease follows the ex-
posure does not prove that the exposure caused the disease.58 Most
diseases have numerous risk factors with a range of probabilities
from "established" to "possible" to "suspected," while other diseases
are "idiopathic," that is, causes unknown. The plaintiffs causation
expert must be able to demonstrate that the exposure more likely
than not caused the disease using a process of causation analysis
whereby the expert considers and eliminates the other potential
causes of the disease.59
Bayes' Law, though abstract, is crucial in the context of disease
causation analysis. Just as Bayes' Law dictates the predictive value
of a diagnostic test, it likewise dictates the predictive value, or reli-
ability, of disease causation analyses. The reliability of such
causation opinions is undeterminable without knowing the base
rate of the disease in the relevant population, and without knowing
how to apply Bayes' Law. Yet courts have continually failed to con-
sider the impact that Bayes' Law has on the reliability of causation
opinions.
To illustrate, suppose a causation expert offers an opinion that
an individual contracted disease "P" as a consequence of her expo-
sure to substance "Q." What is the reliability of this opinion? In
part, the reliability of this causation opinion depends on the base
rate of Q-induced disease among those with disease P. In other
words, the issue is to what extent is exposure to agent Q responsi-
ble for disease P in the population? In this context, we modify the
labels of the familiar 2x2 grid to read:
57. See cases cited supra note 7.
58. See infra notes 315-318 and accompanying text (discussing "signature diseases" be-
lieved to be usually or always caused by a given toxic agent).
59. One should not confuse medical causation analysis with the related process of dif-
ferential diagnosis. See infra Part VIII.D.3.a.
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DISEASE P DISEASE P
INDUCED NOT INDUCED
By AGENT Q By AGENT Q
A C
Causation Claimed True Positives False Positives
B D
No Causation Claimed False Negatives True Negatives
An expert's causation analysis must have sufficient sensitivity and
specificity to render the predictive value of the analysis accurate
"within a reasonable degree of medical certainty," given the rate of
agent Q-induced disease among those with disease P in the popula-
tion. To establish causation within a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, the causation analysis must have a predictive value greater than
50%, indicating that the test is able to establish that it is more
likely than not that the exposure to agent Q caused disease P. As
discussed above, the predictive value depends not only on the sen-
sitivity and specificity of the expert's test, but also on the rate of the
non-agent-induced disease in the population. As Bayes' Law dic-
tates, the lower the base rate of the agent-induced disease among
those with the disease, the poorer the reliability (predictive value)
of the medical expert's causation analysis.
The initial inquiry concerns the sensitivity and specificity of the
medical expert's causation analysis. Focusing on the proffered cau-
sation opinion of the plaintiff's causation expert, we may assume
that the plaintiffs expert's causation analysis has a sensitivity of
100%. In other words, there will be no "false negatives" in the
plaintiff's expert's causation analysis because the expert will opine
that all the plaintiffs with disease P got the disease due to expo-
sures to agent Q. Certainly, the plaintiffs attorneys will not retain
an expert who will undermine their client's case by disputing the
plaintiff's causation theory. When it comes to sensitivity, one may
assume that plaintiffs' retained experts are perfect: they will iden-
tify all diseases caused by the subject agent. The crucial issue thus
becomes the specificity of the plaintiffs expert's causation analysis.
It is the plaintiffs expert's ability to identify "true negatives" and
minimize "false positives" that will determine whether the causa-
tion analysis is reliable. Ultimately, the question to ask is the
following: What specificity must the plaintiffs expert's causation




To arrive at a formula for determining the requisite specificity,
consider again the now familiar grid:
FRACTION OF FRACTION OF
DISEASE P DISEASE P
INDUCED NOT INDUCED
BY AGENT Q BY AGENT Q
A C
Causation Claimed True Positives False Positives
No Causation B D
Claimed False Negatives True Negatives
Remember that the formula for sensitivity is A / (A + B). Assum-
ing that the expert's causation analysis has a sensitivity of 100%,
there are no "false negatives," which means that B = 0.
It may be preferable to express A, B, C and D as "rates" rather
than numbers of people. If B equals 0, then A, the group of "true
positives," is equal to the fraction of disease P induced by agent Q.
For example, if agent Q causes one case in a thousand cases of dis-
ease P in the population, then A = 0.001 and B = 0, assuming the
expert's sensitivity equals 100%.
Next, consider the formula for predictive value A / (A + C). The
expert's specific causation analysis needs a predictive value of
greater than 50% for legally sufficient proof of causation. Setting
the predictive value greater than 0.5, which is the minimum re-
quired, means that A / (A + C) > 0.5. Solving for A:
A > 0.5 (A + C)
0.5A > 0.5C
A> C.
To achieve a predictive value of greater than 0.5, the "true posi-
tive rate" (A) must exceed the "false positive rate" (C), assuming a
sensitivity of 100% (that is, B = 0). For a predictive value equal to
0.5, A must equal C.
Finally, consider the formula for specificity: D / (D + C). As dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph, if one assumes 100% sensitivity
and a predictive value equal to 0.5, then A = C. Since A + B + C + D
- 1, and in this hypothetical B = 0, then D = 1 - (A + C), which
equals 1 - 2A. The specificity formula, D / (D + C), becomes
Toxic Tort Cases
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
(1 - 2A) / (1 - 2A + A) = (1 - 2A) / (1 - A). Since A equals the
proportion of disease P in the population caused by agent Q back-
ground rate, we will set A equal to "x." The formula for the
required specificity to achieve a predictive value of 0.5 is therefore:
Required Specificity = (1 - 2x) / (1 - x).
As seen by this formula, the specificity required to exceed 50%
predictive value will depend on the value of "x," the fraction of
cases of disease P known to be caused by agent Q. The lower the
fraction of the agent-induced disease among those with the disease
(that is, as x becomes smaller), the greater the specificity of the
expert's causation analysis must be to achieve the requisite predic-
tive value. The following table displays the specificity required to
equal 50% predictive value for rates of disease caused by the agent
in the reference population up to 0.5, assuming 100% sensitivity of
the expert's specific causation analysis. The table illustrates that, as
x becomes smaller, the expression "(1 - 2 x) / (1 - x)" approaches
"(1 - x)." Note that in the limiting case of x = 0, which indicates
that agent Q does not cause any cases of disease P, the required
specificity becomes 1.0 (that is, the expert's specificity must be
100%), forcing the expert to conclude that agent Q did not cause
disease P in the subject individual.
FRACTION OF DISEASE P SPECIFICITY REQUIRED FOR
CASES KNOWN TO BE CAUSED PREDICTIVE VALUE OF 0.5














As seen in this table, if agent Q at the estimated dose causes 1
percent of disease P cases, then the plaintiffs causation expert
must use methods able to identify more than 99% of disease P
cases whose diseases were not caused by the exposure to agent Q to
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achieve a predictive value exceeding 50%. In comparison, if agent
Q causes 10% of disease P cases, the expert's specificity must ex-
ceed 0.89. That is, the applied causation analysis must identify
more than 89% of such persons whose diseases were not caused by
the agent at the estimated dose to achieve a mere 50% predictive
value. Further increasing the percentage of agent Q-induced dis-
ease to 50% of persons with disease P who were similarly exposed,
then the mere presence of the disease in any random individual is
more likely than not due to exposure to agent Q (absent evidence
to the contrary). Consider the following finding:
Tests that purport to identify things that are common to begin
with are likely to yield correct results-whatever their inher-
ent quality, they are reliable because external circumstances
make them so. Thus, if a test shows that an individual suffered
from chickenpox during childhood, she probably did; we
don't have to know anything at all about the test to assert that
it is quite "reliable." In a case like this, it hardly matters how
good your "scientific eyesight" happens to be. If you consult a
psychic or a soothsayer you will do nearly as well.60
The same statistics apply to defendants' medical causation testi-
mony, but in reverse. While the plaintiffs medical experts' tests will
have 100% sensitivity (that is, no "false negatives"), the defendant's
causation experts will achieve 100% specificity (that is, no "false
positives"). Certainly, defense attorneys will not retain experts who
will confirm the plaintiffs causation theory where arguably no cau-
sation exists. If the base rate of agent Q-induced disease P is 1%
among persons similarly dosed with agent Q then the fraction of
disease P cases not caused by agent Q among such persons is 99%.
In such a case, the defense expert's opinion that the plaintiff's in-
jury was not caused by the agent at issue are highly reliable,
amounting almost to certainty, no matter how crude the tests they
apply. To borrow a phrase, a psychic or soothsayer will do nearly as
60. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 117-19. As an illustration, suppose that a blind-
folded person is asked to guess whether a flipped coin shows heads or tails. Though the
response is a pure guess, it is nevertheless "reliable" as long as 0.5 or greater probability of a
correct answer is considered reliable. On the other hand, the same blindfolded person's
guess as to what side of a six-sided die is showing is unreliable (that is, less likely than not to
be accurate), not because her guessing is worse, but because of the extrinsic circumstance
that the odds of any given side of the die showing is only one out of six.
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well.6' In contrast, if the fraction of agent Q-induced disease ex-
ceeds 50% among persons with disease P who were similarly
exposed, then the burden should shift to the defendant's experts
to conduct causation analyses evidencing that there are alternative,
more likely causes of disease P in the plaintiff.
To apply Bayes' Law to the proffered causation opinions in a
toxic tort case, it is essential to have information concerning the
base rate of the agent-induced disease in the appropriate popula-
tion. The science of epidemiology can be the source of that
information.
V. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND THE RATE OF AGENT-INDUCED DISEASE
A. Principles of Epidemiology
What are the rates of diseases caused by various agents? The dis-
cipline of epidemiology addresses this question.62 "Epidemiology"
is a branch of science and medicine that strives to "observe the ef-
fect of exposure to a single factor upon the. incidence of disease in
two otherwise identical populations., 63 Epidemiology focuses on
the question of general causation, (i.e., whether a substance is ca-
pable of causing a particular disease) as opposed to specific
61. See Note, supra note 6, at 1472 n.32 ("Extremely precise tests are needed to 'prove'
the presence of highly unlikely results, whereas crude tests can accurately predict substan-
tially probable results." (citations omitted)). Adami & Trichopoulos put it this way:
When the relative risk is higher than 1 but less than 2, the individual who has been
exposed and has developed the disease is more likely than not to have developed the
disease for reasons not entirely due to the exposure. For instance, if the risk of a
light-smoking 55-year-old man of suffering a first heart attack in the next 5 years is
6%, and that of a same-age nonsmoking man is 4% (relative risk 1.5), only 33% of the
smoker's risk (that is, one-third of the total 6%) can be attributed to his smoking.
When the relative risk is higher than 2, a particular individual who has been exposed
and has developed the disease under consideration is more likely to have developed
the disease because of the exposure.
Adami & Trichopoulos, supra note 10, at 109.
62. The related discipline of "health risk assessment" also addresses disease risks asso-
ciated with toxic substances. See generally HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Dennis Paustenbach ed., 2002).
63. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Bert Black & David E. Lilienfield, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L.
REV. 732, 755 (1984)).
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causation (i.e., whether the substance caused the disease in a spe-
cific individual) .64
To establish that a given substance is capable of causing devel-
opment of a particular disease, a scientist might in theory obtain
reliable information by engaging in experimental studies with hu-
man beings. For example, to determine whether exposure to a
certain level of a suspected toxin is associated with a particular dis-
ease, the scientist might compare two randomly selected groups of
people. One of the groups would be exposed to certain doses of
the toxin over a prescribed length of time and the other group
would not. For obvious ethical reasons, however, experimental
studies with human beings are proscribed where the subject
chemical agent is known or thought to be toxic.
65
Instead, epidemiologists use observational methods rather than
experimental methods to study persons exposed to a suspected
toxic substance.66 Epidemiologists seek to determine whether an
association exists between exposure to the chemical and the devel-
opment of a disease. These epidemiological studies use "statistical
methods to detect abnormally high incidences of disease in a study
population and to associate these incidences with unusual expo-
sures to suspect environmental factors."
67
In many toxic tort cases, courts have emphasized the critical role
that epidemiological evidence plays in causation issues. If general
causation is at issue, it is important to have epidemiological evi-
dence to support expert opinions that an alleged exposure caused
64. Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL, SU-
pr note 44, at 333, 381; see also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 715
(Tex. 1997) ("[E]pidemiological studies cannot establish that a given individual contracted
a disease or condition due to exposure to a particular drug or agent." (citing Michael Dore,
A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-In-Fact, 7 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 429,431-35 (1983); Gold, supra note 5, at 380).
65. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 E2d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Green et al., supra note 64, at
338-39.
66. See Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to
Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 441, 441 (1983) ("Because most diseases occur naturally at
some background rate, studying large groups of people offers one of the few opportunities
(apart from using human beings as experimental subjects) to demonstrate a relationship
between exposure and disease." (citing GARY D. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER ON EPIDEMIOLOGY (2d
ed. 1980))).
67. In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(quoting Dore, supra note 64, at 431); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 n.2
(1997) ("Epidemiological studies examine the pattern of disease in human populations.");
In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D. Colo. 1981)
("Where ... the exact organic cause of a disease cannot be scientifically isolated, epidemi-
ologic data becomes highly persuasive."), affd sub nom. Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502
(10th Cir. 1983).
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the plaintiffs' injuries. As stated in Conde v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., a
pesticide poisoning case:
Epidemiologic studies are the primary generally accepted
methodology for demonstrating a causal relation between a
chemical compound and a set of symptoms or a disease.
When an expert does not rely on the primary methodology
for establishing causation, then that places a burden on the
expert to explain his choice of methodologies and to explain
why the evidence from those methodologies should be con-
sidered reliable in the face of generally accepted medical and
scientific opinion to the contrary.68
In accord, the district court in Porter v. Whitehall Laboratory, Inc.,
stated: "A long series of federal cases supports the legal principle
that an expert medical opinion must have an epidemiological or
scientific foundation to support a reasonable finding of fact."
69
It is important to understand a basic consequence of epidemiol-
ogy's observational nature: epidemiology cannot prove causation.
68. 804 F. Supp. 972, 1025-26 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (citation omitted).
69. 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (S.D. Ind. 1992); see also Allen v. Pa. Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d
194, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that an expert's proffered causation opinion was unreli-
able because, among other reasons, there was no epidemiologic support); In rejoint E. & S.
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that epidemiological evi-
dence is indispensable in toxic tort cases where direct proof of causation is lacking); Perry v.
United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892-93 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding trial court's finding that
witnesses were unable to establish causation without "the crucial statistical connection" be-
tween the agent and the disease); Cloud v. Pfizer, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1133-34 (D. Ariz.
2001) ("[C]ase reports do not provide reliable scientific evidence of causation... [because]
they are merely compilations of occurrences .... "); Lennon v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 123 F.
Supp. 2d 1143, 1153 (N.D. Ind. 2000) ("[Medical case reports] are not reliable, because
normally such reports 'record nothing more than a temporal association between an expo-
sure and a particular occurrence,' and are therefore less reliable than epidemiological
studies, because '[e]pidemiologists use their population studies to eliminate the chance
associations and confounding factors, which inherently infect anecdotal reports, to deter-
mine whether a statistically significant positive association exists.'" (citation omitted));
Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 661, 665 (M.D. La. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs'
causation theory lacked scientific reasoning because experts failed to produce a single posi-
tive peer-reviewed epidemiologic study); Nelson v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d
954, 969 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (excluding plaintiffs causation experts' opinions based on anec-
dotal case reports postulating hypothesis that drug may cause blindness because such case
reports "do not demonstrate a causal link sufficient for admission to a finder of fact in
court"); Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1483 (D.V.I. 1994) (finding
that statistically significant epidemiologic findings provide the only reasonably conclusive
data concerning associations of diseases and potential causes in humans), affd, 46 F.3d 1120
(3d Cir. 1994); Cadarian v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(finding epidemiological studies required to confirm plaintiffs' other evidence on causa-
tion). But see Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir. 1999) (considering
epidemiologic evidence less important so long as the "temporal relationship" between the
alleged exposure and the injury is "valid and strong"); see also infra Part VIII.D.3.b.
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Causation is a judgment issue for epidemiologists and other scien-
tists interpreting the epidemiological data.70 A finding of causality
"requires judgment and searching analysis" informed by scientific
expertise."
Through epidemiological studies, scientists can assess the exis-
tence (and strength) or absence of an association between an
agent and a disease. But "an association is not equivalent to causa-
tion.,72 Association is a term used to describe the statistical
relationship between exposure to a chemical agent and the onset
of a disease that occurs more frequently than one would expect by
chance.73 Establishing an association does not necessarily mean
that there is a causal association between the exposure and the dis-
ease.7 4 Causation, by comparison, constitutes an association
between two events in which one event is a necessary link in a
chain of events that results in the effect.7'5 Although epidemiology
cannot prove causation, epidemiologists and other scientists rely
on epidemiologic data in making judgments as to the probability
of a causal connection.76
In the event an epidemiological study finds an association be-
tween exposure to a substance and a disease, scientists can analyze
the study to consider whether the reported association reflects a
cause-and-effect relationship or, alternatively, is a spurious find-
ing.77 "[R]esearchers first look for alternative explanations for the
association, such as bias or confounding factors .. . . ,7 The pri-
mary types of biases are selection bias and information bias.
"Selection bias occurs when the exposed group is selected in a way
that makes it more or less susceptible to disease for reasons inde-
pendent of exposure., 71 Of similar concern is information bias,
which occurs when the participants in the study provide incorrect
information about either exposure or health effects. One form of
information bias is "recall bias," a phenomenon recognized by
70. Green et al., supra note 64, at 374.
71. Id. at 375.
72. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 173 (2003) ("Correlation is
not causation.") (KennedyJ., dissenting); Green et. al., supra note 64, at 336.
73. Green et al., supra note 64, at 348, 387.
74. Id. at 348.
75. Id. at 374, 388-89.
76. Id. at 374; see also Dore, supra note 64, at 434 (asserting that epidemiologic studies
cannot, standing alone, establish causation).
77. Green et al., supra note 64, at 374-75.
78. Id. at 374.
79. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substance Litiga-
tion: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 649 (1992).
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epidemiologists.80 That is, epidemiologists know that people who
have a given disease are motivated to "recall" a putative exposure
to a suspect causative agent, while those free of the disease are not
so motivated to recall all possible exposures. 8' Another type of in-
formation bias occurs when an interviewer whose "awareness of the
identity of cases and controls ... may influence the structure of the
questions and the interviewer's manner, which in turn may influ-
ence the response. ""'
Although epidemiologists cannot control such variables as the
genetic background or lifestyle choices of their human subjects, or
the amount and duration of their exposure to the studied sub-
stance,83  they have systematic methods for assessing the
characteristics of the people in the study and their risk of disease to
avoid bias and errors.84 For example, to eliminate one source of in-
formation bias, whenever possible an interviewer should conduct
"blind" interviews without prior knowledge of whether the inter-
viewee is a case or a control 5
Further, even when a statistical association exists, and no bias is
present, the association may be the result of some other confound-
ing factor, or a so-called "confounder." A confounder is a factor
that is both a risk factor for the disease and is associated with the
exposure of interest."" As an example, assume a study finds that in-
dividuals with gray hair have a higher rate of death than those with
another hair color. Instead of hair color impacting death, however,
the test results might be explained by the confounding factor "ad-
vanced age." Perhaps a better example, relating more to the issue
of toxic exposures, is the positive association between the use of
suntan lotion and the risk of skin cancer, not because the exposure
(suntan lotion) causes skin cancer, but because both skin cancer
and use of suntan lotion are associated with the confounder "sun-
bathing" and exposure to the sun's cancer-causing ultraviolet rays.
As these examples illustrate, when researchers find an association
between an agent and disease, they must first determine whether
80. Green et al., supra note 64, at 365 ("Research has shown that individuals with dis-
ease (cases) may more readily recall past exposures than individuals with no disease
(controls); this creates a potential for bias called recall bias.")
81. Id.
82. DAVID E. LILIENFELD & PAUL D. STOLLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 237 (3d
ed. 1994).
83. Green et al., supra note 64, at 339.
84. Id. at 354-55.
85. LILIENFELD & STOLLEY, supra note 82, at 237.
86. Green et al., supra note 64, at 369-72, 389.
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the association is causal, or the result of confounding or other
weaknesses in the study design."7
After the researchers have analyzed the epidemiological study
for selection and information biases, researchers then consider
generally accepted guidelines for evaluating whether the associa-
tion between exposure to a substance and a disease may be causal .
One generally accepted set of criteria used to evaluate epidemi-
ologic findings is known as the Bradford Hill criteria. 9 As set forth
in Amorgianos v. National Railroad Passenger Co"p., 90 the Bradford Hill
criteria are:
1. Strength: How strong is the association between the
suspected risk factor and the observed outcome?;
2. Consistency: Does the association hold in different
settings and among different groups?;
3. Specificity: How close is the association between the
specific exposure factor and the specific health out-
come (that is, how unique is the quality or quantity
of the response)?;
4. Temporality: Does the hypothesized cause precede
the effect?;
5. Biological plausibility: Does the apparent associa-
tion make sense biologically?;
6. Coherence: Is the association consistent with what is
known of the natural history and biology of the dis-
ease?;
7. Experimental verification: Does any experimental
evidence support the hypothesis of the association?;
87. Id. Another interesting example of confounding is the finding that, with the ex-
ception of very heavy drinkers, the more alcohol people drink, the more money they make.
Christopher Auld, Smoking Drinking and Income, 40 J. HUM. RESOURCES 505 (2005). This
association likely is the result of confounding rather than causal; perhaps wealthier men are
able to afford more alcohol, or alcohol consumption helps some men deal with more stress-
ful, higher-paying careers, two examples of "reverse causality."
88. See Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1575-76 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (dis-
cussing criteria epidemiologists apply when making a judgment as to whether associations
are causal); see also Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 E Supp. 2d 147, 168
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (observing that a finding of an association between exposure and disease is
not in itself proof of causal association, and that epidemiologists instead turn to certain
criteria "to determine whether a statistical association is indeed causal"), aff'd, 303 E3d 256
(2d Cir. 2002).
89. The criteria were named after Sir Austin Bradford Hill after he discussed them in
his article, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation ?, 58 PROC. ROYAL Soc'Y MED.
295 (1965).
90. 137 E Supp. 2d 147, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).
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8. Biological analogy: Are there examples of similar
risk factors and similar outcomes?; and
9. Dose-Response relationship: Has a dose-response
relationship been established (that is, does the
magnitude of the response increase as the magni-
tude of the dose increases)?91
These criteria are to be applied flexibly. As one scholar noted,
"[t]here is no formula or algorithm that can be used to assess
whether a causal inference is appropriate based on these guide-
lines."9 2 For present purposes, the following is a brief exposition of
these criteria in the context of toxic tort litigation.
1. Strength and Significance of the Association-The stronger the
association, the stronger is the support for a causal link. "A strong
association is not easily explained by potential sources of bias or
confounding and hence it is more likely to be causal than is a weak
association, which could more easily be the result of confounding
or bias.,
9 3
Epidemiologists measure the strength of an association by the
magnitude of its effect. That is, the higher the rate of the disease
among the exposed population relative to the reference popula-
tion, the stronger is the association. Epidemiologists use "relative
risk" (RR) or "odds ratio" (OR) to measure the strength of the as-
sociation between exposure and disease.94 The RR is the ratio of
the risk of disease among the group exposed to the chemical agent
compared with the risk of disease among the unexposed group.95
An RR of 1.0 indicates no association, while a relative risk of 2.0
indicates that the risk of developing a disease in the exposed group
is two times higher than the risk of developing that disease in the
unexposed group.96 The OR is similar to the RR except that the OR
91. These criteria can be explained in somewhat different language. See Green et al.,
supra note 64, at 375; Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REv. 732, 762-63 (1984). Alfred S. Evans has updated these criteria and set
forth his "unified concept" of the criteria for causation. Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Dis-
ease: The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 YALEJ. BIOLOGY & MED. 175 (1976).
92. Green et al., supra note 64, at 375. The criterion of temporality, in contrast to the
other criteria, is essential. That is, exposure to the agent must precede the injury, or no
causal inference is possible. See infra Part V.A.2.
93. ISABEL Dos SANTOS SILVA, CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 297
(1999).
94. Green et al., supra note 64, at 376.
95. Id. at 348-49.
96. Generally, epidemiologists consider an RR of 2.0 or less as indicative of a weak as-
sociation. See Ernst L. Wynder, Guidelines to the Epidemiology of Weak Associations, 16
PREVENTIVE MED. 139 (1987). Dr. Marcia Angell, Editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, has stated: "As a general rule of thumb, ... we are looking for a relative risk of
three or more [before accepting a paper for publication], particularly if it is biologically
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is used in case-control mortality studies. The OR expresses the like-
lihood of the exposure being higher in the disease cases versus the
non-disease controls. An OR of 1.0 results when the exposure was
equally likely among the cases (diseased) and the controls (non-
diseased). The higher the RR or OR, the stronger or more power-
ful is the association between exposure and probability of having
the disease.97
The RR or OR found in an epidemiology study is crucial in the
legal context. The standard of proof on the issue of causation is by
a preponderance of the evidence,98 that is, that the defendant's
conduct "more likely than not" caused the plaintiffs injury. In epi-
demiological terms, this standard of proof requires an RR or OR
greater than 2.0. As explained in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.:
The threshold for concluding that an agent was more likely
the cause of a disease than not is relative risk greater than 2.0.
implausible or if it's a brand-new finding." Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces Its Limits, 269
SCIENCE 164, 168 (1995) (quoting Marcia Angell, Editor-in-Chief, New England Journal of
Medicine). "Robert Temple, director of drug evaluation at the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, puts it bluntly: 'My basic rule is if the relative risk isn't at least three or four, forget it.'"
Id.; see also Melissa Moore Thompson, Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic
Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 253, 289 (1992) (arguing that a strong association re-
quires a risk ratio of 8.0 or greater, though moderate associations between 3.0 and 8.0 could
suffice to show causation if coupled with other factors). For comparison, there is a strong
association, and therefore a long-recognized causal association, between bladder cancer and
occupational exposures to aromatic amino compounds used in dye and leather industries.
See Gold, supra note 5, at 399 n.116 (citing W.C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL CANCERS OF THE URINARY SYSTEM 119, 156 (1969)). Reported RRs found in
epidemiologic studies of workers exposed to these compounds have ranged from 30 to 47 in
earlier studies, and 8.7 to 17 in later studies (after improved production methods reduced
exposures). Id.
97. See Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1085 (N.J. 1992) ("The relative risk
of lung cancer in cigarette smokers as compared to nonsmokers is on the order of 10:1,
whereas the relative risk of pancreatic cancer is about 2:1. The difference suggests that ciga-
rette smoking is more likely to be a causal factor for lung cancer than for pancreatic
cancer."). The following example provides a brief explanation as to why a larger RR or OR
evinces causality:
Prospective [cohort] studies have shown that the death rate from lung cancer among
cigarette smokers is approximately 10 times the rate in non-smokers .... To account
for such a high relative risk in terms of an indirect association would require that an
unknown causal factor be present at least 10 times more frequently among smokers
... than among non-smokers. Such a confounding factor should be easily detectable,
and if it cannot be detected or reasonably inferred, the finding of such a strong asso-
ciation makes a conclusion concerning causality more probable.
SILVA, supra note 93, at 297.
98. Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931, 934-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Johns v.
Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986)).
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Recall that a relative risk of 1.0 means that that agent has no
effect on the incidence of disease. When the relative risk
reaches 2.0, the agent is responsible for an equal number of
cases of disease as all other background causes. Thus, a rela-
tive risk of 2.0 implies a 50% likelihood that an exposed
individual's disease was caused by the agent.%
Scientists use the concept of a "confidence interval" as the
means by which an epidemiologist can express statistical confi-
dence in a specific finding of relative risk. For instance, if the RR in
a study is found to be 2.0, the epidemiologist can use statistical
methods to estimate the range of numeric values above and below
2.0 in which RR would likely fall in numerous repeat studies.'00
"The width of the confidence interval provides an indication of the
precision of the point estimate or relative risk found in the study
.... ,,01 The confidence interval should be expressed with esti-
mated 95% accuracy, that is, as a range in which the RR will fall
ninety-five times out of one hundred replications of the study.""
99. 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.
(Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) ("For an epidemiological study to show cau-
sation under a preponderance standard, 'the relative risk of [the condition] arising from
the epidemiological data... will, at a minimum, have to exceed "2".'" (quoting DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3d Cir. 1990))); Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (arguing that relative risk of less
than 2.0 tends to disprove legal causation); Hal, 947 E Supp. at 1403 (requiring breast im-
plant plaintiffs to demonstrate that exposure to breast implants more than doubled the risks
of their injuries, which in epidemiologic terms requires a relative risk of more than 2.0.);
Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 E Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Md. 1986) ("[A risk ratio of two is]
an important showing for plaintiffs to make because it is the equivalent of the required legal
burden of proof-a showing of causation by the preponderance of the evidence."), aff'd sub
nomWheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 E2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987); Manko v. United States,
636 F. Supp. 1419, 1437 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (stating that exposure to a substance is "more
likely than not" a cause of the disease when the risk ratio is greater than two), aff'd in relevant
part, 830 E2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987); Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306, 308 (N.D. Cal.
1982) ("[A risk ratio of two would] sustain[] ... plaintiff's burden of proof on causation.").
It is important to understand that, while epidemiologic studies demonstrating relative risks
less than 2.0 may not be sufficient in some cases to reach a finding of specific causation,
such studies consistently showing a small but elevated relative risk may in the aggregate be
sufficient to establish general causation. See infa Part V.A.3. The association may be weak,
but still causal. Id.; see also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 718 (Tex.
1997) (recognizing that high relative risks do not prove causal associations, and low relative
risks do not disprove causal associations). In terms of the Bradford Hill Criteria, the "strong
association" criterion may be lacking if the epidemiology studies demonstrate relative risks
of less than 2.0. Such relative risks consistently found among exposed subjects across many
epidemiology studies, however, may satisfy the "consistency" criterion and help establish
general causation if the evidence fulfills other criteria.
100. REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 44, at 173.
101. Id.
102. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 91, at 757. One should not confuse the ninety-five
percent significance level with the plaintiffs burden of proof in a civil case.
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Many courts require that epidemiologic studies submitted in sup-
port of a claim of injury demonstrate statistically significant
results.'0 3
With regard to statistical significance, it is important to note that
there is an important difference between the standard practice in
epidemiology as compared with the standard practice in laboratory
sciences. Laboratory scientists routinely discuss non-statistical and
systematic errors in great detail, and usually provide a quantitative
measure of these errors in the confidence interval assigned to the
results. In contrast, epidemiologists may at times discuss non-
statistical errors in the text of published studies, but do not make
any quantitative estimates of the size of these errors. Thus, the "con-
fidence intervals" in epidemiology studies capture only random
A common error made by lawyers, judges, and academics is to equate the level of al-
pha[, the level of statistical significance,] with the legal burden of proof. Thus, one
will often see a statement that using an alpha of .05[, equal to a 95% confidence
limit,] for statistical significance imposes a burden of proof on the plaintiff far higher
than the civil burden of a preponderance of the evidence[, that is, greater than
50%].
This claim is incorrect, although the reasons are a bit complex and a full explanation
would require more space and detail than is feasible here. Nevertheless, we sketch
out a brief explanation. First, alpha does not address the likelihood that a plaintiffs
disease was caused by exposure to the agent; the magnitude of the association bears
on that question. Second, significance testing only bears on whether the observed
magnitude of association arose as a result of random chance, not on whether the null
hypothesis is true. Third, using stringent significance testing to avoid false positive er-
ror comes at a complementary cost of inducing false negative error. Fourth, using an
alpha of .5 would not be equivalent to saying that the probability the association
found is real is 50 percent, and the probability it is a result of random error is 50 per-
cent. Statistical methodology does not permit assessments of those probabilities.
Green et al., supra note 64, at 358 n.67 (citations omitted)
103. See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 284 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that drug com-
panies need not disclose isolated reports of illnesses suffered by users of its drugs until
reports provide statistically significant evidence of causal association); Boughton v. Cotter
Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 834-35, 835 n.20 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court's holding that
plaintiffs' fear of contracting cancer was not supported by evidence where epidemiology
study results did not reach statistical significance); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 911
F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (considering the fact that the scientific community declined to give
weight to statistically non-significant studies); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 E2d
307, 312-13 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting plaintiffs' claims due to the lack of statistical signifi-
cance in available epidemiology studies); Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d
1230, 1236 (W.D. Okla. 2000) (recognizing that plaintiffs' experts did not rely on epidemi-
ology studies showing statistically significant results); Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp.
1310 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that study results were not statistically significant and, there-
fore, could not support plaintiffs position that a chemical "more likely than not" promoted
his cancer), rev'd on other grounds, 78 F.3d 524 (1lth Cir. 1996), rev'd on othergrounds, 522 U.S.
136 (1997).
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errors due to the number of study subjects. The true confidence in-
terval, capturing all possible sources of systematic and random
errors, is much larger.104
A statistically significant association, even at the 95% confidence
level, does not prove that there is a true, causal association. The
association may be false, due to confounders or bias in the study.
10 5
Even if the association is true, it may not be causal. For example,
just because gray hair is associated with death rate does not mean
that gray hair causes death 6 Statistical significance tests the likeli-
hood that an RR above or below 1.0 likely represents an association
(ignoring bias, confounders, and other types of errors) or random
error.0 7 Even an RR that is statistically significant at the conven-
tional 95% confidence level does not prove a "true" association, let
alone causation. For example, an RR that is statistically significant
at the 95% confidence level will occur, due to chance alone, one
time out of every 20 statistical tests. A causation determination be-
gins with statistically significant findings and continues with
application of the remaining Bradford Hill criteria.
2. Temporal Relationship---Unlike the other Hill criteria, tempo-
rality is a prerequisite for a finding of causation. That is, unless the
exposure precedes the injury, there can be no causal link between
the exposure and the injury.0 8 On the other hand, the mere fact
that the injury follows the exposure is insufficient to establish a
causal link.1°
3. Consistency with Other Research-The validity of scientific con-
clusions is often based upon the replication of research findings.
Likewise, consistency among epidemiologic studies is an important
factor in making ajudgment about causation. As one scholar notes:
The need to replicate research findings permeates most fields
of science. In epidemiology, research findings often are repli-
cated in different populations. Consistency in these findings is
an important factor in making a judgment about causation.
104. See generally Alexander I. Shlyakhter, An Improved Framework for Uncertainty Analysis:
Accounting for Unsuspected Erro, 14 RiSK ANALYSIS 441 (1994) (quantifying overconfidence
in reliability of uncertainty estimates, and suggesting that estimated uncertainties be inflated
by default safety factors to account for unsuspected uncertainties).
105. Green et al., supra note 64, at 354-55.
106. Id. at 369.
107. Id. at 355-59.
108. Id. at 376 (citing Carroll v. Litton Sys., Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16833, at *29 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990)); see also SILVA, supra note 93, at 296 ("For an expo-
sure to be the cause of a disease, it has to precede its biological onset.").
109. See infra note 399 and accompanying text (discussing the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fal-
lacy).
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Different studies that examine the same exposure-disease re-
lationship generally should yield similar results. While
inconsistent results do not rule out a causal nexus, any incon-
sistencies signal a need to explore whether different results
can be reconciled with causality." °
"Repeated demonstration of an association of similar direction
and magnitude in several studies, undertaken by different investi-
gators in different population groups, increases confidence in a
genuine causal basis . . . ,11' Conversely, "[c]ausality can never be
inferred on the basis of one or even a handful of epidemiologic
studies .... Many courts require consistency among epidemiol-
ogy studies before opinions concerning causation based on these
studies can reach the jury.
1 1 3
4. Biological Plausibility--Does the theory that the agent can
cause the injury make biological sense? Biological plausibility of a
hypothetical causal relationship strengthens the inference that a
causal association exists. A known or generally accepted mecha-
nism by which the agent, at the doses in question, may cause the
injury is one factor favoring a causal link."4 Biological plausibility
may be based on the "analogy" argument that the agent at issue
causes a similar disease, or that a similar chemical causes the same
disease. "5 Such a plausibility argument, however, is not adequate to
110. Green et al., supra note 64, at 377-78 (citation omitted); see also SILVA, supra note
93, at 296 ("If similar results have been found in different populations using different study
designs, the association is more likely to be causal, since it is unlikely that all studies were
subject to the same type of bias and/or confounding.").
111. Adami & Trichopoulos, supra note 10, at 105.
112. Id.at 107.
113. Compare Cadarian v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 409, 412 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (holding a single Bendectin study insufficient to support an expert's opinion because
the study's authors concluded that the results could not be interpreted without independent
confirmatory evidence), with Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 580 F Supp. 890, 901 (N.D.
Iowa 1982) (noting the persuasive power of multiple independent studies, each of which
reached the same finding of an association between toxic shock syndrome and tampon use),
affd, 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983).
114. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 95 F Supp. 2d 1230, 1236 (W.D. Okla.
2000) (excluding expert's theory that drug caused plaintiffs stroke in part because expert's
theory of mechanism by which drug caused injury "was still only a hypothesis, as opposed to
scientific knowledge").
115. See, e.g., Ruffv. Ensign-Bickford Indus., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 (D. Utah 2001)
(finding admissible plaintiffs' causation expert's theory that 1,1-dimethylhydrazine and 1,2-
dimethylhydrazine are capable of causing non-Hodgkin's lymphoma in humans based in
part on a mouse study showing that a related compound, benzoylhydrazine, produced a
significant increase in lymphomas). For another type of analogy argument, see Maher v.
Quest Diagnostics, 847 A.2d 978 (Conn. 2004) (rejecting the lower court's opinion that the
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establish admissibility of causation testimony."6 Likewise, while
animal studies may provide evidence for the biological plausibility
that an agent can cause a disease in humans, animal studies alone
are generally insufficient evidence of causation in toxic tort cases.117
doubling time for the growth of breast cancer is a reliable indicator of the doubling time for
the growth of cervical cancer).
116. Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 603-09
(D.N.J. 2002) (holding medical expert's opinions inadmissible because he failed to explain
why he accorded weight to studies involving chemicals other than the chemical at issue, and
studies involving types of cancer other than plaintiffs type); Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that "plausibility" does not
equal "reliability," and the fact that aldehydes are skin irritants does not show that they can
cause respiratory diseases). But see Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 328
(Ill. 2002) (affirming admission of plaintiffs' experts' causation opinion based on a method
of "extrapolation" by which plaintiffs' causation experts concluded that subject agent likely
caused plaintiffs' rare form of cancer, even though science had not established a link be-
tween the agent and plaintiffs' cancer type, stating that "extrapolation offers those with a
rare disease the opportunity to seek a remedy for the wrong they have suffered").
117. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11 th Cir. 1999) (find-
ing inadequate the results of animal studies linking plaintiff's disease with breast implants
where more than twenty epidemiological studies failed to find a link); Conde v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding animal studies inadequate for show-
ing causation of diseases in humans); Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349,
1358-61 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding animal studies insufficient to allow a jury to find that a
drug caused birth defects); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir.
1989) (questioning the applicability of animal studies to humans); Int'l Union v. Pender-
grass, 878 F.2d 389, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Humans are not rats, and it is far from clear how
readily one may generalize from one mammalian species to another."); Gulf S. Insulation v.
U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1147 n.19 (5th Cir. 1983) (questioning
whether an effective dose in rats is the same in humans).
"[1Both quantitative and qualitative differences in response to toxic substances may occur
among different species." David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in
CASARETr AND DoULL's TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 11, 25 (Curtis D.
Klaassen ed., 6th ed. 2001). "For example, the LD50 [,which is the statistically derived single
dose of a substance that can be expected to cause death in fifty percent of the animals
tested,] for the highly toxic dioxin (TCDD) 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxin differs by
more than 1000-fold between guinea pigs and hamsters." Id. "Identifying the mechanistic
basis for species differences in response to chemicals is an important part of toxicology be-
cause only through a thorough understanding of these differences can the relevance of
animal data to human response be verified." Id.
Another example demonstrating the uncertainty of extrapolating from animal experi-
mentation to humans concerns the artificial sweetener saccharin. While saccharin is a weak
bladder carcinogen in male rats, it is not shown to cause bladder cancers in female rats or in
any other species. Samuel H. Cohen & Leon B. Ellwein, Risk Assessment Based on High-Dose
Animal Exposure Experiments, 5 CHEMICAL RES. ToxICOLOGY 742 (1992); G.P. Schoenig et al.,
Evaluation of the Dose-Response and in Utero Exposure to Saccharin in the Rat, 23 FOOD & CHEMI-
CAL TOXICOLOGY 475 (1985); S. Takayama et al., Long-term Feeding of Sodium Saccharin to
Nonhuman Primates: Implications for Urinary Tract Cancer, 90J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 19 (1998);
John Whysner & Gary M. Williams, Saccharin Mechanistic Data and Risk Assessment: Urine Com-
position, Enhanced Cell Proliferation, and Tumor Promotion, 71 PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS
225 (1996). Scientists have concluded that the bladder tumors seen in male rats are due to
two proteins in the urine of male rats not found in humans or other species-these proteins
react with high levels of saccharin to produce crystals that damage the bladders of male rats.
Samuel H. Cohen et al., A Proposed Role for Silicates and Protein in the Proliferative Effects of
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Animal experimentation can play a supporting role in the proof of
a causal link, but the party offering animal studies as causation evi-
dence must show that the animal data are relevant and that
extrapolation from animal data to human experience is reason-
able."8
5. Alternative Explanations--One must always evaluate whether
factors other than the agent at issue are responsible for the finding
of an association, including study errors, biases, confounders and
random chance. 9 Consideration of alternative explanations ap-
plies not only to the issue of general causation, but also to the issue
of specific causation. Failure to weigh alternative explanations for a
plaintiff's injury is proper grounds for excluding proffered specific
causation testimony.
2 0
6. Specifcity-It makes little sense to lump different diseases
into a single category for causation analysis. "Specificity" requires
that the specific disease ostensibly associated with a particular
agent must be a distinct disease entity for causation analysis pur-
poses. For example, in Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., the
decedent's widow blamed her husband's brain cancer on his occu-
pational exposures to ethylene oxide (EtO), a known carcinogen.
1 2
1
Pursuant to the FRE Rules 702 and 703, and Daubert, the trial court
barred the plaintiff's causation expert's opinion testimony linking
Saccharin on the Male Rat Urothelium, 12 CARCINOGENESIS 1551 (1991); Michael J. Olson et al.,
A Comparison of Male Rat and Human Urinary Proteins: Implications for Human Resistance to Hya-
line Droplet Nephropathy, 102 ToxICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOLOGY 524 (1990); Joanne
Zurlo & Robert A. Squire, Is Saccharin Safe?Animal Testing Revisited, 90J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
2 (1998). Given this mechanistic theory and the inability of saccharin to produce bladder
cancers in female rats and other species, the male rat studies would be an unreliable foun-
dation for an opinion that saccharin consumption caused a claimant's bladder cancer.
118. See, e.g., In rePaoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[I]n or-
der for animal studies to be admissible to prove causation in humans, there must be good
grounds to extrapolate from animals to humans, just as the methodology of the studies must
constitute good grounds to reach conclusions about the animals themselves."); Hollander, 95
F. Supp. 2d at 1238-39 ("Although animal studies can contribute to an expert's scientific
conclusions as to causation, the court finds that the animal studies on which the plaintiffs'
experts rely are too dissimilar to the facts presented in this litigation to be reliable.");
Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (D. Md. 1986) ("There is a range of
scientific methods for investigating questions of causation-for example, toxicology and
animal studies, clinical research, and epidemiology-which all have distinct advantages and
disadvantages."), aff'd sub nom. Wheelahan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 814 E2d 655 (4th Cir. 1987).
119. Green et al., supra note 64, at 354, 374.
120. See infra Part VIII.D.3.f (discussing the importance of alternative causation and
Bayesian analysis in the context of a Daubert challenge to proffered expert specific causation
testimony).
121. 102 F.3d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the exposure to the disease. 122 The appellate court affirmed be-
cause, among other reasons, there was no evidence that EtO causes
brain cancer.1 2 3 "Evidence has been found that suggests a connec-
don between EtO exposure and human lymphatic and
hematopoietic cancers, but this is not probative on the causation of
brain cancer."
124
The benzene-leukemia link provides an important example of
the need for specificity in causation analysis. It is now evident that
the disease known as "leukemia" is in fact several distinct malig-
nancies. 125 To say "benzene causes leukemia" is not much more
meaningful than to say "benzene causes cancer." In fact, there is
evidence that benzene exposures increase the risk of one type of
leukemia (acute myeloid leukemia [AML]) but not other cell spe-
cific types of leukemia. 2 6 Most courts recognize that the different
122. Id.
123. Id. at 197.
124. Id.; see also Burleson v. Glass, 268 E Supp. 2d 699, 707 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (granting
defendant's motion to exclude expert's causation testimony in part because the relied-on
epidemiological literature found an association between the subject exposure and liver,
spleen, and bone cancers, but not the type of cancers-lung and throat-from which plain-
tiff suffered); Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (excluding expert's
opinion that decedent's occupational exposures caused his squamous cell carcinoma be-
cause none of the published studies on which the expert relied linked the alleged exposures
with decedent's type of cancer); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347,
1352 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("There is no 'fit' where there is 'simply too great [an] analytical gap
between the data and the opinion offered,' as when an expert offers animal studies showing
one type of cancer in laboratory mice to support causation of another type of cancer in
humans." (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997))). But see Roberti v.
Andy's Termite & Pest Control, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827, 828 & n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
("For purposes of this opinion, we conclude it makes no difference whether plaintiff suffers
from autism as opposed to brain damage, etc. Our conclusion would be the same regardless
of the precise label applied to his condition.").
125. Martha S. Linet & Raymond A. Cartwright, The Leukemias, in CANCER EPIDEMIOL-
OGY AND PREVENTION 841, 841 (David Schottenfeld & Joseph F. Fraumeni, Jr. eds., 2d ed.
1996); John N. Lukens, Classification and Differentiation of the Acute Leukemias, in 2 WIN-
TROBE'S CLINICAL HEMATOLOGY 1873, 1873 (G. Richard Lee et al. eds., 9th ed. 1993); Eleni
Petridou & Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Leukemias, in TEXTBOOK OF CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY 556,
556-57 (Hans-Olov Adami eta!. eds., 2002).
126. L. Brandt et al., Occupational Exposure to Petroleum Products in Men with Acute Non-
Lymphocytic Leukaemia, 1 BRIT.J. MED. 555 (1978); Richard D. Irons et al., Synergistic Action of
the Benzene Metabolite, Hydroquinone, On Myelopoietic Stimulation Activity of Granulocyte Macro-
phage Colony Stimulation Factor in Vitro, 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sc. 3691 (1992); M.S. Linet et
al., Comparison of Methods for Determining Occupational Exposure in a Case-Control Interview Study
of Chronic Lymphocytic Leukaemia, 29 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 136 (1987); KE. Malone et al.,
Chronic Lymphocytic Leukaemia in Relation to Chemical Exposure, 130 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1152
(1989); PA. McKinney et al., Chronic Myeloid Leukaemia in Yorkshire: A Case-Control Study, 83
ACTA HAEMATOLOGICA 35 (1990); Otto Wong & G.K. Raabe, Cell-Type-Specific Leukemia Analy-
ses in a Combined Cohort of More Than 208,000 Petroleum Workers in the United States and the
United Kingdom, 1937-1989, 21 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 307 (1995); Otto Wong
et al., Health Effects of Gasoline Exposure. II Mortality Patterns of Distribution Workers in the United
States, 101 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 63 (Supp. 6 1993).
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types of leukemia are distinct diseases. Lumping the leukemias
together for causation analysis may mask or underestimate the in-
creased risk of AML due to benzene exposure, or may lead to the
erroneous conclusion that benzene exposure increases the risk of
all leukemias when, in fact, it increases only the risk of AML (and
perhaps other distinct types). Specificity prevents these analytical
errors.
7. Dose-Response Relationship--A dose-response relationship
demonstrates a direct relationship between the level of exposure
and the risk of disease. This criterion recognizes a basic premise of
toxicology: the resultant injury depends on the dose of the agent
received.1 8 In epidemiologic terms, this means that for a causal
relationship, the Odds Ratio (OR) or Relative Risk (RR) of an in-
jury must increase with increasing exposure. 2 9 Associations that
demonstrate dose-response gradients are powerful indicators of
causal relationships. In contrast, so-called "ecological studies,"
which collect data about a group as a whole (e.g., "railroad work-
ers") without regard to varying exposures among the group
members, are regarded as "weak indicators of general causation.'
130
Related to the concept of a dose-response relationship is the
concept of a "threshold dose." The "threshold" or "no effect level"
is the level of exposure below which the toxic substance does not
127. See, e.g., Austin v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 25 S.W.3d 280, 288-92 (Tex. App. 2000)
(upholding exclusion of plaintiff's expert's testimony that benzene caused decedent's
chronic myelogenous leukemia because expert lacked evidence that benzene causes CML);
see also Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1999); Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81
F. Supp. 2d 661 (M.D. La. 2000).
128. The dose-response relationship "is the most fundamental and pervasive concept in
toxicology." Eaton & Klaassen, supra note 117, at 18; see also Newman v. Motorola Inc., No.
02-2424, 2003 WL 22407265 (4th Cir. Oct. 22, 2003) (affirming trial court's exclusion of
expert's opinion that cellular phone use caused plaintiff's brain cancer because, among
other things, the expert's evidence "failed to demonstrate a dose-response relationship; that
is, it failed to show that with a greater use of cellular phones, a person faces a greater risk of
developing a tumor").
129. There are two types of dose-response relationships: that which applies to the re-
sponses of an individual to varying doses of a toxin, and that which applies to the
distribution of responses to varying doses of a toxin administered to a population of individu-
als. Eaton & Klaassen, supra note 117, at 18. Since epidemiology addresses the issue of
general causation, it is the population dose-response relationship that is of interest at this
point. In contrast, the individual dose-response relationship is of interest in the context of
specific causation.
130. Green et al., supra note 64, at 344; see also SILVA, supra note 93, at 250 ("Ecological
studies are frequently used as a first step in investigating a possible exposure-outcome rela-
tionship, because they can be performed quickly and inexpensively by using readily available
information."); id. at 299 ("Ecological studies per se can show associations, but because of
their great potential for confounding they can never be used to establish causation at an
individual level.").
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exhibit a toxic effect, or at least does not exert a clinical effect.
Courts require the plaintiffs' experts to demonstrate that the plain-
tiff was exposed at a level greater than the threshold dose."' For
example, in Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the plaintiff's ex-
pert toxicologist opined that the defendant's paints caused the
plaintiff's asthma.1 32 While the toxicologist identified several com-
ponents of the paints that were known respiratory irritants, he
provided no information as to how much of the particular compo-
nents the plaintiff was exposed. Likewise, he failed to "provide any
quantification to substantiate in scientific terms what level of expo-
sure would have been sufficient to cause asthma in the plaintiff or
anyone else." 133 The court granted the defendant's motion to ex-
clude the plaintiffs toxicology evidence, stating:
Plaintiffs cite no authority for the propositions that irritating
chemicals in latex paints become bioavailable in relevant
amounts, that actual exposure levels from any particular uses
of latex paint are high enough to cause any reaction, that pro-
longed, unspecified low level exposure to irritants can cause
asthma, or that latex paints generally (or these paints in par-
ticular) cause asthma.m
131. To be precise, "dose" and "exposure" are related, but not identical. Dose is the
amount of the agent that enters the body from the external environment. Eaton & Klaassen,
supra note 117, at 13. In contrast, exposure considers both: 1) the level or concentration of
the agent in environmental media (for example, the concentration of a chemical in air or
water) with which the body comes in contact (via inhalation, skin contact, or ingestion); and
2) the duration of contact with the agent in the environment. Id. at 14. The dose received by
the body depends to a great degree on the exposure. Id. In epidemiologic studies, rarely, if
ever, are the actual doses known, so epidemiologists use exposures as a surrogate for doses.
SeeAmorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 E Supp. 2d 147, 169 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[i]t
is accepted practice in epidemiology and toxicology to measure dose in terms of ambient
concentration in cases ... where the study subjects' actual body burdens of the chemical in
question have not or cannot be measured at the time of exposure." (citing ENVIRONMENTAL
& OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 40 (William N. Rom ed., 3d ed. 1998) ("In most cases, doses
and dose rates cannot be measured directly, and surrogate measures must be developed
from data on exposures observed in the environment external to the worker. Exposure con-
centration or intensity is used as a surrogate for dose rate .... ))), affd, 303 F.3d 256 (2d
Cir. 2002).
132. 936 F. Supp. 900, 902 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
133. Id. at 904.
134. Id. at 905; see also Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., No. 00-5507, 2002 WL
22000 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2002) (excluding proffered causation testimony by plaintiff's expert
because he failed to ascertain the plaintiffs exposure level and failed to determine the level
of exposure necessary to cause harm); Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 E3d 778, 781 (10th Cir.
1999) ("In order to carry [her] burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate 'the levels of exposure
that are hazardous to human beings generally as well as the plaintiffs actual level of expo-
sure to the defendant's toxic substance before he or she may recover.'" (quoting Wright v.
Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 E3d 1105, 1106 (8th Cir. 1996))); Allen v. Pa. Eng'g Corp., 102
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8. Cessation of Exposure-Data demonstrating that elimination of
exposure reduces the incidence of disease are strong evidence of a
causal association. For many exposure-disease investigations,
136
however, intervening to remove the exposure is impossible.
F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a
chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts
necessary to sustain the plaintiffs' burden in a toxic tort case." (citing Wright, 91 F.3d at
1107)); Wright, 91 F.3d at 1107-08 (citing Abuan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 3 F3d 329, 332-34 (9th
Cir. 1993)) (requiring plaintiff in a toxic tort case to prove levels of exposure that are haz-
ardous to human beings generally, as well as plaintiff's actual exposure); Abuan, 3 F.3d at 333
("In cases claiming personal injury from exposures to toxic substances, it is essential that the
plaintiff demonstrate that she was, in fact, exposed to harmful levels of such substances." (quot-
ing Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 E. Supp. 1528, 1533 (D. Kan. 1990) (emphasis added
by the court))); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114-15 (5th Cir.
1991) (excluding expert's opinion that was based on insufficient data regarding level and
duration of exposure to harmful agent); Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., No. 98 CIV.
7126(RPP), 2002 WL 140542 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2002) (holding that without information
relating to decedent's occupational exposures to toxins, plaintiffs causation expert could
not form a scientifically reliable opinion); Current v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., No. W-00-CV-
332, 2001 WL 1875950 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2001) (affirming summary judgment for defen-
dant because, among other reasons, plaintiffs medical expert lacked reliable evidence of
the plaintiff's level of exposure to arsenic); Aldridge v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1010, 1023-24 (D. Md. 1999) (citing Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 E Supp. 756, 760-
61 (E.D. Va. 1995)) (finding it critical that a causation expert testify as to the threshold level
required to cause particular effect), aff'd in relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996); Sta-
sior v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding inadmissible
an ergonomist's testimony due in part to the fact that he did not determine a safe level of
wrist flexion or repetition relative to carpal tunnel injury); Schmaltz v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
878 F. Supp. 1119, 1122 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment where expert was unaware of plaintiffs exposure levels); Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 832 F. Supp. 341, 345-46 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (barring causation testimony because ex-
pert did not know at what dosage Vitamin A is unsafe for pregnant women, and did not
know mother's dose); O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1396
(C.D. Ill. 1992) (excluding causation testimony of plaintiffs treating physician who failed to
take plaintiff's radiation dose into account), affd, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994); Mateer v.
U.S. Aluminum, No. Civ. A 88-2147, 1989 WL 60442, at *8 (E.D. Pa.June 6, 1989) (granting
summary judgment in defendants' favor because plaintiffs' experts failed to describe the
plaintiffs' dosages and the level of exposure hazardous to humans); Cerna v. S. Fla. Bioavail-
ability Clinic, Inc., 815 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("Extrapolating from such [in
vitro] studies in order to opine on [the drug] erythromycin's effects on humans at normal
dosages and normal pH conditions is not methodologically sound or accepted."); Christian
v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 607 (Okla. 2003) ("[An expert's testimony] should reveal a reliable
method for determining the quantity of the toxin necessary to cause injuries of the type
experienced by plaintiff (general causation), unless plaintiff can show that the circum-
stances are such that general causation should not be necessary.").
The proffered exposure estimates need not be scientifically exacting, only reliable using
accepted methods. See discussion infra note 370; see also Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing
Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that industrial hygienist's use of
"odor threshold test" to estimate plaintiffs exposures to solvent is not the most reliable
method, but it is a generally accepted method to determine air levels of contaminants in
absence of air sampling data).
135. Green et al., supra note 64, at 378.
136. SiLvA, supra note 93, at 298.
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9. Consistency with Other Knowledge-This final criterion, some-
times termed "coherence,' 37 directs the researcher to step back
and consider whether other evidence exists to support or under-
mine a finding of a causal association. For example, the finding in
national statistics that lung cancer rates increased after an increase
in tobacco consumption buttresses the view that cigarette smoking
causes lung cancer.M By contrast, a decline in the number of
smokers in recent years, and improvements in air quality in the
United States over the last three decades, undermines the view that
smoking or air pollution is responsible for either the nationwide
increase in numbers of asthematics or for an increase in aggrava-
tion of asthmatic symptoms."'
137. See Anorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 E Supp. 2d 147, 168 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (noting that coherence criterion asks: "Is the association consistent with what is
known of the natural history and biology of the disease?"), affd, 303 E3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).
This concept of coherence can also apply to specific causation analysis. E.g., Medalen v.
Tiger Drylac, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Minn. 2003). In Medalen, the court found incoher-
ence in the alleged association between the plaintiff's skin cancer and her occupational
exposure to powdered coatings. Id. at 1132. The plaintiffs causation expert failed to explain
why the plaintiff's cancer appeared on her nose, which was covered and unexposed to the
powder, and not on exposed skin, such as her hands. Id. At bottom, coherence is applied
common sense.
138. Green et al., supra note 64, at 378-79. Similarly, the spread of HIV infections may
help explain the extraordinary increase in the rates of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL). In
1950, the United States mortality rate for NHL was 2.9 deaths per 100,000 population; by
1990, the rate more than doubled to 6.3 deaths per 100,000 population. Paul A. Scherr &
Nancy E. Mueller, Non-Hodgkin's Lymphomas, in CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION,
supra note 125, at 920, 922. NHL is prevalent among immunosuppressed persons. Id. at 925-
26. "NHL[s] are the most frequent opportunistic malignancies seen in HIV-I-infected per-
sons." Id. at 927. These data support the inference of a causal association between HIV
infection and NHL.
139. Between 1980 and 1995, the overall rate of asthma increased seventy-five percent
in the United States. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Surveillance for Asthma-
United States, 1960-1995, 47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (1998). In comparison,
over the same period the adult smoking rate decreased from 33.2% to 24.7%, a 25% drop.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PERCENTAcE OF ADULTS WHO WERE
CURRENT, FORMER, OR NEVER SMOKERS: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEYS, SELECTED
YEaRs-UNITED STATES, 1965-2000, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/researchdata/adults_
prev/adstatl.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2005). Moreover, air quality has improved in recent
years. The Environmental Protection Agency reports that particulates like soot and dust
have decreased 22% between 1988 and 1995 and that sulfur dioxide concentrations have
dropped by 60% since 1970. Ronald Bailey, Asthma Attack: The Unexpected Cause of a New Epi-
demic, REASON ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2001, http://www.reason.com/rb/rb010301.shtml. As one
researcher stated: "Like most people, I assumed tobacco smoke and pollution were the
problem-this was the politically correct way to think. But these factors turned out not to
play a major role. In high-pollution areas, in low-pollution areas, among all ethnic groups,
there was asthma. Clearly, something else was involved." Ellen Ruppel Shell, Does Civilization
Cause Asthma, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2000, at 94 (quoting Fernando Martinez). Thus, the




The "attributable risk" (AR) is the proportion of disease in a
population theoretically caused by exposure to a certain agent.
One scholar notes:
A frequently used measurement of risk is the attributable risk
(AR). The attributable risk represents the amount of disease
among exposed individuals that can be attributed to the ex-
posure. It can also be expressed as the proportion of the
disease among exposed individuals that is associated with the
exposure (also called the "attributable proportion of risk," the
"etiologic fraction" or "attributable risk percent"). The attrib-
utable risk reflects the maximum proportion of the disease
that can be attributed to exposure to an agent and conse-
quently the maximum proportion of disease that could be
potentially prevented by blocking the effect of the exposure
or by eliminating the exposure. In other words, if the associa-
tion is causal, the attributable risk is the proportion of disease
in an exposed population that might be caused by the agent
and that might be prevented by eliminating exposure to that
agent.
To determine the proportion of a disease that is attributable to
an exposure, a researcher would need to know the incidence of the
disease in the exposed group and the incidence of disease in the
unexposed group. The attributable risk is:
AR = (incidence in exposed persons) - (incidence in nonexposed persons) 
140
(incidence in exposed persons)
The AR is the proportion of disease cases induced by the agent in
the total number of disease cases.1 4' For example, suppose that the
incidence of the subject disease among the exposed group is seven
7 out of 100 persons, while the incidence among the unexposed
group is five 5 out of 100 persons. The AR is: (7 - 5)/ 7 = 0.29.142
140. Green et al., supra note 64, at 351-52 (citations omitted).
141. This definition of AR assumes that the greater incidence of disease in the exposed
group is a consequence of the exposure and not due to some (confounding) characteristic
that differentiates "exposed" and "unexposed" populations, aside from the exposure itself.
142. Alternatively, one can calculate the AR by using the RR or OR found in an epide-
miology study rather than the raw numbers of diseased persons in the exposed and
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This means that, in theory, 29% of those exposed incurred the dis-
ease because of the exposure to the subject agent, and 71% of those
exposed incurred the disease for other reasons.
C. Epidemiology of Cancer
The quantitative knowledge available concerning exposure to
various agents and cancer is quite good in some cases, while in
other cases it is not.4 3 In their seminal work addressing the causes
of cancer in America, Doll and Peto made their best estimate,
based on epidemiologic evidence, of the proportion of cancers
caused by various factors. The following table, a modification of
Table 20 in Doll and Peto's book, 144 summarizes their findings.
PERCENT OF CANCER DEATHS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
VARIOUS DIFFERENT FACTORS
PERCENT or ALL CANCER DEATHS





Food Additives <1 -5-2
unexposed groups. The proportion of risk of disease (RR) or death (OR) in the exposed
population due to the exposure is:
AR = (RR- 1) / RR; orAR= (OR- 1) / OR.
Green et al., supra note 64, at 351-52.
143. RICHARD DOLL & RICHARD PETO, THE CAUSES OF CANCER, at Preface (1981).
144. Id. at 1256. Prior to the publication of Doll and Peto's work, other respected can-
cer scientists allocated cancer incidences among various causes as best they could. Their
estimates are surprisingly consistent with those of Doll and Peto's. See John Higginson &
Calum S. Muir, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Misconceptions and Limitations to Cancer Contro4 63
J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1291 (1979); Ernest L. Wynder & Gio B. Gori, Contributions of the
Environment to Cancer Incidence: An Epidemiologic Exercise, 58 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 825
(1977); see also ROBERT LICHTER & STANLEY ROTHMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER-A PO-
LITICAL DISEASE? 61-63 (1999) (summarizing and comparing the estimates of Doll & Peto,
Wynder & Gori, and Higginson & Muir).
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FACTOR OF CLASS BEST ESTIMATE RANGE OF ACCEPTABLE
OF FACTOR ESTIMATES




Industrial Products <1 <1-2
Medicines and Medical 1 0.5-3
Procedures
Geophysical Factors 3 2-4
Infection 10(?) 1-?
Unknown ? ?
More recently, researchers have recognized that cancer is an un-
avoidable risk. Common elements such as background
radioactivity, errors in DNA synthesis, free radicals produced in
metabolism, and normal hormones all contribute to cancer risk.
145
For the U.S. population, the baseline risk of developing cancer
sometime during life is almost one in two (proportion of cancer
incidence in males is 0.43; in females, it is 0.38). The DNA damage
that inevitably accumulates over a lifetime is the probable cause of
the vast majority of human cancers. In fact, the risk factor for can-
cer that overwhelms all other risk factors is age. 146 Still, Doll and
Peto's estimates remain a fair base on which to ground cancer cau-
sation analysis.
For the purposes of this Article, we have chosen to focus on can-
cers associated with occupational exposures, often the subject of
toxic tort claims. As seen in the table above, Doll and Peto estimate
that occupational exposures cause four percent of all cancers.147
145. Brian E. Henderson et al., Toward the Primary Prevention of Cancer, 254 SCIENCE 1131
(1991).
146. L.A.G. RIES ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, PUB. No. 99-2789, SURVEILLANCE Epi-
DEMIOLOGY AND END RESULTS: SEER CANCER STATISTICS REVIEW, 1973-1996, at 39, 63-66
(1999).
147. Now, more than two decades after Peto and Doll published their comprehensive
study, their estimate that four percent of cancers are attributable to occupational exposures
is probably high. Henry C. Pitot III & Yvonne P. Dragan, Chemical Carcinogenesis, in CASARETr
AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS, supra note 117, at 241, 284 ("In
regard to the general causative relationship between exposure to chemicals in the workplace
and the development of human cancer, Doll and Peto (1981) have presented a compelling
argument that only about 4 percent of all cancer deaths in the United States can be attrib-
uted to occupational circumstances. With strict government regulation of actual and
PERCENT OF ALL CANCER DEATHS
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Based on this estimate, and without further information, a claim
that occupational exposures caused a person's cancer would have
to be supported by causation testimony with sufficient specificity to
identify more than 96% of all cancers that are not caused by occu-
pational exposures; that is, where x = 0.04. Applying the formula
derived in Section IV:
Required Specificity = (1 - 2x) / (1 - x) = 0.92 / 0.96 - 0.96.
There is always, however, additional information. Most conspicu-
ous is the particular type of cancer at issue. In a toxic tort case
involving cancer, the plaintiff will claim that a particular agent or
group of agents caused the particular type of cancer at issue. Some
types of cancer are more closely associated with occupational expo-
sures than other types. Indeed, Doll and Peto estimated the
percentage of certain cancers ascribable to occupational exposures:148
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF CERTAIN CANCERS
ASCRIBABLE TO OCCUPATION
TYPE OF No. DEATHS CANCER DEATHS ASCRIBED TO OCCUPATIONAL
CANCER IN 1978 HAZARDS IN 1978 UNITED STATES
MALE FEMALE MALE % FEMALE %
DEATHS ASCRIBED DEATHS ASCRIBED
ASCRIBED ASCRIBED
Mesentery 652 697 98 15 35 5
and
peritoneum
Liver and 1,812 984 72 4 10 1
Intrahepatic
bile ducts
Larynx 2,909 550 58 2 6 1
Lung 71,006 24,080 10,651 15 1,204 5







Bone 997 740 40 4 7 1
Skin other 1,061 753 106 .10 15 2
than
melanoma
Prostate 21,674 - 217 1
potential industrial health hazards during the last two decades, it is likely that this figure will
decrease even further in the future.").
148. DOLL & PETO, supra note 143, at 1244 tbl.19.
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TYPE OF No. DEATHS CANCER DEATHS ASCRIBED TO OCCUPATIONAL
CANCER IN 1978 HAZARDS IN 1978 UNITED STATES
MALE FEMALE MALE % FEMALE %
DEATHS ASCRIBED DEATHS ASCRIBED
ASCRIBED ASCRIBED
Bladder 6,771 3,078 677 10 154 5
Leukemia 8,683 6,708 868 10 335 5
Other & 15,445 14,821 1,045 6.8 185 1.2
Unspecified I
Doll and Peto estimated that the total effect of occupational fac-
tors (U.S., 1978) was for males, 14,777 / 218,337 = 6.77%; and for
females, 2,292 / 183,618 = 1.25% . More recent estimates of can-
cer risks indicate that occupational exposures may cause 5% of all
cancers in the U.S.
150
VI. APPLICATION OF EPIDEMIOLOGIC DATA AND BAYES'
LAW IN Toxic TORT CASES
As stated, epidemiology addresses the issue of general causa-
tion-that is, whether the agent at issue is capable of causing
disease. 51 It follows that epidemiologic studies are relevant evi-
dence of causation in toxic tort cases in which general causation is
at issue. 52 But the use of epidemiologic studies in legal cases often
goes beyond establishing general causation. In some circum-
stances, the calculated Attributable Risk (AR) as determined in
epidemiologic studies can provide a measure of the likelihood that
149. Id.; see also ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CASES
AND MATERIALS 378-79 (2d ed. 1985) (reporting that man-made carcinogens may cause less
than eight percent of cancer deaths in the United States); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second
Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 295-97
(1985) (citing a study concluding that, except for tobacco-induced cancers, the risk of can-
cer in the United States is holding steady despite an influx of chemical and industrial
hazards).
150. Harvard Center for Cancer Prevention, Harvard School of Public Health, Harvard
Report on Cancer Prevention: Vol 1: Causes of Human Cancer, 7 CANCER CAUSES & CONTROL S3,
S55-S58 (Supp. 1996).
151. See Brennan, supra note 6, at 512 ("Epidemiology makes statements only about the
group, not the individual. Individual attribution involves uncertainty, because the epidemi-
ological data produce only summary statistics applicable to the sample or to the population
the sample represents.").
152. Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 66, at 445-46 ("Although the epidemiological study
by itself does not conclusively show that an individual plaintiff's injury was caused by expo-
sure to a particular chemical, it is at least relevant circumstantial evidence, showing the
probability of a relationship between the chemical in question and the injury." (citing Grin-
nell v. Pfizer & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969))).
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the exposures at issue caused the particular plaintiffs injury (spe-
cific causation).
Suppose that a male claimant sought workers' compensation for
his lung cancer, which he claims resulted from his on-the-job expo-
sure to diesel exhaust. Doll and Peto's estimated base rate
(designated "percent ascribed" in the table above) for occupa-
tional lung cancer among males with lung cancer is 15%. Given
this base rate, the claimant's medical expert would have to demon-
strate that the causation analysis has sufficient specificity to identify
eighty-two percent of nonoccupational lung cancers, absent more
detailed information concerning exposure levels and attendant
ARs among persons so exposed. 15 4 There often is additional infor-
mation available, however, allowing experts to refine the AR for
those exposed to the subject agent.
Arguably, benzene is the most thoroughly studied of all potential
occupational carcinogens.' One extensively studied and quanti-
fied exposure-effect relationship is the benzene-leukemia link and,
153. Required Specificity = (1 - 2x) / (1 - x) = 0.7 / 0.85 =_ 0.82. For a discussion and
derivation of the formula used to determine the required specificity, see supra Part IV.
154. Doll and Peto suspect that their estimate of occupational lung cancer risk may be
"a little high." DOLL & PETO, supra note 143, at 1244.
155. Benzene has received intense scrutiny because it is an economically important
chemical that is associated with a dreadful human health effect: leukemia. Assessment of the
leukemogenic risk of benzene became particularly important following Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, in which the United States Supreme Court
overturned the 1978 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) revised ben-
zene standard on the ground that OSHA had not demonstrated that benzene exposure in
compliance with the previous benzene standard presented a significant risk of leukemia. 448
U.S. 607 (1980). That decision spawned extensive research on the quantitative assessment of
benzene exposure risk. See, e.g., KENNY S. CRUMP & BRUCE C. ALLEN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
& HEALTH ADMIN., DOCKET H-059B, QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES OF RISK OF LEUKEMIA FROM
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO BENZENE Exhibit 152 (1984); D. GILBERT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CONTRACT 68-01-5949, AN EXPOSURE AND RISK ASSESSMENT FOR BENZENE (1982);
Harland Austin et al., Benzene and Leukemia: A Review of the Literature and a Risk Assessment, 127
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 419 (1988); Susan M. Brett et al., Review and Update of Leukemia Risk
Potentially Associated with Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 267
(1989); Daniel M. Byrd & Elizabeth T. Barfield, Empirical Degree-Of Belief Methods for Risk As-
sessments Based on Epidemiology Data: Application of a Procedure for Combinational Analysis of Risk-
Related Components to a Series of Occupational Studies of Leukemia Incidence Associated with Benzene
Exposure at Several Rubber Hydrochloride Plants in Ohio, in RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MAN-
AGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 209 (C. Richard Cothern et al.
eds., 1988); Robert A. Rinsky et al., Benzene and Leukemia: An Epidemiologic Risk Assessment, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1044 (1987) [hereinafter Rinsky et al., Risk Assessment]; Robert A. Rinsky
et al., Leukemia in Benzene Workers, 2 AM.J. INDUS. MED. 217 (1981); Mary C. White et al., A
Quantitative Estimate of Leukemia Mortality Associated with Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 2
RISK ANALYSIS 195 (1982). Quantitative risk assessment since has become the standard
method used by regulatory agencies to estimate the risk of cancer presented by environ-
mental or industrial exposures to the regulated agent. Steven H. Lamm et al., Consistencies
and Inconsistencies Underlying the Quantitative Assessment of Leukemia Risk from Benzene Exposure,
82 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 289, 289 (1989).
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more particularly, acute myeloid leukemia (AML) .156 We can use
the benzene-AML association in an example analysis to demon-
strate the impact of Bayes' Law on the reliability of causation
analyses.
In one epidemiologic study ("Rinsky Study") ,1 the authors at-
tempted to reconstruct the cohort's benzene exposures and, based
on these calculated exposures, estimate the risk of contracting leu-
kemia per unit cumulative exposure of benzene as measured in
parts per millionoyears (ppmeyrs). The authors derived the follow-
ing formula for determining the Odds Ratio (OR) of contracting
leukemia:
O -- e (0 .0 12 6 . ppm.yrs)
ORe
Based on the formula in the Rinsky Study, one can calculate the
Odds Ratio for any given cumulative benzene exposure. Then, hav-
ing derived the Odds Ratio for contracting leukemia at the given
exposure level, one can determine the level of specificity required
for a causation analysis to achieve a 50% predictive value.
For example, assume that the plaintiff alleges that occupational
exposure to benzene caused his AML. Assume further that the best
estimate of the plaintiff's daily occupational exposure to benzene is
1 ppm, 8-hour time-weighted average, which equals the current
permissible exposure limit (PEL) for benzene established by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).158 Finally,
assume that the plaintiff was so exposed during his 20-year career,
resulting in an estimated cumulative benzene exposure of 20
ppmeyrs. According to the Rinsky Study, the Odds Ratio for those
in the plaintiffs exposure class is:
OR = e °'126"20) = 1.29.
An Odds Ratio of 1.29 means that the proportion of the leuke-
mias in persons so exposed attributable to benzene exposure (that
is, the Attributable Risk, or AR) is:
156. See id. at 290 ("Clinical and epidemiologic evidence consistently indicate that acute
myeloid leukemia (AML) and its variants (alternatively called acute nonlymphocytic leuke-
mias, or ANLL) can be caused by benzene exposure. While some studies have implicated
other types of leukemia or even lymphomas, only AML and its variants have consistently
been seen in excess in groups of workers with excess benzene exposure.").
157. Rinsky et al,, Risk Assessment, supra note 155.
158. 29 C.ER. § 1910.1028 (2004).
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AR = (1.29 - 1) / 1.29 = 0.22, or 22%.
Since 22% of the persons with leukemia who are exposed to a
cumulative exposure of 20 ppmeyrs are (in theory) attributable to
the benzene exposure, the causation analysis must have the follow-
ing specificity to achieve a predictive value of 0.5:
Required Specificity = 1 - 2(0.22) / (1 - 0.22) = 0.72.
In this hypothetical, the plaintiffs causation experts must dem-
onstrate that their methods have sufficient specificity to identify in
this exposure population more than 72% of AMLs in the benzene-
exposed population that are not benzene-induced (that is, less
than 28% "false negatives") to achieve reliability greater than 50%.
Since the exposure itself does not establish causation within a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty (that is, more likely than not),
the plaintiffs causation expert must be able to establish causation
by considering factors other than exposure. Failure to evaluate al-
ternative explanations for the plaintiff's leukemia weakens the
specificity of the plaintiffs proffered causation analysis by increas-
ing the probability of "false positives."
VII. SEQUENTIAL UNCERTAINTIES
As in other negligence cases, a toxic tort plaintiff bears the bur-
den to prove "an unbroken causal connection between the alleged
negligent act and the injuries suffered."'59 There are several links in
the causal chain leading from an alleged exposure to the alleged
injury:
1. Whether the person in fact has the alleged injury;
2. Whether the agent is capable of causing the injury;
3. Whether the person was exposed to the agent at a
sufficient level to cause the injury;
4. Whether the injury arose after the person received
an etiologically significant dose of the agent; and
5. Whether the causation analysis attained the specific-
ity required to identify the agent as the probable
cause of the injury.




The uncertainties attending each of these steps decrease the
overall probability that the exposure in fact caused the person's
injury. To the extent that these factors are independent, the likeli-
hood that all factors are true equals the product of the
probabilities of each factor.60 This "product rule" is sometimes
called sequential uncertainties.
The product rule is a special case of conditional probabilities
that give rise to Bayes' Law. Recall the definition of Predictive
Value discussed in Section II. In the context of a medical test used
to indicate the presence of a disease, the predictive value is the
proportion of positive test results that are true positives:
true positive
test result
Predictive Value = total number of
positive test results
In terms of conditional probabilities, this equation is:
P(HIE) = P(H&E) / P(E),
where P(HIE) is the predictive value, or probability that the hy-
pothesis is true (that is, the person has the disease), given the
evidence of a positive test; P(H&E) is the probability that the indi-
vidual has the disease and the test is positive (that is, the
probability of a true positive); and P(E) is the probability of a posi-
tive test, given P(H) as the probability that an untested individual
has the disease (in Bayesian terms, the "prior" probability) . Rear-
ranging the terms, the probability of finding both the disease and a
160. The product rule states that the probability of the joint occurrence of two (or
more) independent events is the product of their individual probabilities. E.g., Koehler &
Shaviro, supra note 19, at 254 (citing RICHARD A. WEHMHOEFER, STATISTICS IN LITIGATION
41 (1985), & Alan D. Cullison, Probability Analysis ofJudicial Fact-Finding: A Preliminary Outline
of the Subjective Approach, 1 U. TOL. L. REV. 538, 541-42 (1969)). "Two Events, A and B, are
independent if the probability of A equals the probability of A given that B has occurred,
and the probability of B equals the probability of B given that A has occurred (that is, P(A) =
P(AIB) and P(B) = P(BIA))." Id. at 254 n.24. In other words, "[i]f the occurrence of event B
is in no way affected by the occurrence of event A, then the two events, A and B, are said to
be independent." KNAPP & MILLER, supra note 23, at 21. The statistical formula for the
product rule is: P(A&B) = P(A)P(B). Id. The typical example of this principle is a coin toss.
Each flip of a coin is independent of all other flips of the coin. Thus, the probability of toss-
ing a coin twice and getting two heads is: 0.5 x 0.5 = 0.25, or one out of four.
161. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Note that the probability of both the
presence of disease and a positive test result equals the prevalence of the disease multiplied
by the sensitivity of the test. In probabilistic terms, the relationship is: P(H&E)
P(H)P(EIH).
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positive result ("true positive") is expressed in the following for-
mula:
P(H&E) = P(HIE)P(E).
This is the general multiplication rule in terms of conditional
probabilities. 62 The product rule, also called sequential uncertain-
ties, is the general multiplication rule applied to instances of
independent events. If the occurrence of event B is in no way in-
fluenced by the occurrence of event A, then P(AIB) = P(A), and
the general multiplication rule simplifies to:
P(A&B) = P(A)P(B)
in cases of independent events.
In Harber & Shusterman, Medical Causation Analysis Heuristics,'6
the authors provide the following example of sequential uncertain-
ties in the context of an alleged occupational asthma. "[I]f it is
80% certain that an employee has asthma, 80% certain that the
employee was exposed to moderate levels of chlorine, 80% certain
that such repetitive exposures are capable of inducing asthma, and
80% certain that the employee did not have preexisting asthma,
then according to the multiplicative approach, the likelihood of
work-relatedness is much less than 50% (.80 x .80 x .80 x .80)." 6s
The product rule dictates that, to prove causation, each inde-
pendent step of the plaintiff's expert's causation analysis must
substantially exceed 0.5 probability. Otherwise, the product rule
dooms the ultimate conclusion that the exposure actually caused
the injury to "less likely than not" status. For example, if the prob-
ability of the expert's specific causation testimony achieves 70%
probability of truth independent of general causation, the plaintiff's
claim must nevertheless fail if the independent probability of gen-
eral causation is 70% or less (that is, 0.7 x 0.7 = 0.49). A logical
corollary of the product rule is that "the probability of the entire
chain (or the last link) being true is always and without exception less
162. KNAPP & MILLER, supra note 23, at 21.
163. Id. As an example of independency in the context of testing for diseases, suppose
that the testers apply the wrong assay for a particular disease. In that case, a positive result
would be independent of disease presence. If the incidence of the disease in the population
[P(H)] is 0.1, and the probability of a positive test result in this population [P(E)] is 0.5,
then the probability of having both a positive test result and presence of the disease
[P(H&E)] is determined by the product rule: P(H&E) = (0.1) (0.5) = 0.05, or 5%, assuming
that the test result is not influenced by the presence of the disease.
164. 38J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 577 (1996).
165. Id. at 580.
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probable than the probability of the least probable link in the chain.
1 66
Thus, if general causation, or any other independent link in the
causal chain, is less than fifty percent probable, then the probabil-
ity of the entire chain of causation is inevitably less likely than not.
Similarly, if the product of the probabilities of any two or more in-
dependent links in the causative chain is less than 0.5, then, again,
the probability of the entire causal chain being true is less likely
than not. In either case, if the truth of the entire causal chain is
improbable, the ultimate link in the causal chain (that is, the sub-
ject agent caused the plaintiffs injury) is likewise improbable.
It is essential for proper use of the product rule that each factor
is independent, just as each flip of a coin is independent of all the
flips that have gone before. People v. Collins is a case in which the
trial court misunderstood this independence requirement for
proper application of the product rule. 167 At trial, the prosecutor
offered evidence concerning the probability of the joint occur-
rence of several unusual traits displayed by the two defendants.'
The prosecutor applied the product rule, assuming each trait was
independent. 169 This assumption was incorrect, as the California
Supreme Court found.170 "If traits are not independent, but rather
tend to occur together, then the multiplication of the individual
166. PIATrELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 18, at 136. According to this corollary, the prob-
ability of the ultimate link being true is less than the probability of the least probable link.
This statement does not mean that the probability of the truth of the ultimate link determined
independently must be less than the weakest link. Rather, it means that the ultimate link must
be weaker than the weakest link when the probability of each preceding link is considered as
a factor in the probability of the ultimate link being true. For example, in the context of a
toxic tort case, one could determine that the probability of the ultimate link of specific cau-
sation being true is 0.9, assuming that all previous links are true. This independent probability
may actually be greater than any previous link. But, if the probabilities of all the preceding
links are factored into the probability of the ultimate link, then the corollary of the product
rule is logically inevitable. Thus, in a toxic tort case, if the probability that the agent is capa-
ble of causing the alleged injury is only 0.6, then the probability of the ultimate link being
true, that is, that the agent in fact caused the plaintiffs injury, must be less than 0.6. In the
context of a toxic tort case, one can state this corollary as: general causation is the sine qua
non of specific causation. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 E Supp. 1387, 1413 (D.
Or. 1996) (holding that testimony regarding specific causation is irrelevant unless general
causation is established).
167. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968); see also Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B. Fairly, A Bayes-
ian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REv. 489, 490-91 (1970) ("[T]he
prosecution called an instructor of mathematics at a state college in an attempt to establish
that, assuming the robbery was committed by a Caucasian blond with a ponytail who left the
scene in a yellow car accompanied by a Negro with a beard and a mustache, the probability
was overwhelming that the accused were guilty because they answered to this unusual de-
scription.").
168. Collins, 438 P.2d at 36-37.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 38-42.
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probabilities of each factor usually yields a composite probability




In Section IV, we derived this formula for determining the re-
quired specificity to achieve a predictive value of 0.5 at a base rate
of x.
Required Specificity = (1 - 2x) / (1 - x).
As demonstrated in this Section, due to sequential uncertainties
the plaintiffs' causation experts may sometimes need predictive
values greater than 0.5 for their causation opinions. We need a
general formula for specificity that yields the predictive values nec-
essary in the face of sequential uncertainties.
Recall that the predictive value is equal to the rate of "true posi-
tives" divided by the rate of disease in the population ("true
positives" plus "false negatives"). Using the 2x2 grid:
Predictive Value = A / (A + C).
Recall that, if we assume 100% sensitivity, the rate of "true posi-
tives", A, is the same as the rate of the disease in the population, x.
So:
Predictive Value = x / (x + C).
Rather than setting the predictive value equal to 0.5 as we did in
Section IV, we now set it equal to the variable "y":
Predictive Value = x / (x + C) = y.
Recall that specificity is the rate of "true negatives" (that is, those
free of the disease who test negative) divided by the total number
tested who are disease-free (that is , "true negatives" plus "false
positives"). Using the 2x2 grid, specificity is D / (D + C). As shown
171. Finkelstein & Fairly, supra note 167, at 491-92. In the Collins case, the prosecutor
listed separately the characteristics "Man with mustache" and "Negro man with beard." Id. If
the assumed probabilities for these two characteristics (0.25 and 0.1, respectively) are multi-
plied, the probability of randomly selecting a Negro man with a beard and a mustache is
0.025, or approximately one out of forty. These characteristics, however, are not likely inde-
pendent. "[I]f every Negro man with a beard also had a mustache then the chance of a
Negro man with a beard and a mustache is one-tenth, not one fortieth as indicated by the
product rule." Id. at 492.
[VOL. 38:4
SUMMER 2005]
in Section IV, assuming 100 percent sensitivity, D = 1 - (A + C). The
formula for specificity becomes:
D/(D+C)=(1-A-C)/ (1-A).
Since A equals x, the specificity formula becomes:
Specificity = (1 - x- C) / (1 - x).
Since the predictive value is x / (x + C) = y, then C = (x / y) - x.
Replacing "C" in the specificity formula:
Specificity = 1 - x- [ (x / y) - x] / (1-x);
Simplifying,
Specificity Required for Predictive Value of y - [1 - (x/ y)] / (1 - x).
As an example of the use of this general formula for required
specificity, suppose that the plaintiff claims that her employer, a
railroad, negligently exposed her on the job to diesel exhaust,
which caused her lung cancer. Further, suppose that the court as-
signs a probability of general causation of 0.75 because diesel
exhaust is a "likely" lung carcinogen. 172 Sequential uncertainties
dictate that the required predictive value is:
0.5 / 0.75 = 0.67.
An epidemiologic study of railroad workers ("Garshick Study")
173
found a relative risk (RR) of 1.45 (CI = 1.11, 1.89) for lung cancer
among a group of railroad workers with the longest possible dura-
tion of diesel exhaust exposure. 174 Among this group of exposed
172. See NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/8-
90/057F, HEALTH ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR DIESEL ENGINE EXHAUST 9-24 (2002) [here-
inafter HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR DIESEL EXHAUST] (classifying diesel exhaust as "likely to be
carcinogenic in humans by inhaling").
173. Eric Garshick et al., A Retrospective Cohort Study of Lung Cancer and Diesel Exhaust Ex-
posure in Railroad Workers, 137 AM. REv. RESPIRATORY DISEASES 820 (1988) [hereinafter
Garshick Study].
174. The EPA considers the Garshick Study, supra note 173, "to have the best available
exposure data for possible use in establishing exposure-response relationships and deriving
a cancer unit risk." HEALTH ASSESSMENT FOR DIESEL EXHAUST, supra note 172, at 9-22. A
reanalysis of the data used in the Garshick Study, supra note 173, however, uncovered "some
concerns and potential shortcomings" of this cohort study. Kenny S. Crump, Lung Cancer
Mortality and Diesel Exhaust: Reanalysis of a Retrospective Cohort Study of U.S. Railroad Workers, 11
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railroad workers, the base rate of cases attributable to diesel ex-
haust exposure (the "Attributable Risk," or AR) based on this RR is
(1.45 - 1) / 1.45 = 0.31, or 31%.
Given that diesel exhaust is not a known human carcinogen, but
is classified by the EPA as a likely one, and assuming that the plain-
tiff was exposed to levels of diesel exhaust comparable to the
railroad workers in the Garshick Study cohort, what specificity
must the plaintiff's medical expert's causation analysis achieve to
exceed, at a minimum, a predictive value of 0.67? Using the gen-
eral formula derived above to determine the minimum specificity
required:
(1- (0.31 /0.67)) / (1-0.31) = 0.78.
In this hypothetical, the plaintiff's medical expert must demon-
strate that the causation analysis has sufficient specificity to detect
and identify more than three out of four lung cancers not induced
by diesel exhaust among similarly diesel exhaust-exposed persons.
Failing to explain how the causation analysis excludes the endemic
cases of lung cancer, the expert's opinion is unreliable.
VIII. BAYES' LAw, SEQUENTIAL UNCERTAINTIES, AND DAUBERT
A. The Court as Gatekeeper
Rules of evidence address the admissibility and inadmissibility of
proffered evidence. Generally, courts exclude irrelevant evidence,
unfairly prejudicial evidence, and unreliable evidence, such as
INHALATION TOXICOLOGY 1, 12 (1999). This reanalysis showed that the highest rates of lung
cancer were not among the workers with the highest exposures, thereby failing the "expo-
sure gradient causation criteria discussed above. The elevated lung cancer rates among
trainmen-those who ride in trains, including engineers, brakemen, and conductors-were
more likely due to lifestyle factors, such as dietary and smoking habits, rather than diesel
exhaust exposure. Id. at 11. The workers with the highest potential diesel exhaust exposures,
who were exposed also to asbestos and welding fumes, experienced lung cancer mortality
rates no different from the lowest exposure group, a fact that "argues against a causal effect
of diesel exposure in this cohort." Id. at 14. The Health Effects Institute (HEI) convened an
expert panel to evaluate strengths and limitations of epidemiologic studies for diesel ex-
haust quantitative risk estimation. HEALTH EFFECTS INSTITUTE, DIESEL EMISSIONS AND LUNG
CANCER: EPIDEMIOLOGY AND QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT: A SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
INSTITUTE'S DIESEL EPIDEMIOLOGY EXPERT PANEL 33 (1999). The expert panel concluded:
"the lack of a positive exposure-response association in the railroad worker cohort date sub-
stantially weakens that study's potential to provide a reliable quantitative estimate of risk of
exposure to diesel engine emissions." Id.
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hearsay. 5 One can argue that courts should not act as gatekeepers
excluding such evidence because aggressive cross-examination of
witnesses will reveal weaknesses. Courts nevertheless disallow the
introduction of such evidence to the jury. " [M]uch of the law of
evidence consists of excluding evidence because we are afraid the
lawyers will not do a good enough job of persuading the jury of the
defects in the evidence--or at least that the jury will not satisfacto-
rily perceive those defects."'76 Courts are particularly wary of
opinion evidence offered by experts.
77
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, all fed-
eral and most state courts followed the test set forth in Frye v.
United States to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. 8
Under the Frye test, scientific evidence was admissible only if such
evidence was based on a principle that was "sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs." 79 In Daubert v. Me18e0 Dow Pharmaceuticals, c theit elogs.  b t . rr l  a uicas, n . , 
United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, in particular FRE 702,8l superseded the Frye test.1 8 2 In
Daubert, the Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not
175. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding irrelevant evidence); FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding
unfairly prejudicial evidence); FED. R. EVID. 802 (excluding hearsay evidence, with excep-
tions).
176. Ronald J. Allen et al., Probability and Proof in State v. Skipper: An Internet Exchange,
35 JURIMETRICS J. 277, 294 (1995) (quoting E-mail from Richard Friedman, Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School, to bayesian-evidence@massey.ac.nz (Aug. 8, 1994)).
177. See, e.g., Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
courts must determine whether an expert's opinion "is genuinely scientific [or] unscientific
speculation offered by a genuine scientist"); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infalli-
bility in the eyes of ajury of laymen."); Huntingdon v. Crowley, 414 P.2d 382, 390 (Cal. 1966)
(acknowledging the existence of a "misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new
scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental nature"). But see McCoRMICK ON
EVIDENCE 491 (Edward W. Oleary et al. eds., 2d ed. 1972) ("Any relevant conclusions which
are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other rea-
sons for exclusion.").
178. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
179. Id. at 1014; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, A Half-Centuiy Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1980) (citing People v.
Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (Mich. 1977) ("It therefore is best to adhere to a standard
which in effect permits the experts who know the most about a procedure to experiment
and to study it. In effect, they form a kind of technical jury, which must first pass on the
scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of fact."))
("[The Frye test] assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific
method will have the determinative voice." (quoting Addison, 498 F.2d at 743-44)).
180. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
181. FED. R. EVID. 702; see also supra note 11 (setting forth FRE 702).
182. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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incorporate the Frye standard."' To the contrary, the issue in a
court's determination whether to admit scientific opinion testi-
mony is whether the expert used reliable methods.
8 4
Daubert introduced a "new era" in the scrutiny of expert testi-185
mony. 1 Prior to Daubert, the Frye "general acceptance" test stood in
as a surrogate for reliability; after Daubert, the trial judge must di-
rectly assess reliability.' 6 The Supreme Court recognized that
expert testimony could be "both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it."''8 7 Faced with a proffer of
expert scientific evidence, the trial court is now charged with the
role of "gatekeeper," and must initially determine pursuant to FRE
104(a) 8 8 whether the expert is proposing to testify to scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or deter-
mine a fact in issue. 9 If so, the court must consider whether the
183. Id.
184. Id. at 597.
185. Rice v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Pac. Ry. Co., 920 F. Supp. 732, 736 (E.D. Ky.
1996). In at least some federal circuits, it is now necessary that, when faced with a Daubert
challenge to proffered testimony, the trial court "must adequately demonstrate by specific
findings on the record that it has performed its duty as gatekeeper." Goebel v. Denver & Rio
Grande W. R.R., 215 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2000). In other circuits, however, if no party
raises an objection to proffered testimony, trial courts are not required to make "explicit on-
the-record rulings.... [Appellate courts will] assume that the district court performs such
analysis sub silentio throughout the trial with respect to all expert testimony." Hoult v. Hoult,
57 E3d 1, 5 (lst Cir. 1995).
186. DanielJ. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REv. 699, 703 (1998); see also Lee Ep-
stein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) ("[After Daubert,
judges] can no longer exclusively rely on a consensus in the scientific community to evaluate
the quality of research presented by experts in their courtrooms. They are now also required
to judge the research themselves, to evaluate its credibility, to assess its methods, and to ap-
praise its design."). Professor Capra argues, persuasively, that although the "general
acceptance" test may exclude novel, yet reliable, scientific evidence, this surrogate for reli-
ability is nevertheless superior to direct reliability assessments by judges. Capra, supra, at 703
("With all due respect to federal judges, the scientists in the field are probably in a better
position to assess the reliability of complex scientific testimony. For this reason, some surro-
gate test or touchstone for admissibility must still be found-it is simply not enough to tell
trial judges that they must determine whether expert testimony is 'reliable.'"). That said,
general acceptance remains an important criterion within the Daubert inquiry Id. at 705 ("In
many cases .. the acceptance factor may well be decisive, or nearly so. Thus, we expect that
a technique that satisfies the Frye test usually will be found to be reliable as well. On the
other hand, a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within
the community is likely to be found unreliable." (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985))).
187. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should not be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991)).
188. "Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness...
or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court .... In making its deter-
mination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges."
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
189. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; see also Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 215 F.3d
1083, 1088 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[A] district court, when faced with a party's objection, must
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proffered testimony meets the reliability and relevancy tests of FRE
702. The proponent of the proffered expert testimony bears the
burden of establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of
proof) °90 The focus of the Daubert inquiry is the expert's testimony,
not the expert's credentials.'9' The Ninth Circuit recognized that
"something doesn't become 'scientific knowledge' just because it's
uttered by a scientist."
19 2
FRE 702 contains two requirements. First, the evidence must be
reliable, or in other words, trustworthy.9 3 Trustworthiness guaran-
tees that scientific methods and procedures support the
information. 194 Second, the evidence must be relevant. 95 Courts
have described the relevance criterion as one of "fit."196 To satisfy
this requirement, the proffered testimony or evidence must relate
to the facts of the case in such a way that it will help the jury resolve
adequately demonstrate by specific findings on the record that it has performed its duty as
gatekeeper.").
190. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10 (citing Bouijaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-
76 (1987)); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I1), 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995); Schmaltz v. Norfolk& W. Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119, 1120 (N.D. Ill. 1995); see also
Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 E3d 1300, 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he propo-
nent of the testimony does not have the burden of proving that it is scientifically correct, but
that by a preponderance of the evidence, it is reliable."); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp.,
131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("[B]urden is on Plaintiffs to show that well-
conducted epidemiology studies do show a statistically significant relationship [between
disease and alleged agent). It is not Defendant's burden to show the lack of such relation-
ship.").
191. See FED. R. EVD. 702 advisory committee's note (2000) ("The trial court's gate-
keeping function requires more than simply 'taking the expert's word for it.'"); Goebel 215
F.3d at 1088 (citing DePaepe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 1998)) ("It is
axiomatic that an expert, no matter how good his credentials, is not permitted to specu-
late."); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942, 983 (E.D.
Ark. 1998) (noting that "plaintiffs experts are highly credentialed in their fields," but never-
theless excluding their proffered opinions); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997) (noting that the central issue in a Daubert challenge is scientific
reliability of the proffered opinions, not the experts' credentials). Contra Ferebee v. Chevron
Chem. Co., 736 E2d 1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating, pre-Daubert, that "[o]n questions
such as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if
experts are willing to testify that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to
credit such testimony").
192. DaubertI, 43 .3d at 1315-16.
193. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9; see also FED. R. EvID. 702 ("[Ain expert... may testify
... if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the prod-
uct of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case."); FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note
(2000) (providing examples of several factors the courts have used to assess the reliability of
proffered opinion testimony after Daubert).
194. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
195. Id. at 591.
196. Id. (citation omitted).
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a factual dispute.'97 "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondi-
tion to admissibility."98
In Daubert the Supreme Court provided four nonexclusive (and
nondispositive) factors that trial courts should consider in making
this determination under Rule 702. First, the court must evaluate
whether the theory or technique can be, and has been, tested.'9 9
Second, the court must determine whether the theory or tech-
nique has been subjected to peer review and publication. 200 Third,
the court must consider the known or potential rate of error.201 Fi-
nally, as required under the superseded Frye test, the court must
evaluate the general acceptance of the theory in the scientific
community.102 Upon remand of Daubert, the Ninth Circuit also con-
197. Id.; see also Robinson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (excluding causation expert's opinion that prescription drug caused plaintiff's re-
bound insomnia because expert was not privy to the fact that plaintiff experienced rebound
insomnia prior to her first drug dose); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F.
Supp. 2d 147, 163 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that if expert testimony shows that toxic agent
causes one type of disease, but plaintiff has another type of disease, testimony, though reli-
able, does not "fit" and is inadmissible), affd, 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).
198. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92; see also Lockheed Litig. Cases, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 37
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that an epidemiologic study is the type
of data experts rely on, and a causation expert's testimony based on one is, therefore, per se
reasonable and admissible).
199. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; see also Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 200 ER.D. 596, 602 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (citing FoSTER & HUBER, supra note 21, at 37-68) ("The 'testability' requirement
is a threshold requirement aimed at excluding pseudoscience from the courtroom. A theory
that is untestable is unfalsifiable and of no practical value in the courtroom.... But to stop
the analysis at testability would allow in any theory, even one universally recognized as
wrong, merely because it is falsifiable.").
200. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; see also Burleson v. Glass, 268 E Supp. 2d 699, 705 (W.D.
Tex. 2003) (excluding plaintiffs causation expert in part because his theory that exposure
to thoriated tungsten welding rods could cause lung or throat cancer "has never been tested
and never been submitted for peer review").
201. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; see, e.g., Burleson, 268 E Supp. 2d at 707 ("Defendants ar-
gue that the two-year period from alleged exposure to tumor onset supports their position
that the potential for error with respect to [plaintiffs causation expert's] theory is high. The
Court agrees.").
202. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. As one court noted, "[t]he decision in Daubert kills Frye
and then resurrects its ghost." In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 E Supp. 1014, 1033
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). The Daubert rule requires the court to determine where the mainstream of
scientific consensus lies. The novelty of a scientific opinion weighs against admissibility be-
cause "the courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork even of the inspired sort. Law
lags science; it does not lead it." Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996).
As noted by the Superior Court of Arizona:
The "general acceptance" issue can be addressed by permitting scientists to speak to
the courts through their published writings and scholarly treatises and journals and
that courts view such writings as "evidence" not of the actual reliability of the new sci-
entific technique, but of its acceptance in the scientific community.
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Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *8 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 1,
1998). The burden is on the proponent of the new theory to show a scientific consensus
supporting its use. Id. Judicial review of scientific publications helps to distinguish the main-
stream views from the fringe. "Even a person who knows nothing about hydrology can
distinguish the mainstream of the Mississippi from stagnant pools near its banks." PETER W.
HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 200 (1991).
Standing the "general acceptance" factor on its head, some courts in toxic tort cases have
expressed the view that the law cannot wait for science to establish the requisite causal link
between the subject agent and injury. For arguably the most egregious example of this flip,
see Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 2001). In Banner, a worker alleged that
two occupational exposures several months apart caused her to suffer acute symptoms-
nausea, headache, tiredness, respiratory problems, trembling, and skin irritation-and per-
manent brain damage and psychological problems. Id. at 927-30. Ajury returned a verdict
of $2.2 million for the plaintiff. Id. at 928. The defendant appealed on the ground that the
trial court should have excluded the plaintiffs causation experts' opinions. Among other
shortcomings, the defendant complained that the expert who testified as to the plaintiffs
permanent brain damage, a neuropsychologist, lacked any established scientific support for
his opinion that the chemical could cause the plaintiff's alleged permanent injuries. Id. at
931-32. Affirming the judgment, the Eighth Circuit did not refute the defendant's conten-
tion that the expert lacked established scientific support for his general causation opinions.
Instead, the court deferred to the district court's finding of scientific validity. Id. at 932, and
stated a relaxed evidentiary standard. Id. at 928. "[T]he first several victims of a new toxic
tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply because the medical litera-
ture, which will eventually show the connection between the victims' condition and the toxic
substance, has not yet been completed." Id. (quoting Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229
F.3d 1202, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 2000)). Thus, the Eighth Circuit believes that law leads science
and that it can establish the plaintiffs causal link by judicial ukase. Not resting on its tor-
tured tautology, the Eighth Circuit went on to state that the plaintiffs causation expert's
novel conclusion was admissible in part because the defendant failed to prove the impossi-
ble, that is, that the subject agent "is incapable of causing permanent injury." Id. at 932. The
Eighth Circuit thereby improperly shifted to the party challenging the proffered causation
testimony the burden of proving the inadmissibility of the testimony, contrary to Daubert. See
supra note 190 and accompanying text.
The Eighth Circuit justifies this burden shifting in the context of toxic tort cases with the
emotional argument that the court cannot wait for the epidemiologic body counting. This
view, too, is contrary to Daubert.
We recognize that in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexi-
ble, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights
and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by the Rules of Evi-
dence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the
particularized resolution of legal disputes.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. Since future discovery of a heretofore unknown causal association is
always possible, the Eighth Circuit's "law leads science" test will never exclude proffered
opinion testimony on the ground that general causation evidence is lacking. See Chlorine
Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("EPA cannot reject the
'best available' evidence simply because of the possibility of contradiction in the future by
evidence unavailable at the time of action-a possibility that will always be present."). No
one can know whether future research will show the alleged connection between the subject
agent and the injury, contrary to the Eighth Circuit's presumption. Contrary to Bonner, and
consistent with fairness, justice, logic, and Daubert, the Fifth Circuit averred: "We must re-
solve cases in our courts on the basis of scientific knowledge that is currendy available."
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sidered whether the expert's proffered testimony grew "naturally
and directly" from research conducted independent of litigation
and was thereby trustworthy, or whether the expert formed his
opinion in the context of litigation, rendering the testimony
suspect.
20 3
Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 E3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 151 F.3d 269
(5th Cir. 1998).
The injustice of the Bonner rationale is on display in the case law. Consider the numerous
cases spanning the decades from the 1940s to the 1960s in which courts awarded plaintiffs
damages grounded on the now disproved "traumatic cancer theory," which maintained that
simple trauma could cause cancer. See HUBER, supra, at 39-56 (reviewing history of the
trauma-induced cancer cases). These cases seem humorous today, yet the injustice visited
upon numerous defendants in these cases who were in fact not responsible for the plaintiffs'
cancers was a consequence of the same "law leads science" theory advanced by the Bonner
court. Indeed, the Bonner court's reasoning echoes a trauma-cancer case in which the New
Mexico Supreme Court proclaimed that it would not wait for medical evidence to establish
an indisputable causal connection between the trauma and the cancer. White v. Valley Land
Co., 322 P.2d 707, 711 (N.M. 1957). These decisions belie the view that "[b]ecause of the
problems of identifying chemically induced disease, fewer people will be compensated than
are actually harmed." Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 66, at 444. To the contrary, admitting
opinions based on the mere possibility of general causation, such as in Bonner and the
trauma-cancer cases, results in compensation to many plaintiffs not harmed by the agent at
issue. Alchemists were right after all: one can create gold through pseudoscience, at least in
some courtrooms.
203. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I1), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1995). The Ninth Circuit powerfully explained this important criterion for determining the
reliability of the expert's testimony:
That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted independent of the liti-
gation provides important, objective proof that the research comports with the
dictates of good science. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM 206-09 (1991) (describing how the prevalent practice of expert-
shopping leads to bad science). For one thing, experts whose findings flow from ex-
isting research are less likely to have been biased toward a particular conclusion by
the promise of remuneration; when an expert prepares reports and findings before
being hired as a witness, that record will limit the degree to which he can tailor his
testimony to serve a party's interests. Then, too, independent research carries its own
indicia of reliability, as it is conducted, so to speak, in the usual course of business
and must normally satisfy a variety of standards to attract funding and institutional
support. Finally, there is usually a limited number of scientists actively conducting re-
search on the very subject that is germane to a particular case, which provides a
natural constraint on parties' ability to shop for experts who will come to the desired
conclusion. That the testimony proffered by an expert is based directly on legitimate, preexisting
research unrelated to the litigation provides the most persuasive basis for concluding that the
opinions he expresses were "derived by the scientific method."
Daubert , 43 F.3d at 1317 (emphasis added); see also Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 235
(7th Cir. 1996) ("[Daubert prevents] the hiring of reputable scientists, impressively creden-
tialed, to testify for a fee to propositions that they have not arrived at through the methods
that they use when they are doing their regular professional work rather than being paid to
give an opinion helpful to one side in a lawsuit."); Rosen, 78 F.3d at 318 (commenting that a
court's duty under Daubert is to weed out courtroom science from real science).
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The U.S. Supreme Court clarified that:
[N] othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit [bare author-
ity] of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.2 °4
It is now clear that the experts' conclusions, as well as their
methodologies, are subject to the courts' scrutiny and excludable
under Daubert.25 "When a scientist claims to rely on a method prac-
ticed by most scientists, yet presents conclusions that are shared by
no other scientist, the district court should be wary that the
method has not been faithfully applied."2 6 Some courts recognize
that in a toxic tort case, the court's gatekeeping duty is "especially
204. Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); see also Allison v. McGhan Med.
Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[Daubert decisions] warn against leaping from
an accepted scientific premise to an unsupported one."); Brumley v. Pfizer, Inc., 200 F.R.D.
596, 602 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that an expert cannot rely on a study to support a con-
clusion that the study itself does not make).
205. Joiner modified Daubert, allowing trial judges to evaluate data offered to support the
experts' bottom-line opinions to determine whether that data provide adequate support.
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146; see also Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir.
2001) (allowing the district court, on remand, "to plumb the depths of the precise relation-
ship between the materials cited and the conclusions drawn"); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of
P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) ("[D]istrict courts must be careful not to
'don the amateur scientist's cap in ruling on scientific validity.' But, trial judges remain free
to determine as a threshold question whether an expert is in fact predicating her conclu-
sions on the scientific theory, procedure, or principle on which she purports to rely."
(quoting Summers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599, 604 (10th Cir. 1997))); Hall & Silber-
geld, supra note 66, at 448 ("Courts should ... scrutinize epidemiological evidence for
reliability.") (citation omitted). But see Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314,
324 (I11. 2002) (applying the Frye "general acceptance" standard as interpreted by Illinois
courts, affirming trial court's admission of plaintiffs' causation expert's conclusion that ex-
posure caused plaintiffs' cancers even though expert admitted that no scientific consensus
supported her causation conclusion) ("'[Gleneral acceptance' does not concern the ulti-
mate conclusion. Rather, the proper focus of the general acceptance test is on the
underlying methodology used to generate the conclusion."). For an expression of the pre-
Joiner"methods v. conclusions" dichotomy, compare Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
1529, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to
resolve the complex and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link low-level expo-
sure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On questions such as these, which stand at the
frontier of current medical epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such
a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony."), with Wilson v.
Petroleum Wholesale, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (D. Colo. 1995) (refusing, pre-Joiner, to
examine the analytical gap between the doctor's general causation opinion and the absence
of scientific support).
206. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996).
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sensitive" because a 'jury may blindly accept an expert's opinion
that conforms with their underlying fears of toxic substances with-
out carefully understanding or examining the basis for that
opinion.
20 7
The ideal view is that "the primary goal of an expert witness is to
convey knowledge to the court in a truthful and accurate man-
ner."1°s As the gatekeeper of opinion testimony, however, the courts
must take a more suspect view of proffered opinion testimony.
207. Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 24 (D. Mass. 1995) (quoting
O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (C.D. Ill. 1992)).
208. Andrew A. Marino & Lawrence E. Marino, The Scientific Basis of Causality in Toxic
Tort Cases, 21 DAYTON L. REv. 2, 19 (1995).
209. See, e.g., Newton v. Roche Labs., 243 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679 (W.D. Tex. 2002) ("[An
expert of dubious qualifications] more closely fits the profile of an 'expert for hire' whose
opinions are more likely to be biased."); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 289
(E.D. Va. 2001) ("[Some experts] are of dubious assistance to the trier of fact... [and are]
often less then [sic] helpful and sometimes misleading ... ."). In a candid statement, two
physicians who often appear in toxic tort cases as expert witnesses for plaintiffs stated that
"[s]cientific testimony in court is offered on behalf of one side or another, and it does not
represent consensus, but rather the opinion of the expert or experts involved." Daniel T.
Teitelbaum & Nachman Brautbar, Benzene and Multiple Myeloma: Appraisal of the Scientific Evi-
dence, 95 BLooD 2995, 2996 (2000). Although unintended, this statement encapsulates the
necessity for Daubert scrutiny of proffered opinion testimony. Daubert commands that, in
court, science must do the speaking, not merely the scientist. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F3d 1311, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Turpin v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992) (excluding plaintiff's expert's opin-
ion because "personal opinion, not science, is testifying here"); Chambers v. Exxon Corp.,
81 E Supp. 2d 661, 665 (M.D. La. 2000) (stating that "[p]ersonal opinions" do not suffice as
scientific evidence); Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984) (observing
that when an expert becomes an advocate for a cause, the expert departs from the ranks of
objective scientists). Assuming these experts practice what they publish, courts are well ad-
vised to carefully scrutinize their proffered testimony. Given their approach to opinion
testimony, it is unsurprisingly that these physicians have been the targets of successful
Daubert challenges. See, e.g., Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (excluding Dr. Teitelbaum's testimony that
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) caused plaintiffs lung cancer); Cabrera v. Cordis Corp.,
134 F.3d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 1998) (excluding Dr. Brautbar's proffered testimony that
plaintiff developed "autoimmune disease with atrophy" caused by silicone contained in a
surgically implanted brain shunt); Chambers, 81 F. Supp. 2d 661 (excluding Dr. Brautbar's
proffered testimony that plaintiffs occupational exposures to benzene caused plaintiffs
chronic myelogenous leukemia); In re Ingram Barge Co., 187 F.R.D. 262 (M.D. La. 1999)
(excluding Dr. Brautbar's proffered testimony that plaintiffs' occupational exposures to
various solvents increased their risks of developing cancer); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v.
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 942 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (excluding Dr. Teitel-
baum's proffered testimony that aflatoxins caused plaintiffs laryngeal cancer), affd, 191
F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999); Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F Supp. 981, 986
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (excluding Dr. Brautbar's proffered testimony that plaintiffs occupational
exposures to fragrances caused her to develop "multiple chemical sensitivity"); Leija v. Mara-
thon Oil, No. 96-617531 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2000) (excluding Dr. Teitelbaum's proffered
testimony based on a novel skin absorption model used to estimate the plaintiffs benzene
dose); Austin v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 25 S.W.3d 280 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (excluding Dr.
Teitelbaum's proffered testimony that plaintiffs occupational exposures to benzene caused
his chronic myelogenous leukemia).
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Both truthfulness and accuracy are necessary for reliable scientific
testimony. While in some circumstances the sincerity of expert wit-
nesses may be an issue,21° this Article addresses the reliability of
honestly held opinions. Honest opinions held by competent expert
211witnesses may nevertheless be unreliable . In toxic tort cases, fail-
ure to address the base-rate problem will lead to unreliable
causation judgments. Such judgments may at times be correct, but
they are not reliable because they fail to consider the crucial base-
rate factor.212 A causation analysis that ignores the base-rate prob-
lem is frequently inaccurate and always unreliable.1 3
In Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., the plaintiff's expert was as blunt as Drs. Braut-
bar and Teitelbaum when asked about his work in the case: "This is not a scientific study.
This is a legal opinion." 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). The Allen court responded:
[T] he goal of Daubert and this court's previous cases has been to bring more rigorous
scientific study into the expression of legal opinions offered in court by scientific and
medical professionals. In the absence of scientifically valid reasoning, methodology
and evidence supporting these experts' opinions, the district court properly excluded
them.
Id.
210. E.g., Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[S]cientists
whose conviction[s] about the ultimate conclusion of their research is so firm that they are
willing to aver under oath that it is correct prior to performing the necessary validating tests
[may] properly be viewed by the district court as lacking the objectivity that is the hallmark
of the scientific method."); see also Lust, 89 E3d at 597 (concluding that doctor's testimony
"was influenced by a litigation-driven financial incentive"); Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., No.
98 CIV.7126(RPP), 2002 WL 140542, at *10 (S.D.N.. Jan. 31, 2002) ("The paucity of sup-
port for his opinion in his First Report demonstrates that Dr. Bidanset was ready to form a
conclusion first, without any basis, and then try to justify it."); Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw,
Inc., No. 95 C 2723, 1996 WL 145778, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1996) (disregarding expert's
report because expert did not prepare it), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 149
F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Marbled Murrelet v. Pac. Lumber Co., 880 E Supp. 1343, 1365
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding expert's testimony lacked objectivity and credibility because it was
crafted by attorneys), affd, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996); Occulto v. Adamar of N.J., Inc., 125
F.R.D. 611, 616 (D.NJ. 1989) (noting that expert cannot simply be alter ego of trial attor-
ney). Cf Turpin, 959 F.2d at 1351 (commenting on repeated appearances by the same
causation experts in numerous Bendectin suits).
211. See PIATELLI-PALMAR1NI, supra note 18, at 84 ("[A] witness can easily give false tes-
timony in perfectly good faith. Between good faith and reliable testimony lie the heuristics
and the blind spots we have been discussing[, such as ignoring the base rate].").
212. "The cognitive illusions shown up by this blind spot [of ignoring the base rate] are
so universal and so pertinacious that we would be wise enough (and lucky enough) to re-
main in good health and never find ourselves wrongly accused of a crime we did not
commit." Id. at 215-16. To that observation, one should add the corollary that one should
be wise enough and lucky enough not to find oneself as a defendant in a toxic tort case
wrongly alleged to have negligently exposed a sick person, or a dead person, to a toxic
agent.
213. Admittedly, under Daubert courts may at times bar opinions that are in fact correct.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) ("We recognize that, in prac-
tice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will
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B. Bayes'Law as a Component ofDaubert
Scrutiny in Toxic Tort Cases
It is crucial that judges (or their special masters) undertaking a
Daubert inquiry in toxic tort cases understand Bayes' Law and apply
it to the proffered testimony to determine its reliability. As the phi-
losopher Philip Kitcher said: "If you ignore the base rate and
follow some non-Bayesian process of reasoning you will almost cer-
tainly arrive at erroneous conclusions about your risk. Granting
that people do not naturally perform the Bayesian computation,
the significant points are that that computation improves their de-
cision making and that they can be taught to do it. 2 14 All evidence
is probabilistic. 215 "Overtly probabilistic evidence [such as base
rates], however, makes the risk of error explicit."216 Indeed, the
known or potential error rate is one of the four express reliability
factors set forth in Daubert.
17
It is arguable that the rules of evidence require a judge to apply
Bayesian analysis to determine the reliability of testimony. The
Federal Rules of Evidence states:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.218
As stated by a National Research Council panel:
From this rule one might infer that the court wishes and ex-
pects to have its judgments about facts at issue to be expressed
in terms of probabilities. Such a situation is tailor-made for
the application of Bayes' Theorem and the Bayesian form of
prcvcnt the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is
the balance that is struck by the Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search
for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes."); see also
PIArrELLI-PALMARINI, supra note 18, at 21 (saying that judgments that are true may never-
theless be unreliable).
214. KITCHER, supra note 52, at 186 n.14; see also Koehler & Shaviro, supra note 19, at
267-68 (explaining that Bayes' theorem can be made intuitively plausible through examples
and proved based on intuitively plausible principles).
215. Seeid.
216. Id. at 252; see also STATISTICAL EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 4 ("[Slince courts deal
with uncertainty in reaching decisions, ... formal statistical theory can provide a proper
framework for improving judicial decision making.").
217. 509 U.S. at 594.
218. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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statistical inference in connection with evidence. Thus some
have characterized the Bayesian approach as what the Court
needs and often thinks it gets.
219
A Bayesian approach to evaluating proffered epidemiologic evi-
dence would help avoid a frequent judicial misapprehension of the
legal significance of Odds Ratios (OR) and Relative Risks (RR) .2.
Some courts have held that epidemiologic studies must have an
OR or RR of 2.0 or greater to support the plaintiffs contention
that the exposure more likely than not caused the injury.221 The
reasoning is simple. The standard of proof on the issue of causa-
tion is by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, that the
defendant's conduct "more likely than not" caused the plaintiff's
injury.222 In epidemiologic terms, this standard of proof requires an
RR or OR of greater than 2.0. As explained in Hall v. Baxter Health-
care Corp.:
The threshold for concluding that an agent was more likely
the cause of a disease than not is relative risk greater than 2.0.
Recall that a relative risk of 1.0 means that that agent has no
effect on the incidence of disease. When the relative risk
reaches 2.0, the agent is responsible for an equal number of
cases of disease as all other background causes. Thus, a rela-
tive risk of 2.0 implies a 50% likelihood that an exposed
individual's disease was caused by the agent.2
From this viewpoint, only if the OR or RR exceeds 2.0 does the
Attributable Risk exceed 50%, and only then may one conclude
that a given injury among the study subjects is more likely than not
a result of the exposure. Conversely, if the OR or RR is less than
219. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE, supra note 18, at 193.
220. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing Odds Ratio and Relative Risk).
221. Id.; see also ROBERT P. CHARROW & DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
THE COURTROOM: ADMISSIBILITY AND STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AFTER Daubert 28-34
(1994) (contending that a relative risk of slightly more than 2.0 will rarely, if ever, satisfy the
legal causation standard); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REv. 643, 691 (1992) (concluding that in the absence of other information, a doubling of
the risk found in epidemiology studies is inadequate to support a plaintiffs verdict, though
lower risks may suffice if other risk factors can be eliminated).
222. See supra note 2.
223. 947 F Supp. 1387, 1403 (D. Or. 1996); see also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner,
953 S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997) (holding that to be considered reliable scientific evidence
of general causation, epidemiologic studies must, at a minimum, result in an RR of more
than 2.0 and a statistically significant association).
SUMMER 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
2.0, any given case in the study population is less likely than not
caused by the exposure.224
Other courts disagree. In a case where the plaintiff is able to
eliminate most or all known or suspect risk factors other than the
exposure at issue, the plaintiff could argue that an RR or OR of less
than 2.0 is nevertheless admissible evidence that the agent caused
the injury. As explained in the Reference Guide on Epidemiology:
For example, genetics might be known to be responsible for
50% of the incidence of a disease independent of exposure to
the agent. If genetics can be ruled out in an individual's case,
then a relative risk greater than 1.5 might be sufficient to
224. An OR or RR greater than 2.0 in an epidemiology study does not mean that there
is a greater than 50% chance that the plaintiffs disease was caused by the exposure. It
means only that, among the study subjects, the risk of developing the disease exceeds the
"base" or "background" risk. SeeJames Robins & Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causa-
tion Under a Stochastic Modelfor Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRICS 1125, 1126 (1989). The RR or
OR of an epidemiology study does not apply to a plaintiff whose exposure circumstances are
different than the subject of the epidemiology study. "Epidemiology focuses on the question
of general causation (i.e., is the agent capable of causing disease?) rather than that of spe-
cific causation (i.e., did it cause disease in a particular individual?)." Green et al., supra note
64, at 336. As one commentator illustrated:
Epidemiological studies can predict the risk of death from riding bicycles on road-
ways. But can the value of the risk be applied with confidence to an individual cyclist
in a particular situation? The answer is certainly no. Such a value merely averages risk
and does not take into account potentially pertinent factors such as the number of
hours ridden per week, safety equipment worn, level of training, or type of roadway.
Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for Toxic
Tort Litigation, 71 N.C. L. REV. 247, 254 (1992); see also Heckman v. Fed. Press Co., 587 F.2d
612, 617 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[S]tatistical data about a group do not establish concrete facts
about an individual."); David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. RaV. 2139, 2165 (1994) ("In a case
where a plaintiff alleges personal injury from exposure to a substance, the issue at hand is
not whether the agent can potentially cause that injury. Rather, the issue is whether the
agent caused the particular plaintiffs injury."), quoted in Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1400. "External
validity" concerns the appropriateness of applying epidemiological findings to persons out-
side the study. Sven Hernberg, Validity Aspects of Epidemiological Studies, in EPIDEMIOLOGY OF
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 269, 269-73 (M. Karvonen & M.I. Mikheev eds., 1986). Since it is
unlikely that the plaintiff was a subject of the epidemiology study, external validity requires
an examination to determine whether it is appropriate to apply the results of an epidemiol-
ogy study to the plaintiff. See In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1131 (2d
Cir. 1995) (observing that causation in toxic tort cases is usually subject to a two-step inquiry:
(1) Does epidemiology evidence establish a causal link between agent and disease? and
(2) Is plaintiff within class of persons to which inferences from general causation should be
applied?); Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720 (requiring plaintiffs to show that their circumstances
were similar to those in relied-on epidemiology study).
[VOL. 38:4
SUMMER 2005] Toxic Tort Cases
support an inference that the agent was more likely than not
responsible for the plaintiffs disease.2
In Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., the New Jersey court expressed
this view:
The physician or other such qualified expert may view the
epidemiological studies and factor out other known risk fac-
tors such as family history, diet, alcohol consumption,
smoking ... or other factors which might enhance the re-
maining recognized risks, even though the risk in the study
fell short of the 2.0 correlation. 6
Similarly, the Second Circuit in In rejoint Eastern & Southern District
Asbestos Litigation declined to adopt a threshold for a RR227 The
court held that the trial court would instruct the jury on statistical
significance, letting the jury decide whether a number of studies
228
with RR's between 1.0 and 2.0 have significance in the aggregate.
Our analysis shows that a plaintiffs causation expert can rely on
epidemiology studies with ORs or RRs less than 2.0 so long as the
expert's methods have sufficient specificity and are otherwise reli-
able. As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the
225. Green et al., supra note 64, at 386 (citations omitted); see also Carl F Cranor et al.,
Judicial Boundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts After Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 37-40 (1996) (arguing that courts
should not exclude epidemiologic evidence simply because the relative risk is less than 2.0,
unless there is no other supporting evidence).
226. 591 .2d 671, 675 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
227. 52F.3datl1134.
228. Id.; see also Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 418-19 (D. Utah 1984) (reject-
ing the fifty percent standard of causation in connection with statistical evidence);
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986) (holding that an epide-
miology study with a risk ratio between 1.3 and 1.8 with other supporting data was sufficient
to get to the jury on the issue of causation); Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 605 A.2d 1079, 1087
(N.J. 1992) ("[A] relative risk of 2.0 is not so much a password to a finding of causation as
one piece of evidence, among others, for the court to consider determining whether the
expert has employed a sound methodology in reaching his or her conclusion."). Some
commentators have suggested that courts adjust the recoveries allowed toxic tort plaintiffs
based on the RR found in the relied-upon epidemiology studies. See 2 AM. LAw INST., EN-
TERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 369-75 (1991) (suggesting proportionate
compensation to all with a particular disease based on the attributable fractions of causa-
tion); Gold, supra note 5, at 397-401 (suggesting a compensation scheme that discounts
recoveries to reflect uncertainty); Robins & Greenland, supra note 224, at 1131 (1989) (con-
cluding that proportional liability schemes cannot be based on epidemiologic data alone).
But seeDaniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1237-51 (1987) (suggesting,
pre-Daubert, a "most likely victim" theory of recovery whereby plaintiffs whose injuries were
most likely caused by defendants' conduct recover full compensation, while those whose
claims are most speculative recover nothing).
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Attributable Risk (AR, derived from the OR or RR of an epidemi-
ology study) is a group statistic measuring the strength of
association between an agent and a disease. The AR is not a meas-
ure of a particular person's odds of contracting a disease as a result
of exposure to the agent. 29 In brief, the AR addresses general causa-
tion as opposed to specific causation. An RR or OR of less than 2.0
(resulting in an AR of less than 50%) indicates a weak association s
and, thus, indicates that the putative association is less likely to be a
real, causal association. Nevertheless, "strength of association,"
which RRs and ORs measure, is but one of the Bradford Hill crite-
ria23 1 and is not dispositive on the issue of general causation.
Epidemiology studies consistently showing a positive, though weak,
association between the agent and the disease can be persuasive
evidence that the agent is capable of causing the disease in ex-
posed persons. For example, a weak carcinogen that yields a low
AR is nevertheless a real carcinogen. From a general causation
viewpoint, an RR or OR less than 2.0 is not dispositive.
As seen in cases such as DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,23 2 and Sanderson v. International Flavors & Fragrances, inc.,2 3
courts use Relative Risks and Odds Ratios (and by implication the
resulting ARs) derived in epidemiology studies as measures of spe-
cific causation-that is, as a measure of the odds that the subject
exposures caused the plaintiffs' injuries in a particular case. Al-
though not the true meaning of ARs, this use has some merit. We
do not object to this use of ARs per se,254 so long as the court rec-
ognizes that the plaintiff must first provide reliable evidence of
general causation.
Assuming that the plaintiff has sufficient evidence of general
causation, the court can then turn to the AR calculated from the
relied-upon epidemiology studies to determine whether the plain-
tiff has reliable evidence of specific causation. At this step, we
disagree that an OR or RR of at least 2.0 (that is, an AR of more
than 50%) is a threshold for proof of specific causation. As argued
in Part VIII.C.3.d, the proper Bayesian approach is to allow the
plaintiffs expert to demonstrate that his or her causation analysis
229. See supra Part VI (discussing the application of epidemiologic group statistics to
particular cases).
230. See supra note 96 (discussing "weak" and "strong" associations).
231. See supra Part V.A (discussing the Bradford Hill criteria).
232. 911 F.2d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990).
233. 950 F. Supp. 981, 1000 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
234. Scientists agree that ARs may be useful in this regard. See Hall & Silbergeld, supra




has sufficient reliability to reach the jury. To determine whether
the proffered testimony is reliable, the court must consider the
base rate of the agent-induced disease in the reference popula-
tion-that is, the AR derived from the RR or OR found in the
relied-on epidemiology study. Given that base rate and its relevance
in the case, the expert must show that the causation analysis em-
ployed has sufficient specificity to detect those in the reference
population who have the disease, but not as a result of exposure to
the agent ("false positives"). If the rate of the agent-induced dis-
ease in the reference population drops below 50% (that is, if the
OR or RR drops below 2.0), the opinion that the plaintiff's injury
was more likely than not caused by the exposure becomes more
difficult to support. Nevertheless, the opinion can be reliable if the
expert's causation analysis is sufficiently and demonstrably specific.
A blanket rule barring epidemiologic studies with ARs of 50% or
less deprives causation experts the chance to show that their causa-
tion-determining methods are specific enough to limit "false
positives" and achieve legally sufficient proof. Courts should al-
low-indeed, require-causation experts to show that their
methods are sufficiently specific to overcome the base-rate prob-
lem.
This conflict among the courts may be more apparent than real.
Many of the courts that apply an RR or OR threshold of 2.0 qualify
this view, recognizing that plaintiffs may be able to eliminate cer-
tain alternative causative agents in their particular cases, thereby
raising the odds that their injuries were induced by the subject
agents. As explained in Daubert II, a case applying the 2.0 thresh-
old:
A statistical study showing a relative risk of less than two could
be combined with other evidence to show it is more likely
than not that the accused cause is responsible for a particular
plaintiff's injury. For example, a statistical study may show that
a particular type of birth defect is associated with some un-
known causes, as well as two known potential causes-e.g.,
smoking and drinking. If a study shows that the relative risk of
injury for those who smoke is 1.5 as compared to the general
population, while it is 1.8 for those who drink, a plaintiff who
does not drink might be able to reanalyze the data to show
that the study of smoking did not account for the effect of
drinking on the incidence of birth defects in the general
population. By making the appropriate comparison-between
Toxic Tort Cases
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non-drinkers who smoke and non-drinkers who do not
smoke-the teetotaller plaintiff might be able to show that
235the relative risk of smoking for her is greater than two.
C. Sequential Uncertainties as a Component ofDaubert Scrutiny
Under the Daubert holding, "any step that renders the analysis
unreliable ... renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is
true whether the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely
misapplies that methodology."236 This logical point is an implicit recog-
nition of the "sequential uncertainty" principle discussed in Part
VII. Applied in a toxic tort case, this principle means that any unre-
liable or misapplied methodologic step in the expert's causation
analysis renders the expert's ultimate opinion concerning specific
causation unreliable and inadmissible pursuant to Daubert. Stated
differently, the sequential uncertainty principle dictates that the
probability of the ultimate link in a chain of events (in a toxic tort
case, specific causation) is always less than the probability of the
weakest link in the plaintiffs causation chain.237 By necessity, if any
link in the causal chain is unreliable, the plaintiff will be unable to
bear the burden of proof.
An example of a case in which the court ignored this principle is
Hallahan v. Ashland Chemical Co.23 In Hallahan, the defendant
chemical companies moved for summary judgment on the ground
that there was no admissible evidence of an association between
the plaintiffs disease, chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML), and
human exposures to benzene.139 The appellate court disagreed and
affirmed the lower court's denial of the defendants' motion. The
court reviewed the plaintiffs scientific evidence, which found a
"suggestive increase in CML" reported among a series of benzene-
exposed cases. 240 The plaintiff presented a recent epidemiology
235. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.16 (9th Cir.
1995); see also Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1404 (D. Or. 1996) (apply-
ing an RR threshold of 2.0, but favorably citing Daubert H for the proposition that
epidemiologic studies with an RR of less than 2.0 may be relevant under some circum-
stances).
236. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (2000) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146,
155 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring that each stage of the expert's testimony be reliable).
237. See supra Part VII.
238. 699 N.YS.2d 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
239. Id. at 613.
240. Id. (quoting Song-Nian Yin et al., A Cohort Study of Cancer Among Benzene-Exposed
WorkersIn China: Overall Results, 29 AM.J. INDUS. MED. 227, 232-33 (1996)).
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study out of China that concluded: " [T] his study of benzene-
exposed workers in China provides further support for the associa-
tion of benzene exposure with an increased risk for myelogenous
leukemia. The risk was strongest for AML [acute myelogenous
leukemia], but an [statistically nonsignificant] excess of CML was
also noted."24' The Court concluded that the plaintiff's theory that
his benzene exposure caused his CML "transcended 'the realm of
mere speculation' ... and was sufficient to raise a genuine factual
,,242
issue as to the cause of plaintiffs disease. In Hallahan, evidence
that general causation is a mere possibility, somewhat more than
speculation, sufficed for the plaintiffs case to reach the jury.
The plaintiff's evidence of general causation in Hallahan is fa-
cially unreliable. ' A mere possibility that benzene can cause CML
compels the conclusion that proof of specific causation (in this
case, that the plaintiffs benzene exposure caused his CML) must
fall short of the "more likely than not" standard of proof. As the
principle of sequential uncertainties dictates, if the probability of
the independent causal link of general causation (or any other in-
dependent causal link, for that matter) is less than 0.5, then the
ultimate conclusion that the exposure caused the plaintiffs disease
will be less than 0.5 even if the plaintiff establishes the remaining
independent causal links with certainty (P = 1.0). In other words,
the product of multiplying a probability of 0.5 or less by any other
probabilities, even certainty (P = 1.0), will be at most 0.5. Finding a
mere possibility of general causation, something a little better than
241. Id.
242. Id. (citations omitted).
243. The proffered causation testimony is facially unreliable, because the Hallahan court
apparently accepted the view that the plaintiff's evidence raised the mere possibility of gen-
eral causation, that is, something less than probable. Thus, the court in effect allowed ajury
to vote on the issue of specific causation based on evidence that the alleged causal associa-
tion was less likely than not. In most toxic tort cases in which the parties present
epidemiological evidence, the parties dispute the significance of the studies, the plaintiff
arguing that the studies demonstrate a likely causal association between the agent and the
disease, and the defendant arguing that the association is merely possible or unlikely. See,
e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (affirming district court's summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant in part because epidemiologic studies offered in support of
causation merely suggested the possibility that PCB exposure is associated with lung cancer).
In essence, the Hallahan court accepted the typical defense view that the evidence raised a
mere possibility of a causal association, but nevertheless held that a mere possibility of gen-
eral causation was good enough to allow a jury to vote on specific causation. See Marino &
Marino, supra note 208, at 8 & n.20 (opining that imposing on defendant the burden to
show that the agent "can't cause" the injury is nearly impossible to bear). The Hallahan deci-
sion carries the implication that a defendant in a toxic tort case in which general causation
is at issue faces, at the Daubert stage, the daunting task of proving the impossibility of general
causation.
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speculation, the Hallahan court should have dismissed the plain-
tiff's claim.
The mere possibility that benzene can cause CML passed admis-
sibility muster in Hallahan, but not in Austin v. Kerr-McGee Refining
Corp.,244 or in Chambers v. Exxon Corp.14 5 In Austin, the Texas Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim because her causation expert's opinions were unreliable pur-
246suant to Daubert and its progeny. The Austin court considered the
same study central to the Hallahan court's holding, but judged it
inadequate as evidence of general causation. The Texas Supreme
Court noted that the study showed a statistically significant in-
creased risk of leukemia generally, and AML specifically, among
benzene-exposed workers. "The study showed, however, that the
increase in . .. CML was not statistically significant. ' 47 The Austin
court recognized what the Hallahan court missed: there were no
studies cited by the plaintiffs causation expert that "recognized or
posited that exposure to benzene causes CML specifically. 248 The
scintilla of general causation evidence provided by the "China
study" that there is a possible association between benzene and CML
is facially unreliable specific causation evidence that there is a prob-
able causal association between the decedent's CML and the
decedent's benzene exposures.
Likewise, in Chambers, the federal district court noted that sev-
eral studies mention the possibility that benzene exposure may
cause CML, "but each one concludes that there was no statistically
significant association between CML and exposure to benzene.,
249
The "personal opinions" of plaintiffs experts "do not suffice as
evidence" because "theories of toxic causation 'unconfirmed by
epidemiological proof cannot form the basis for causation in a
court of law.' ,,250 Consequendly, the court granted the defendant's
motion in limine to exclude the opinion testimony of the plaintiffs
causation experts.251 The Chambers court recognized that the prof-
fered testimony of the plaintiffs experts was pure ipse dixit. The
underlying epidemiologic data suggested a mere possibility that
benzene could cause CML, but the plaintiffs experts leapt across
244. 25 S.W.3d 280, 293 (Tex. App. 2000).
245. 81 F. Supp. 2d 661, 664 (M.D. La. 2000).
246. Austin, 25 S.W.3d at 293.
247. Id. at 290.
248. Id.
249. Chambers, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
250. Id. at 665 (quoting Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 315 (5th Cir.
1989)).
251. Id. at 666.
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an analytical gap and concluded that benzene probably causes
CML.
252
D. Putting It Together: The Daubert Test in Toxic Tort Cases
Courts "must address the recurring issue of what is the quantity
and quality of scientific evidence that a plaintiff must present on
the issue of medical causation in a world of imperfect scientific
knowledge."23 That issue will continue to recur as courts judge the
intrinsic reliability of proffered scientific and medical evidence
supporting or refuting a causal link between a toxic agent and an
injury. Courts will apply the reliability factors stated in Daubert and
its progeny-testability, general acceptance, peer-reviewed publica-
tion, litigation independence, error rate, etc. Aside from the
intrinsic reliability of the proffered evidence in toxic tort cases,
however, there is an additional question: To pass the gatekeeper,
what must intrinsically reliable scientific evidence show to substan-
tiate the causation experts' opinions concerning the probability
that the alleged exposures caused the plaintiff's injury? In other
words, does the intrinsically reliable evidence show what the ex-
perts say it shows? Judging the extrinsic reliability of proffered
evidence tests whether there is substantiation for the experts' opin-
ions, or whether the opinions are unreliable ipse dixit. Put yet
another way, is the proffered evidence reliable for the purpose
given? The remainder of this Article addresses this issue of extrin-
sic reliability. This is the point of a Daubert inquiry where
quantitative considerations such as Bayes' Law and sequential un-
certainties come into play.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to stress that, at the
Daubert phase, courts should not require the plaintiffs' causation
experts to prove that the exposures more likely than not caused
the plaintiffs' injuries. That is the standard of proof for the trier of
fact to decide the ultimate question of specific causation. To the
contrary, at the Daubert stage, the proponent of a causation opin-
ion has the burden to prove a lesser assertion: that the proffered
252. See Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2001)
("Mere possibility does not establish medical causation. Although an adverse case report is
not required to 'rule out' every other possibility to have some reliability, it should do more
than just fail to rule out the alleged cause.").
253. Id. at 1348.
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causation opinion has reliable substantiation."4 Reliability, not
truth, is the extant issue. The Daubert focus, then, is on the data
underlying the expert's opinions and the expert's extrapolations
from the relied-on data. With this focus in mind, the question is
what must the causation experts' evidence show, and what should
be the standard for determining the admissibility of proffered ex-
pert causation opinions in a toxic tort case?
We present our proposed test for determining the extrinsic reli-
ability of causation experts' opinions in toxic tort cases. After the
court has applied the relevant qualitative Daubert factors to deter-
mine whether the underlying causation data are intrinsically
reliable, the court should then determine whether the data are ex-
trinsically reliable. The inquiry at this stage is whether the
causation expert has reliable scientific evidence in support of an
opinion that the truth of each independent link in the causal chain
(diagnosis, general causation, and temporality) is highly probable,
that is, "clear and convincing." Alternatively, if two of the three in-
dependent causal links are undisputed or otherwise shown to be
true beyond a reasonable doubt, the experts' causation evidence
passes scrutiny if the third independent causal link is shown to be
true to a mere probability.
Then, if the experts' opinions survive this inquiry into the inde-
pendent causal links, the court must judge the evidence offered in
support of the "dependent" links of the specific causation analysis.
The expert must have reliable evidence addressing: 1) the dose or
exposure experienced by the plaintiff; 2) whether the plaintiff's
dose or exposure exceeded the level generally hazardous to hu-
mans and capable of causing the subject injury; and 3) alternative
causes and the predominance of the subject agent as the most
likely cause of the injury based on quantitative causation analysis.
The court must require the experts to produce reliable evidence
addressing each one of these dependent links. The experts' spe-
cific causation opinions must be rational inferences drawn from
the presented evidence.
254. "[P]rovability is a weaker notion than truth." DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, G6DEL,
ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 19 (1979). In turn, reliability is a weaker notion
than provability. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999)
("[T]he proponent of the testimony does not have the burden of proving that it is scientifi-
cally correct, but that by a preponderance of the evidence, it is reliable.").
255. An authoritative textbook of cancer epidemiology suggests the following criteria
for proof of causation that roughly parallel the criteria for evidence of causation suggested
in this Article:
Causality can be conclusively established between a particular exposure as an entity
and a particular disease as an entity. In contrast, it is not possible to establish such a
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To make clear, the causation expert need not show at the Daubert
phase the truth of each of these factors with clear and convincing
256evidence. Rather, the expert's burden at the Daubert phase is to
show: 1) that there are reliable scientific data supporting the opin-
ion that each independent causal link is true to a high probability;
and 2) that the experts' specific causation conclusion rationally
flows from the evidence presented. The court fulfills its gatekeep-
ing duty by reviewing the scientific evidence presented by the
expert witness to determine its reliability, considering the reliability
factors and principles set forth in Daubert and its progeny. The ex-
pert's failure to produce reliable scientific evidence supporting the
opinion that any one of the independent causal links is true to a
high probability,257 or failure to produce reliable scientific evidence
that the agent most likely caused the plaintiff's injuries, would ren-
der the expert's opinions unreliable and inadmissible.
link conclusively between an individual exposure and a particular disease of a given
individual, for example, smoking in a patient with lung cancer. It is possible, however,
to infer deductively that the specific individual's illness was more likely than not caused
by the specified exposure. For this conclusion to be drawn, all of the following crite-
ria must be met... : (1) The exposure under consideration, as an entity, must be an
established cause of the disease under consideration as an entity .... (2) The rele-
vant exposure of the particular individual must have properties comparable (in terms
of intensity, duration, associated latency, etc.) to those that have been shown to cause
the disease under consideration. (3) The disease of the specified person must be
identical to, or within the symptomatologic spectrum of the disease that, as an entity,
has been etiologically linked to the exposure. (4) The patient must not have been
exposed to another established or likely cause of this disease. If the patient has been
exposed to both the factor under consideration (for example, smoking) and another
causal factor (for example, asbestos), individual attribution becomes a function of
several relative risks, all versus the completely unexposed: (a) relative risk of those
who only had the exposure under consideration, (b) relative risk of those who had
only been exposed to the other causal factor(s), and, (c) relative risk of those who
had a combination of these exposures. (5) The relative risks allow inferences about
probabilities in individuals, provided that the association has been documented as
unbiased, unconfounded, precise, and causal. This is because a relative risk has a
baseline component equal to 1 that characterizes the unexposed and another com-
ponent that applies only to the exposed.
Adami & Trichopoulos, supra note 10, at 108 (citing BRIAN MACMAHON & DIMITRIUS
TRICHOPOULOS, EPIDEMIOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND METHODS (1996)).
256. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (observing that
the proponent of opinions need not prove that the opinions are correct, but that they are
reliable) ("The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of
correctness.").
257. See infra Part VIII.D.2 (discussing a qualification of this proposed standard of
proof).
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Note that this standard of admissibility addresses the causation
expert's extrapolation from "reliable" scientific evidence." s Before
reaching this point of Daubert scrutiny, the court must weed out the
intrinsically unreliable scientific data by application of the four ex-
press Daubert factors and other reliability factors developed by the
courts following Daubert.29 In many cases, the expert's proffered
opinions may involve such unreliable methodologies as to render
the opinions inadmissible before the court turns to the expert's
extrapolations from the data (the extrinsic reliability).2 0
In the remainder of this Section, this Article will explain in more
detail the proposed standard for admission of expert causation tes-
timony in toxic tort cases. A discussion of each of the independent
258. The Joiner Court made clear that an examination of the expert's extrapolations, as
well as the expert's methods, is within the scope of a court's Daubert scrutiny. Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit [bare authority] of the expert. A court may conclude that there is sim-
ply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered."); see also Allison
v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 1999) ("[Daubert decisions] warn
against leaping from an accepted scientific premise to an unsupported one."). But see
Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 326-27 (2002) (citing pre-Joiner and
pre-Daubert cases to hold, under Illinois law, that experts' conclusions, no matter how novel,
are admissible so long as experts' methods are generally accepted).
259. See supra Part VIII.A (discussing the reliability factors considered by the Daubert
Court and its progeny); see also Castellow v. Chevron USA, 97 E Supp. 2d 780, 793 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (recognizing that expert's recalculations and changes of opinion during litigation
"call into question the validity of his opinions and undermine the value of those calculations
to a factfinder"); Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (E.D. Tenn.
1999) (recognizing several "red flags" raised by plaintiffs causation expert's opinions, in-
cluding the fact that the expert reached his conclusions before completing his research); 2
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, 702-23 to 702-38 (8th
ed. 2001) (describing the seven "red flags" that insinuate unreliability of proffered expert
opinions).
260. The "extrinsic reliability" criterion as applied to specific causation testimony sug-
gested in this Article is analogous to the "fit" criterion established in Daubert and applied by
subsequent courts. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I), 43 F.3d 1311,
1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that, post-Daubert, courts must determine not only
whether the proffered testimony is "good science"-intrinsically reliable-but also "ensure
that the proposed expert testimony is 'relevant to the task at hand,' i.e., that it logically ad-
vances a material aspect of the proposing party's case") (citation omitted). The Supreme
Court referred to this second prong of the analysis as the "fit" requirement. Id. at 1321 n.17
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993)). Whichever label,
the issue is: Does the evidence actually support what the expert says? More particularly, does
the expert have data supporting the opinion that the agent most likely caused the plaintiff's
injury? Evidence that does not fit, that is, evidence that is extrinsically unreliable, is irrele-
vant and inadmissible even if intrinsically reliable. For example, a high-quality, large-scale
epidemiology study that detects a statistically significant elevated risk of acute myelogenous
leukemia (AML) in workers exposed to relatively high levels of benzene for twenty or more
years may have intrinsic reliability, but lacks extrinsic reliability to support a claim that low-




links of the causal chain-diagnosis, general causation, and tem-
porality-and the dependent links of specific causation-
dose/exposure, threshold, and alternative causation follows. Then,
the Article will discuss each of these causal links in the context of
Daubert case law.
1. The Independent Links and Sequential Uncertainties-The inde-
pendent links of the causation chain are diagnosis, general
causation, and temporality. These links are independent in the
sense that experts can reach conclusions concerning each one of
them without reference to any other causal link. For example, a
physician can reach a diagnosis of a disease without knowing when
the patient was exposed to the agent or whether the agent is capa-
ble of causing the diagnosed disease. Similarly, an epidemiologist
can determine whether the agent at issue is capable of causing a
particular disease without knowledge of the physician's diagnosis in
a particular case.
A valid analysis requires the court to separately consider these
three independent causal links. As explained above, proper use of
the sequential uncertainties principle, also known as the product
rule, requires independence for each link in the causal chain, just
as each flip of a coin is independent of all prior flips. 2 61 In counter-
point, the product rule does not apply to dependent links in a
causal chain, such as the "exposure/dose" link and the related
"threshold" link. These links are dependent because the latter link,
addressing whether the exposure/dose in a particular case was suf-
ficient to cause the injury, is dependent on the exposure/dose at
issue.
It is the principle of sequential uncertainties that compels the
standard of proof suggested above. To reiterate, this Article sug-
gests that the court should require causation experts to produce
reliable scientific evidence in support of an opinion that the truth
of each independent link in the causal chain is highly probable,
that is, "clear and convincing." Alternatively, if two of the three in-
dependent causal links are undisputed or otherwise shown to be
true beyond a reasonable doubt, the experts' causation evidence
passes scrutiny if the third independent causal link is shown to be
true to a mere probability. Pursuant to sequential uncertainties, if
each independent link is merely probable (say P = 0.7), then the
probability of all three independent links being true would be less
likely than fifty percent (0.7 x 0.7 x 0.7). On the other hand, if two
261. See supra Part VII (explaining "independent" events and the importance of the
concept of independence in statistical analysis).
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of the three independent links are uncontested (P = 1.0) or other-
wise shown to be beyond reasonable doubt (say, P = 0.9), then the
experts' causation chain remains intact so long as the third inde-
pendent link is probable (P > 0.5).
In this analysis, the Article addresses various standards of proof,
namely, "more likely than not," "probable," "clear and convincing,"
"highly probable," and "beyond reasonable doubt." These stan-
dards of proof require some explanation. Here, the Article takes a
small detour to discuss them.
2. Standards of Proof-As discussed at the beginning of this Arti-
cle, a toxic tort plaintiff must establish that exposures to the toxic
agent probably caused the injury. The term "probable" is easy
enough to understand, with a consistent definition in the disci-
plines involved in toxic tort cases: statistics, toxicology, medicine,
and the law. In statistics, the term "probable" is designated as P >
0.5.62 Toxicologic and epidemiologic researchers apply this statisti-
cal concept in their work. In essence, the meaning of the term
"probable" in law is the same, stated in such phrases as "prepon-
derance of the evidence," "more probable than not," or a "balance
of probabilities.
26
"[P]hrases such as 'clear and convincing,' 'clear, cogent, and
convincing,' and 'clear, unequivocal, and convincing' have all been
used to require a plaintiff to prove his case to a higher probability
than is required by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
264
On the other end of the proof scale, the "clear and convincing"
standard does not rise so far as the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard.65 The "clear and convincing" standard is "an intermedi-
ate standard of proof."2 66 In Colorado v. New Mexico, the United
262. See, e.g., Knapp & Miller, supra note 23, at 17 (probability lies between 0 and 1; 0
means the event cannot occur; 1 means the event definitely will occur; 0.5 means that the
event is equally probable to occur or not to occur).
263. "The first term[, preponderance of the evidence,] is the most common phrase
used in the United States, while the latter ones are more common in England and Austra-
lia." Statistical Evidence, supra note 18, at 200. "Indeed, terms and phrases such as 'beyond a
reasonable doubt,' 'preponderance of the evidence,' 'more likely than not,' and 'substantial
probability of cause' are arguably subject to statistical representation and analysis." Id. at 4.
Nevertheless, "[w]hile the use of statistics has burgeoned in court cases, this use has almost
never extended to quantifying and analyzing the uncertainty reflected in legal terms." Id.
264. California ex reL Cooper v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theatre, 454 U.S. 90, 93 n.6
(1981) (citation omitted).
265. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
266. Id.; see also Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (charac-
terizing "clear and convincing" as an "intermediate standard of proof'); BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed. 1999) ("[A clear and convincing evidence standard] indicat[es]
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. This is a greater burden
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States Supreme Court stated that the clear and convincing evi-
dence standard "place[s] in the ultimate factfinder an abiding
conviction that the truth of [the] factual contentions are highly
probable."267 This standard of proof, applied to causation testimony
as suggested in this Article, requires the plaintiffs' causation ex-
perts to produce reliable scientific evidence showing that each of
the three independent causal links (diagnosis, general causation,
and temporality) is highly probable.
Why do we suggest a "clear and convincing" level of evidentiary
proof of each causal link at the Daubert stage? This suggestion is a
consequence of sequential uncertainties. If any one of these links
was merely probable, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to
prove specific causation by a preponderance of the evidence (ex-
cept as discussed in the next paragraph). For example, suppose
that a causation expert has sufficient scientific data to demonstrate
that it is merely probable, but not clear and convincing, that the
subject agent is capable of causing the injury (that is, general cau-
sation). Let us set the probability of general causation in this
hypothetical at 60%, that is, P = 0.6. Even if the remaining two in-
dependent causal links (temporality and diagnosis) are each
assigned a very high probability of 90%, that is, P = 0.9, the overall
probability drops below 0.5:
0.6 x 0.9 x 0.9 = 0.49,
meaning that the scientific evidence does not support the plain-
tiff's claim.
Admittedly, if scientific data show that two of the causal factors
are true beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning each is true to a cer-
tainty of more than 95% (P > 0.95), the plaintiffs case can get past
the Daubert stage if the evidence in support of the remaining fac-
tor's truth supports a conclusion of mere probability. Likewise, if
the defendant does not challenge the admissibility of two of the
causal links, the court may assume that the probability of the truth
of the unchallenged links is 100%, and the causal chain passes
Daubert scrutiny so long as the expert has evidence that the remain-
ing causal link is probably true.
Based on this logic, we propose a standard for determining the
extrinsic reliability of proffered causation testimony. As stated
than preponderance of the evidence,... but less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
267. 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
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above, and repeated here, courts exercising their gatekeeping
function should require causation experts to produce reliable scien-
tific evidence demonstrating that the truth of each independent causal link
(diagnosis, general causation, and temporality) is clear and convincing; or
if reliable scientific evidence demonstrates that the truth of two of the three
independent causal links is uncontested or otherwise beyond a reasonable
doubt, then the causation expert's opinion is admissible if reliable scientific
evidence supports the truth of the remaining independent causal link to a
mere probability.
Even if the expert's testimony passes this scrutiny, the plaintiff
may nevertheless be unable to prove that the subject agent proba-
bly caused his injury. That ultimate issue is for the trier of fact. But
the testimony should not reach the trier unless the expert pos-
sesses reliable scientific evidence that the plaintiff's ultimate claim
that the agent caused the injury is "reasonably possible."2M Under
the principle of sequential uncertainties, toxic tort plaintiffs estab-
lish a reasonable possibility that the subject agents caused their
injuries only with reliable evidence that the causal links pass the
Daubert inquiry suggested above.
3. The Causal Links-The following subsections discuss each of
the links in the causation expert's chain of causation.
a. The Independent Link of Diagnosis-In most cases, the "diagno-
sis" link in the plaintiff's causation chain is among the strongest
links, most easily demonstrated to be reliable. 69 In many toxic tort
cases, the defendants do not challenge the medical doctors' diag-
noses,270 particularly when the diagnoses are formed independent
268. In Marino & Marino, supra note 208, at 27, the authors suggest that the court's
gatekeeping function is to determine whether the expert's testimony is "reasonably possi-
ble," and therefore reliable. Defining their terms, the authors state: "'Possible' means only
that the causal relationship is not impossible. In science, 'possible' can be applied to any
asserted causal relation because none are impossible. The term 'reasonably possible' refers
to causal statements whose probability of truth is greater than the naked minimum (any-
thing greater than zero)." Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). "Any standard of truth greater than
'reasonably possible' would usurp the function of the trier of fact." Id. at 27. Marino and
Marino's "reasonably" does not qualify "possible" in any meaningful way because the phrase
still applies to anything that is at all possible, which-according to Marino and Marino-
means it applies to any asserted causal relation. For this Article, the authors adopt a differ-
ent and, we think, more useful definition of "reasonably possible." That is, the truth of the
plaintiff's assertion that the exposure caused the injury is "reasonably possible" only if reli-
able scientific evidence demonstrates that each link in the causal chain is most probable.
269. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[D]ifferential
diagnosis generally is a technique that has widespread acceptance in the medical commu-
nity, has been subject to peer review, and does not frequently lead to incorrect results.").
270. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 E3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (involving
plaintiff with severe sinus problems that required surgery); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 E3d
381, 383 (2d Cir. 1998) ("There is no doubt in the case before us either as to the injury or as to
the defendant's wrong; both are conceded."); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.
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of the litigation. In such cases, the accuracy and reliability of the
medical diagnosis are not at issue. The court may accept the diag-
nosis as proven, with a probability of 100% (P = 1.0).
Courts are highly deferential to physicians' conclusions based on
differential diagnoses.'1  This deference is misplaced, given that a
treating physician's testimony "is subject to the same standards of
scientific reliability that govern the expert opinions of physicians
hired for purposes of litigation."27 In addition, a court should never
defer to the plaintiffs' experts no matter what their qualifications
are. In effect, such deference imposes on the defendant the burden
of demonstrating the unreliability of the plaintiff's proffered
medical causation testimony, contrary to the law. Most important,
Cir. 1996) (involving plaintiff with birth defects); McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038
(2d Cir. 1995) (involving plaintiff with throat polyps); Wilson v. Petroleum Wholesale, Inc.,
904 F. Supp. 1188 (D. Colo. 1995) (involving plaintiff with hearing loss and tinnitus). The
defendants in these cases conceded that the medical experts' differential diagnoses were
reliable. The major issue in these cases was general causation: Could the alleged exposure
have caused the plaintiffs disease? Thus, the physicians' differential diagnoses were not at
issue.
271. See, e.g., Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260-61 (6th Cir. 2001)
(reversing trial court's exclusion of doctor's causation testimony that plaintiffs carpal tunnel
syndrome was occupationally induced) ("[D]ifferential diagnosis is an acceptable method of
determining causation ... ."); Westberry, 178 F.3d at 262-63 (finding that differential diagno-
sis is a tested methodology, subjected to peer review and publication, infrequently leading to
incorrect results, and generally accepted in the medical community); Boren v. Burlington N.
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 637 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Neb. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Westbery, 178 F.3d
257) ("The admission of an expert opinion on causation based on differential diagnosis has
been upheld by the federal courts.").
272. Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1207 (8th Cir. 2000). Medical diag-
noses are prominent in the debate as to whether, pursuant to Daubert, courts should assess
the reliability of "technical" evidence in the same fashion as they assess the reliability of
"hard science." CompareJean Macchiavoli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic
Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 Hous. L. REV. 369, 390-94 (2001) (arguing that a
physician's diagnostic methods are not "hard science" and thus the Daubert factors do not
apply), with Capra, supra note 186, at 706 ("[C]ourts that scrutinize nonscientific testimony
less rigorously than scientific testimony risk drawing a questionable line between the two
and encourage experts to evade the stricter Daubert factors by claiming to be nonscien-
tific."). Indeed, as argued in this section, many courts improperly have conflated a
physicians "scientific" causation analysis with their "technical" differential diagnosis and,
consequently, have deferentially treated the causation opinions of physicians, according to
them a less rigorous reliability analysis than accorded other causation scientists such as epi-
demiologists and toxicologists. See supra note 271. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the United
States Supreme Court addressed this issue, holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence re-
quire courts to assess the reliability of all proffered opinions based on scientific or technical
principles. 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999). The specific language of Rule 702 requires no less.
See supra note 11. However, the Court allowed lower courts to not apply all of the Daubert
reliability factors-testability, peer review and publication, error rate, and general accep-
tance-to "technical" opinions. Id at 150-51.
273. See supra note 2 (discussing the plaintiffs burden of proof on the issue of causa-
tion).
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the deference is undeserved; differential diagnoses are often
wrong, arguably among the least reliable of opinions allowed in
front of ajury. 4 The unreliability of differential diagnosis increases
in the context of litigation, where physicians are assisting claimants
pursuing money damages (or assisting defendants avoiding
payment of damages) rather than patients seeking treatment.1
75
274. See EDMOND A. MURPHY, THE LOGIC OF MEDICINE 201 (2d ed 1997) (stating that
the process of exclusion to arrive at a diagnosis is often abused and rarely justified); B. Er-
menc, Comparison of The Clinical and Post Mortem Diagnoses of the Causes of Death, 114 FORENSIC
SCI. INT'L 117 (2000) (comparing post-mortem diagnoses with clinical diagnoses and find-
ing total agreement in 49.30% of diagnoses and total disagreement in 9.87% of cases);
Lician L. Leape, Error in Medicine 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994) ("Autopsy studies have
shown high rates (35 percent to 40 percent) of missed diagnoses causing death.... [A] I
percent failure rate is substantially higher than is tolerated in industry, particularly in haz-
ardous fields such as aviation and nuclear power. As W.E. Deming points out (written
communication, November 1987), even 99.9 percent may not be good enough: 'If we had to
live with 99.9 percent, we would have: 2 unsafe plane landings per day at O'Hare, 16,000
pieces of lost mail every hour, 32,000 bank checks deducted from the wrong bank account
every hour.'"). In one study, researchers found that autopsy disproved 27% of the main
clinical diagnoses, and in another 12% of cases, autopsies demonstrated that the main clini-
cal diagnoses were merely subsidiary in contributing to death. H.M. Cameron & E.
McGoogan, A Prospective Study of 1152 Hospital Autopsies: I. Inaccuracies in Death Certiicates, 133
J. PATHOLOGY 273 (1981). "Experience has shown many ways in which clinical judgments
can go awry." Farber, supra note 228, at 1257 (citing R. APFEL & S. FISHER, To Do No HARM:
DES AND THE DILEMMAS OF MODERN MEDICINE 142 (1984)); see also To ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A BETTER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (asserting that
between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die in hospitals each year as a result of medical errors).
Some courts tacitly have acknowledged the weaknesses of differential diagnoses in the con-
text of litigation by stating, tautologically, that a reliable differential diagnosis "does not
frequently lead to incorrect results." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 758 (3d
Cir. 1994). "If a reliable differential diagnosis does not frequently lead to incorrect results,
consider the likelihood of an invalid result when the ruling out process is not so reliable."
Sheldon Margulies, The Differential Diagnosis: Its Use and Misuse, FOR THE DEFENSE, Aug. 2002,
at 14, 56.
275. Courts recognize that expert opinions offered in the courtroom, including medi-
cal opinions, are less reliable than those offered in practice, in research, and for peer review.
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert I1), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that one reliability factor to consider is whether the expert reached his or her opin-
ion for the purpose of testifying, and that courts "may not ignore the fact that a scientist's
normal work place is the lab or field, not the courtroom or the lawyer s office); Soido v.
Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 E. Supp. 2d 434, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2003) ("Expert opinions gener-
ated as the result of litigation have less credibility than opinions generated as the result of
academic research or other forms of 'pure' research."); Newton v. Roche Labs., 243 F. Supp.
2d 672, 679 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (observing that an expert of dubious qualifications "more
closely fits the profile of an 'expert for hire' whose opinions are more likely to be biased");
Trigon Ins. Co v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 289 (E.D. Va. 2001) (observing that some
experts "are of dubious assistance to the trier of fact" and are "often less then [sic] helpful
and sometimes misleading"). As stated in Stolson v. United States, "there is not much difficulty
in finding a medical expert witness to testify to virtually any theory of medical causation
short of the fantastic." 708 E2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1983). Justice William 0. Douglas ex-
pressed a blunt view on this topic: "[A] doctor for a fee can easily discover something wrong
with any patient .... [A doctor's or psychiatrist's] report may either overawe or confuse the
jury and prevent a fair trial." Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 125 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
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The respective parties' attorneys retain experts to testify as to a
particular opinion. Cases in which the defendant challenges the
plaintiffs medical expert's diagnosis present the courts with
antagonistic medical opinions concerning diagnoses. Someone is
wrong. The court should not tip the scales by deferring to either
party's medical causation experts.
Indeed, the courts' Daubert analysis must include scrutiny of the
plaintiffs medical expert's diagnosis if challenged by the defen-
dant with competent medical evidence. Bayesian analysis bears on
this issue. Physicians should, and do, take into account the base
rate of the disease in the population when determining the most
likely disease afflicting an individual based on the signs and symp-
toms presented.
[P]hysicians frequently rely on the principles of Bayesian
reasoning when deciding on a diagnosis. Doctors combine
probabilities of disease (prevalence) with their knowledge of
the frequency of signs and symptoms in a given disease and
competing diseases to progressively modify and ultimately
dissenting in part). A lawyer who wants to tell a story to the jury can always find an expert to
help. As Bernard Goldberg put it in the context of biased journalism: "[H] ere's one of those
dirty little secrets journalists are never supposed to reveal to the regular folks out there in
the audience: a reporter can find an expert to say anything the reporter wants-anything!"
BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT THE NEWS 20
(2002). Lawyers can do the same.
For a stark example of judicial skepticism of a litigation-dependent "differential diagno-
sis," see Reiff v. Denver Publ'g Co., No. 98-Z-1658, 1999 WL 1442047 (D. Colo. Dec. 23,
1999). In Reiff the plaintiff's retained medical expert conducted a "differential diagnosis"
and determined that the plaintiff's short-term, occupational exposure to lacquer thinner
caused certain acute symptoms. Id. at *5-6. The medical witness relied solely on the plain-
tiff's oral medical history presented to him in the context of litigation, years after the
exposure incident. Id. at *6. The court observed that a medical history given independent of
litigation is generally reliable, "based on the reasonable assumption that patients who are
seeking diagnosis and treatment for a medical illness would not fabricate their symptoms."
Id. The court, however, would not extend this assumption of reliability to the plaintiffs oral
history underlying the medical expert's "differential diagnosis." Under the circumstances,
the court concluded that the plaintiff did not appear in the doctor's office "for diagnosis
and treatment of any illness or symptoms," but rather "for purposes of assisting in this law-
suit." Id. at *6-7. Thus, the court excluded the medical witness's opinions based on this
"sham" consultation. Id.
For a clear example of judicial preference for litigation-independent diagnosis of the
plaintiff's treating physicians as compared with the retained expert's diagnosis reached in
the context of litigation, see Sepulveda v. HHS, No. 92-349V, 1995 WL 502887 (Fed. Cl. Aug.
10, 1995). "It is difficult to believe that the treating physicians, who worked so hard to de-
termine a diagnosis for petitioner, and who specifically noted the particular cranial nerve
involvement petitioner endured, simply missed the diagnosis of bulbar poplio [offered by
petitioner's retained medical expert]." Id. at *3.
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arrive at their view of the likelihood of the disease under
consideration."
276
Courts should consider the specificity of the plaintiff's medical
expert's observations and tests. Did the expert consider the preva-
lence of the diagnosed disease and the prevalence of other diseases
manifesting the same signs and symptoms? How did the expert
eliminate competing diseases as the most likely disease? These are
the types of questions that toxic tort defendants should raise when
challenging the plaintiffs medical diagnosis, and that the court
should consider in its Daubert analysis.
The plaintiffs claim faces serious trouble if the defendant as-
serts a legitimate challenge to the medical expert's diagnosis. Such
cases frequently result in summary judgment for the defendant
because an unreliable diagnosis overlays other weak causal links.
For example, in Downs v. Perstorp Components Inc., a chemical
splashed on the plaintiffs arms and face causing an immediate
burning sensation.277 Later, the plaintiff allegedly experienced neu-
rological symptoms and sought treatment from Dr. Kaye Kilburn,
who diagnosed chemical encephalopathy and opined that the
chemical splash had caused the injury.278 The magistrate judge ex-
cluded Dr. Kilburn's proffered causation opinion, finding that it
failed to meet Daubert's reliability test.2 7 9 The appellate court af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Dr.
Kilburn relied on unorthodox neurological and neuropsychologi-
2810cal tests in reaching his diagnosis. In addition, Dr. Kilburn could
not cite a single scientific study suggesting that the chemical could
cause toxic encephalopathy. 21 Downs exhibits a typical pattern: an
276. Mary Sue Henifin et al., Reference Guide on Medical Testimony, in REFERENCE MAN-
UAL, supra note 44, at 439, 467.
277. 26 F. App'x 472, 474 (6th Cir. 2002).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 475-76.
281. Id. at 476. Dr. Kilburn's dismal track record in Daubert and Frye challenges may well
have played a part in the Downs court's rejection of his neurological opinions. Prior to
Downs, numerous courts had held that Dr. Kilburn's proffered opinions were unreliable and
inadmissible. See, e.g., Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2001); Valen-
tine v. Pioneer Chlor Alkali Co., 921 F. Supp. 666 (D. Nev. 1996); Thomas v. FAG Bearings
Corp., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Weaver v. Shoals Pest Control, No. CV-92-
000287 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Aug. 25, 1999), aff'd, 787 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 2000); Lofgren v. Motorola,
No. CV 93-095521, 1998 WL 299925 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 1, 1998); Goeb v. Tharaldson, No.
C3-92-602051 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 4, 1998), affd, No. CX-98-2275, 1999 WL 561956 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 3, 1999), affd, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000); Griffin v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc.,
No. DV-98-86150, 2000 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1320 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Sept. 28, 2000); see also
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 271 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (rejecting Dr. Kil-
burn's opinion that a settlement agreement was unfair to asbestos-exposed workers, in part
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unreliable general causation opinion often accompanies an unreli-
282
able diagnosis.
As a general rule, only physicians can offer medical diagnoses in
court.283 Other scientists, however, can opine on other causal links,
because Dr. Kilbur's "diatribe ... appeared immoderate and contrary to the weight of the
scientific evidence and therefore unpersuasive").
282. See, e.g., Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 134 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1998) (excluding opinion
that plaintiff developed "autoimmune disease with atrophy" caused by silicone contained in
a surgically implanted brain shunt); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 E Supp.
2d 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (excluding questionable diagnosis of plaintiff's chronic neurological
condition that lacked reliable scientific evidence that acute exposure to organic solvents
could cause such conditions), aff'd, 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002); Grant v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992 (D. Ariz. 2000) (excluding causation opinion because ex-
perts were unable to specify criteria for diagnosing "atypical syndrome" caused by breast
implants) ("[W] here experts propose that breast implants cause a disease but cannot specify
the criteria for diagnosing the disease, it is incapable of epidemiological testing."); Sander-
son v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (excluding opinion
that plaintiffs occupational exposures to fragrances caused her to develop "multiple chemi-
cal sensitivity").
283. See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 683 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming the trial
court's exclusion of plaintiffs retained expert on specific causation because the expert was
not a medical doctor), amended by, 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000); Newton v. Roche Labs., Inc.,
243 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (excluding expert's testimony that acne drug caused
psychiatric injury because, though he held himself out as a pharmacologist, expert had no
degree in pharmacology and had conducted no clinical research); Plourde v. Gladstone, 190
F. Supp. 2d 708 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding toxicologist not competent to perform "differential
diagnosis"), afffd, No. 02-9136, 2003 WL 21511764 (2d Cir. June 27, 2003); Magdaleno v.
Burlington N. R.R., 5 F. Supp. 2d 899 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding non-physician ergonomist
unqualified to opine as to cause of plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome); Whiting v. Boston
Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 19 & n.30 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding epidemiologist unqualified
to testify as to specific cause of a person's disease).
In In re TMI Litigation, the expert, James Gunckel, Ph.D. and Distinguished Professor
Emeritus at Rutgers University, had been Chairman of the Radiation Science Center, Chair-
man of the Department of Radiation and Environmental Health and Safety, and Chairman
of the Health Safety Council. 193 F.3d at 678. He offered to testify that residents in the vicin-
ity of the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor at the time of the accident were exposed to
radiation doses sufficient to cause erythema. Id. at 679. Despite his expertise in the area of
ionizing radiation, the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion of Gunckel's specific
causation testimony. Id. at 683.
Although Gunckel is a respected scientist, he is neither a medical doctor nor a health
physicist. So far as the record is concerned, his only knowledge of the health effects
of radiation was obtained from literature he reviewed in connection with his reten-
tion as an expert in this litigation. He plainly does not meet Rule 702's
"Qualifications" requirement and cannot, therefore, offer an expert opinion as to ra-
diation-induced medical conditions.
Id. at 680 (citations omitted).
More precisely, only physicians can offer diagnostic opinions concerning human illnesses.
See Bider v. A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 2004) (labeling engineers'
causation analysis as "nonmedical differential diagnosis"); cf Clausen v. M/V New Carissa,
339 F.3d 1049, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming admission of "differential diagnoses"
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particularly general causation. Consequently, it is important to dis-
tinguish "differential diagnoses" and "causation analyses," a
distinction often missed by courts. In a differential diagnosis, a
physician observes the symptoms and signs displayed by the patient
and conducts appropriate examinations and tests to arrive at a di-
agnosis of the patient's disease. s4 In contrast, a causation analysis is
an expert's method of determining by scientific means the most
likely cause of the disease. For example, an oncologist as a matter
of course conducts tests to determine the type of cancer causing
the plaintiffs symptoms (differential diagnosis), but seldom en-
gages in research to determine the cause of the tumor's
occurrence in the patient (causation analysis) . Many courts con
fuse the concepts of differential diagnosis and causation analysis.286
In one case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit distinguished between the treating doctor's differential di-
agnosis and his causation analysis:
Dr. Hof acknowledged that the differential diagnosis he per-
formed was for the purpose of identifying Delores Turner's
condition, not its cause. He admitted that he made no attempt
to consider all the possible causes, or to exclude each poten-
tial cause until only one remained, or to consider which of
two or more non-excludable causes was the more likely to
have caused the condition.
performed by aquatic biologists offered by both parties, each of whom offered differing
opinions concerning the cause of oyster deaths).
284. See Turner v. Iowa Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 474 (26th ed. 1995)) (defining differential diagnosis as a
systematic comparison of symptoms to determine the patient's disease).
285. See, e.g., Medalen v. Tiger Drylac U.S.A., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Minn.
2001). In Medalen, the plaintiff's medical witness answered the defense counsel's question as
to whether he attempted to determine the etiology of the plaintiffs basal cell carcilna
with: "I didn't attempt to determine it, because it really wouldn't impact treatment." Id. at
1137.
286. See, e.g., Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 260-61 (6th Cir. 2001)
(referring to physician's causation analysis as "differential diagnosis"); Westberry v. Gislaved
Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing differential diagnosis as a tech-
nique that identifies causes of medical conditions by eliminating likely causes until the most
likely cause remains); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d
584, 609 (D.N.J. 2002); Wilson v. Petroleum Wholesale, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 1188, 1190 (D.
Cal. 1995); Boren v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 637 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Neb. Ct. App.
2002) (stating that causation testimony based on differential diagnosis "has been upheld by
the federal courts" (citing Westbeny, 178 F.3d at 257)); see also 2 SALTZBURG ET AL., suprra note
259, at 702-32 (describing differential diagnosis as "excluding other causes, such as genetics
or other toxins, for a certain disease").
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As a treating physician, Dr. Hof wanted to identify Delores
Turners' [sic] condition so he could treat it. Dr. Hof's diagno-
sis was, we believe, one which the medical community more
properly identifies as "differential," see, e.g., Stedman's Medi-
cal Dictionary 474 (26th ed. 1995) (identifying differential
diagnosis as a systematic comparison of symptoms to deter-
mine which of two or more conditions is the one from which a
patient is suffering), rather than the type of causal diagnosis
which the legal community calls "differential," see, e.g., West-
berry, 178 F.3d at 262 (identifying differential diagnosis as a
technique that identifies the cause of a medical condition by
eliminating the likely causes until the most probable cause is
isolated) .27
Boiled down to essentials, a real, medical differential diagnosis de-
termines a patient's disease based on signs and symptoms,2ss while a
287. Turner, 229 F.3d at 1208; see also Lawrence v. Synthes Inc., No. 1623 EDA 2003 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2004) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that differential diagnosis can
determine causation because differential diagnosis addresses what a condition is and how to
treat it, while causal assessment determines how a condition arose).
288. For medical texts that define "differential diagnosis" consistently with the
definition employed in this Article, see STEPHEN N. ADLER ET AL., A POCKET MANUAL OF
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS, at xv (3d ed. 1994) ("In the practice of clinical medicine, one
encounters a variety of symptoms, signs, and laboratory tests. Each clinical finding and test
result is associated with a differential diagnosis; that is, a list of conditions or disease entities
that can produce the given finding or result."); BECOMING A CLINICIAN 40 (Shirley Neitch &
Maurice Murson eds., 1998) ("A differential diagnosis is a list of possible disease processes
which may explain the etiology of a patient's complaint."); CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 59
(J. B. Wyngaarden & L. H. Smith, Jr. eds., 17th ed. 1985) ("For each diagnosis considered,
the physician weighs information favoring that possibility against information that makes the
diagnosis unlikely. Consideration of alternative possibilities in the differential diagnosis is
helpful in directing the physician to select diagnostic studies that confirm or exclude each
possible diagnosis."); CLINICAL MEDICINE 13 (Harry L. Greene et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996) ("A
full diagnosis should answer the following questions: Is the identified disease(s) the
explanation of the patient's signs and symptoms?"); R. DOUGLAS COLLINS, DYNAMIC
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS, at xiii (1981) ("The basic premise of teaching differential
diagnosis is that the causes of each symptom can be analyzed by one or more of the basic
sciences of anatomy, histology, physiology, and biochemistry."); LEONARD V. CROWLEY,
INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN DISEASE 6 (4th ed. 1997) ("In a differential diagnosis, the
practitioner considers a number of diseases that are characterized by the patient's
symptoms."); RICHARD L. DEGOWIN & DONALD D. BROWN, DEGOWIN'S DIAGNOSTIC
EXAMINATION 2 (7th ed. 2000) ("The clues that are found suggest a list of problems from
which is generated hypotheses to explain the cause of the problems in terms of diseases in a
list called the differential diagnosis."); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 369
(W.B. Saunders ed., 26th ed. 1981) (defining differential diagnosis as "the determination of
which one of two or more diseases or conditions a patient is suffering from, by systematically
comparing and contrasting their clinical findings"); FRENCH'S INDEX OF DIFFERENTIAL
DIAGNOSIS, at Preface Page (I.A.D. Bouchier et al. eds., 13th ed. 1996) ("The guiding
principle throughout has been to suppose that a particular symptom attracts special notice
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so-called legal differential diagnosis is in fact a causation analysis,
which is the determination of the most likely cause of a plaintiffs
injury.
This confusion has consequences. It is important to distinguish
these two procedures because, as is often held, only medical ex-
perts (usually physicians) are qualified to provide testimony
2819concerning differential diagnoses. On the other hand' causation
analyses require input from other scientific health disciplines, such
as toxicology and epidemiology.290 The reliability of a physician's
in a given case, and that the diagnosis has to be established by differentiating between the
various diseases to which this symptom may be due."); MOSBY'S MEDICAL, NURSING, &
ALLIED HEALTH DICTIONARY 522 (6th ed. 2002) (defining differential diagnosis as "the
distinguishing between two or more diseases with similar symptoms by systematically
comparing their signs and symptoms"); TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY 581
(19th ed. 1997) (defining differential diagnosis as "identification of a disease by comparison
of illnesses that share features of the presenting illness, but differ in some critical ways");
TEXTBOOK OF GENERAL MEDICINE 6 (Mahendr Kochar ed., 1983) ("The most common and
important use of laboratory tests is diagnostic. Physicians use them as aids in selecting the
most likely diagnosis from a list of several possibilities that may have been suggested by the
history and physical examination, that is, in making the differential diagnosis."); THE
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 20 (A. McGehee Harvey et al. eds., 21st ed. 1984)
("Indications for further or more intensive examination may arise from consideration of the
differential diagnosis.... It is common practice to select laboratory tests on the basis of the
diagnostic possibilities under consideration.").
289. See, e.g., Smelser v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 1997) (limiting
biomechanics expert's testimony because, though he was qualified to determine injury-
causing forces in general, he was not qualified to render medical opinions regarding the
cause of plaintiffs injuries); Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (10th Cir. 1983)
(holding that a non-physician with a doctorate in immunology and professorship in pathol-
ogy was not qualified to attribute the plaintiff's injury to swine flu vaccine); Niklaus v.
Vivadent, Inc., U.S.A., 767 F. Supp. 94, 96 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that a Ph.D. in visual
science was not qualified to make a medical diagnosis of an eye condition). But see Martin v.
Shell Oil Co., 180 F Supp. 2d 313, 320 (D. Conn. 2002) (allowing plaintiffs' toxicology ex-
pert to opine that the subject chemical agent caused the plaintiffs' injuries).
290. At least two commentators have opined that physicians are unqualified to conduct
causation analysis. See Marino & Marino, supra note 208, at 12-14, 14 n.33 (distinguishing
between "scientific" methods and "medical" methods) ("Courts have rarely recognized the
impropriety of physicians testifying to causal links that are determinable only by the meth-
ods of science rather than medicine."); see also Siharath v. Sandoz Pharmns. Corp., 131 F.
Supp. 2d 1347, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("With respect to general causation, the relevant scien-
tific field is epidemiology or toxicology and not clinical medicine."); Mason v. Texaco, Inc.,
741 F. Supp. 1472, 1497 (D. Kan. 1990) (finding that scientists are more qualified than phy-
sicians to testify as to causation), rev'd on other grounds, 948 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991);
Ballentine v. The Terminex Int'l Co., No. 98C-836 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2004) (excluding
causation opinions of physicians because they were not toxicologists); cf Cloud v. Pfizer,
Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1134 (D. Ariz. 2001) ("[A] physician cannot rely on general ex-
perience to give reliable statistical evidence." (citing Erickson v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 131
F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2001))); Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp.
2d 147, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (excluding industrial hygienist's causation testimony because he
was not an epidemiologis ), afd, 303 E3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002). But see Magistrini v. One Hour
Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 E Supp. 2d 584, 611 (D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs argu-
ment that defendants' retained physicians could not testify on medical causation because they
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differential diagnosis depends on the quality of the physician's
clinical methods (medical/clinical history, examination, diagnostic
tests, etc.). These clinical methods have little to do with causation
analysis.291 In contrast, a causation analysis considers such things as
the "Relative Risk," "Odds Ratio," or "Attributable Risk," found in
relevant epidemiology studies; confounders; dose-response rela-
tionship; statistical significance; interspecies extrapolation from
relevant toxicology studies; chemical analogies; and the "BradfordHill.. . .292
Hill" criteria. These are the tools of causation science, not clini-
cal medicine.
Nevertheless, physicians often present their causation analyses in
the context of differential diagnoses. In this way, physicians are
able to bootstrap their causation opinions through the permissive
admissibility sieve accorded physicians' clinical diagnoses. Courts,
however, should apply the same close scrutiny to physicians' causa-
tion analyses as they apply to the causation opinions of scientists
293such as toxicologists and epidemiologists. The deference ac-
corded medical witnesses' causation opinions, supported with scant
scientific evidence, permits lay juries to find causal links science
has not found.294 After all, it was causation analyses masquerading
were not epidemiologists); Michael B. Kent, Jr., Daubert, Doctors And Differential Diagnosis:
Treating Medical Causation Testimony As Evidence, 66 DEF. COUNs. J. 525, 532 (1999) (averring
that physicians can testify on issues of general causation, but they must employ the tools of
toxicology and epidemiology to do so).
291. See Henifin et al., supra note 276, at 472 ("[A]n expert's opinion on diagnosis and
his or her opinion on external causation should generally be assessed separately, since the
bases for such opinions are often quite different.").
292. See generally Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on Toxicology,
in REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 44, at 401, 401; Green et al., supra note 64, at 333.
293. See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
("[T]he mere statement by an expert that he or she applied differential diagnosis in deter-
mining causation does not ipso facto make that application scientifically reliable or
admissible.").
294. Long ago legal scholars recognized that:
What is needed is a separation between the issue of cause and all the other issues,
which are often meritorious in themselves but too frequently parade meretriciously
in the guise of cause. Perhaps this would affect substantive results only a little, but it
would contribute much to clarity of thought.
FlemingJames, Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761, 811 (1951). To help sepa-
rate a physician's causation analysis from his or her differential diagnosis, thereby clarifying
thought, courts should bar evidence concerning a physician's differential diagnosis in cases
in which the diagnosis itself is not at issue. If the diagnosis is unchallenged, the physician's
clinical methods are irrelevant.
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as the physicians' diagnoses that opened the courthouse doors to
the ludicrous trauma-cancer cases.295
Here, it is important to reiterate the distinction between "gen-
eral causation" and "specific causation." To establish causation in a
toxic tort case, the plaintiffs experts must be able to testify that the
dose of the toxic agent at issue is capable of causing the disease
(that is, general causation).29 6 Then, the plaintiffs experts must be
able to testify that the alleged exposure in fact caused the plain-
tiffs injury (that is, specific causation) .297 General causation is the
purview of the toxicologists and epidemiologists. 29 On the other
hand, the issue of specific causation requires input from medicine
and the scientific causation fields of toxicology and epidemiology.
The determination of the cause of a patient's disease must be based
in part on the medical history of the patient, which will provide
clues as to the cause of the patient's disease. Only a medical expert is
295.. See supra note 202 (discussing numerous cases in which physicians testified that
traumatic blows caused the plaintiffs' cancers even though science never identified trau-
matic blows as a cause of cancer).
296. See, e.g., Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1357 (N.D. Ga. 1999)
("General causation is the capacity of a product to cause injury ...."); Cartwright v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 906 (M.D. Fla. 1996) ("[T]he question for causation
purposes is: At what levels of exposure do what kinds of harm occur?"); Cavallo v. Star En-
ter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 764 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("[A]ll chemicals can cause health problems at
some level or concentration of exposure, but they vary widely in the types of harm caused
and in the levels of exposure required to trigger those harms. In addition, all chemicals have
thresholds of exposure that must be exceeded before the harms will occur, and these
thresholds may be identified through scientific studies and literature. The task of the toxi-
cologist, therefore, is to identify a dose-response relationship for a particular chemical (or
chemical mixture) and illness and analyze the results to determine whether the duration
and concentration of exposure in a given instance could have caused the alleged harms."),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996). Compare Wright v. Willamette
Indus., Inc., 91 E3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs failed to make a submissible
case of formaldehyde poisoning because they failed to establish levels of formaldehyde ex-
posure generally hazardous to humans and plaintiffs' actual exposures), with Bednar v.
Bassett Furniture Mfg. Co., 147 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiffs made a
submissible case of formaldehyde poisoning because they established levels of formaldehyde
exposure generally hazardous to humans and that their infant daughter's actual exposures
likely exceeded hazardous levels).
297. See Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1164 (E.D. La. 1997) ("Proof of
causation has two components, general and specific. General causation deals with whether
the substance at issue... can cause diseases or disorders in people in general. Specific cau-
sation focuses upon whether the substance... was in fact the cause of the ailments or
symptoms in the particular patient."); see alsoCloud v. Pfizer, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132
(D. Ariz. 2001) (classifying causation expert's testimony into general or specific causation
"because in order to carry her burden of proof, Plaintiff must show both general and spe-
cific causation" (citing Raynor v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 104 E3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir.
1997))).
298. See Polaino v. Bayer Corp., 122 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D. Mass. 2000) (questioning qualifi-




qualified to review the person's medical history and weigh the po-
tential causes of the disease. A physician, however, can reliably
opine as to the potential causes of a patient's disease only if the
putative cause is among those agents epidemiologic or toxicologic
science has demonstrated to have a probable causal associationS 300
with the disease at issue. In addition, the physician must also con-
sider the patient's dose of the alleged causal agent, a factor of
import in medicine, toxicology and epidemiology.301
299. But see Martin v. Shell Oil Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 313, 320 (D. Conn. 2002) (holding
that the plaintiffs' toxicology expert could offer his specific causation opinion that methyl
tertiary-butyl ether [MTBE] caused the plaintiffs' injuries). The Martin court compounded
its error by holding that the toxicologist could offer his medical opinion that the plaintiffs
would require future medical monitoring for cancer. Id.
300. Tragically, not all courts apply this logic. Lack of scientific causation evidence did
not deter the trauma-cancer cases from reaching the factfinders, who then awarded dam-
ages to plaintiffs for injuries not caused by the traumatic blows. See supra note 202. In Suleski
v. United States, the court relied on a physician's testimony that swine flu vaccination caused
the plaintiffs Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS) despite the lack of reliable scientific evidence
that the vaccine could cause GBS more than six weeks after the injection. 545 F. Supp. 426,
430 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) ("[E]xpert epidemiological testimony is not determinative of the
issue of causation in this case ... ."). In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., the court affirmed
judgment for the family of a deceased agricultural worker who claimed that the decedent's
dermal absorption of the pesticide paraquat caused him to develop pulmonary fibrosis, a
claim unsupported by the science. 736 E2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In an oft-cited
passage, the court explained that a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established
by animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a
relationship exists. Id. As long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a conclu-
sion is sound, such as use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient examination,
products liability law does not require precluding recovery until a "statistically significant"
number of people have been injured or until science has had time and resources to com-
plete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. Id. Relying on Ferebee, the court in
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., affirmed a multimillion-dollar verdict for a child born with
birth defects. 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11 th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff lacked evidence that in utero
exposure to the spermacide used by her mother could cause such birth defects. Id. To the
contrary, the epidemiologic evidence presented by the defendant indicated no such associa-
tion. Id. The court, however, rejected the defendant's negative evidence, explaining that "it
does not matter in terms of deciding the case that the medical community might require
more research and evidence before conclusively resolving the question." Id. In Bonner v. ISP
Techs., Inc., the Eighth Circuit demonstrated that this "law leads science" reasoning somehow
survives Daubert and Joiner. 259 E3d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 2001). The Bonner court affirmed
judgment for a plaintiff claiming permanent brain damage as a result of occupational expo-
sures, a claim bereft of epidemiologic support. Id. The court explained: "The first several
victims of a new toxic tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply be-
cause the medical literature, which will eventually show the connection between the victims'
condition and the toxic substance, has not yet been completed." Id. (quoting Turner v. Iowa
Fire Equip. Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also supra note 202 (discussing
Bonner).
301. Benedi v. McNeil-PPC., Inc. presents a model of admissible causation testimony. 66
F.3d 1378 (4th Cir. 1995). In Benedi, the plaintiff claimed that a toxic combination of Extra-
Strength Tylenol and alcohol caused his liver damage. Id. at 1381. The plaintiff offered the
testimony of two liver disease specialists to prove general causation-that the toxic combina-
tion of the drug and alcohol is capable of causing the type of liver damage incurred. Id, at
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Another reason to distinguish between a physician's differential
diagnosis and his or her causation analysis is that, as mentioned
above, some courts are highly deferential to physicians' conclu-
sions based on differential diagnoses.02 Such deference, however,
1382. These experts were able to cite scientific literature to support their opinions that the
subject drug-alcohol combination was associated with an increased risk of liver injury. Id.
Then, the plaintiff offered the testimony of his two treating physicians to prove specific
causation-that the subject dose caused his liver damage. Id. These physicians examined the
plaintiff's liver and found evidence of drug toxicity; they also considered and eliminated
confounders, most prominently viral infections, as possible causes of the injury. Id. Finally,
the physicians considered the dose in concluding that the drug-alcohol combination caused
the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 1384.
302. See infta Part VTII.D.3.a (discussing the inappropriateness of deferring to a physician's
diagnosis in litigation). Worse than mere deference, some courts have stated that clinical medi-
cine is not a "hard" science and, hence, the Daubert factors are inapplicable. E.g., Moore v.
Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 E3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'den banc, 151 E3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998).
In Moore, the plaintiff alleged that he was occupationally exposed to irritating vapors that
caused him to develop Reactive Airway Disease (RAD), a diagnosis and causation supported by his
medical expert. M at 683. A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed a verdict for the defendant, hold-
ing that the trial court had abused its discretion by excluding the plaintiffs proffered medical
causation testimony. Id at 687-88. In the panel's view, the Daubert reliability factors applied to
"hard" or "Newtonian" science, and clinical medicine "is not a hard science discipline." Id at 682.
As a result, "the 'Daubert factors,' which are techniques derived from hard science methodology,
are, as a general rule, inappropriate for use in making the reliability assessment of expert clinical
medical testimony." Id Applying these principles to the proffered causation testimony, the court
held that the plaintiffs medical expert's opinions were grounded in the methodology of clinical
medicine. Id at 696. The expert had examined the plaintiff, conducted medical tests, eliminated
alternative causes, reviewed occupational safety standards, considered relevant medical literature,
and applied his experience in treating patients with respiratory diseases. Id The court concluded
that this methodology is well accepted within the field of clinical medicine, and thus the physi-
cian's failure to rely on epidemiologic evidence was not critical. Id
A dissenting judge assailed the Moore majority's "remarkable premise" that clinical medicine is
not a hard science. Id at 711 (Davis, J., dissenting). The dissenter complained that the medical
expert had no scientific support for his conclusion that exposure to any irritant at unknown levels
can trigger RAD. Id at 714. He observed: "The purpose of Daubert was to exclude such specula-
tion, based primarily on a temporal connection, as lacking any scientific validity." Id
The authors endorse Professor Capra's analysis of the Moorepanel's holding:
The Moore panel's analysis is flawed because it permits a party to evade the requirements of
hard science simply by calling a clinical expert who can testify to causation without having
to rely on epidemiological evidence, animal studies, or any other of the bases ordinarily
used by scientists. The fact that clinical medicine and laboratory medicine have different
goals does not mean that a clinical doctor should be able to testify to causation on the basis
of information that a laboratory scientist would reject as insufficient. The Moore court ig-
nored the fact that clinical experts treat patients--they do not conclude definitively on
causation in toxic tort situations. The Moore decision allows the clinical expert to testify in
court to a conclusion that the expert would not and could not reliably draw in his profes-
sional life.
Capra, supra note 186, at 750-51. Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit corrected its error en banc. Moore
v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 E3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v.Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997)).
Nevertheless, some commentators cling to the view that causation opinions offered by clini-
cians should be excused the exigent inquiry applied to opinions based on "hard" sciences. See, e.g.,
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should never extend to an expert's causation analysis merely be-
cause the expert is a physician, as in McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.30 s In
that case, the appellate court affirmed the admission of the medical
expert's testimony that occupational exposures to glue caused the
plaintiff's throat polyps despite the fact that the expert could point
to no studies identifying glue as a causative agent of that disease.
Nevertheless, the proffered causation testimony passed the court's
Daubert scrutiny because the doctor characterized his causation
Jean M. Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible ofDaubert,
38 Hous. L. REV. 369, 391-92 (2001) (arguing that causation assessment is a routine component
of differential diagnosis and, in effect, that a physician can reach a reliable causation conclusion
based on "experience and training" unaided by the "hard" sciences of toxicology and epidemiol-
ogy); Jack E. Karns, Establishing the Standardfor a Physician s Patient Diagnosis Using Scientific Evidence:
Dealing with the Split of Authority Amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 29 (2000)
("The idea that the trier of fact would be shielded from scientific evidence [based on a physician's
differential diagnosis] simply because it is not vetted in a manner comparable to methodologies
generally accepted in the legal community is not acceptable.").
As Professor Capra points out, this view creates "a perverse result: a party will have the incentive
to argue that its expert should be heard by the jury because the expert is not a scientist! This would
create a race to the bottom for experts, and that is a race that must be rejected." Capra, supra note
186, at 748-49. "A trial judge becomes a matador, not a gatekeeper, if she must admit nonscien-
tific expert testimony simply because the expert has the requisite experience." Id. at 741.
Regarding the role of Daubert, Professor Capra discusses that:
Even if the specific Daubert factors are held inapplicable, the Daubert gatekeeping function
is and must remain applicable to all expert testimony. Expert testimony of all stripes must
be reliable or else it is not helpful within the meaning of Rule 702, and [pace Professor
Karns' opinion to the contrary,] Daubert makes clear that it is up to the trial judge under
Rule 104(a) to determine that question.... Put in a positive sense, an expert who is not a
scientist should receive the same degree of scrutiny for reliability as an expert who pur-
ports to be a scientist.
Id. at 747.
In the authors' view, a physician's reliance on "experience" to reach a general causation con-
clusion is at bottom an unreliable ipse dixit: "It is so because I am an expert and I say it is so."
Baker v. Metro-North Railroad Co. exhibits the "race to the bottom" Professor Capra fears. No.
3:98CV1073(RNC), 2003 WL 22439730 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2003). The Baker court allowed a phy-
sician to testify that the plaintiffs repetitive motions at work caused the plaintiff to develop carpal
tunnel syndrome even though the physician failed to quantify the plaintiffs on-the-job repetitive
motion stresses. Id. at *2. The court believed that the physician's "differential diagnosis provides a
sufficiently reliable foundation for his opinions." Id. In contrast, the court barred the specific
causation opinions of the plaintiffs retained ergonomist due to the same failure to quantify the
plaintiff's workplace stressors. Id at *3. Even assuming that the ergonomist was qualified to offer
"medical causation testimony," the court nevertheless barred her specific causation opinion be-
cause her non-quantitative analysis "appears to differ substantially from the rigorous analysis an
expert in her field would employ in the course of his or her work.... Plaintiff offers no evidence
that experts in ergonomics determine medical causation without quantifying the individual's
exposure to known risk factors and taking account of rest periods." Id Thus, the court found
reliable the specific causation testimony of the nonscientist who used the same non-quantitative
analysis the court found unreliable in the hands of the scientist. The lesson to plaintiffs' attorneys:
Retain nonscientists to present quasi-science in court.
303. 61 E3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995).
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testimony as a differential diagnosis.3 4 The McCullock court failed
to recognize that "an expert's opinion on diagnosis and his or her
opinion on external causation should generally be assessed sepa-
rately, since the bases for such opinions are often quite
different."30 5 A differential diagnosis, no matter how well per-
formed, cannot establish general causation. 30 6
Contrast McCullock with Caraker v. Sandoz Pharmaceutical Corp., in
which the court did not defer to the physician's causation analysis."°7
Although the Caraker court mislabeled the physician's causation
analysis as a "differential diagnosis," in the end the error was harm-
less. The court recognized the impropriety of extending a
deferential review to the physician's causation determination.
The methodology [of differential diagnosis], in the abstract,
has been considered sound, but when it is used in the practice
of science (as opposed to its use by treating physicians in the
practice of medicine out of necessity) it must reliably "rule in" a
potential [sic] for the expert to reliably place the purported
potential cause on the differential diagnosis [sic] in the first
place as well as reliably "rule out" the other potential causes
until the physician is left with the most likely one. Both of these
steps must be based on sufficient and reliable data for the
methodology as a whole to be reliable. Thus, if the "ruling in"
step is bad or if an extrapolation from the existing data is par-
ticularly questionable or involves too great an analytical leap
(or several such leaps), the whole opinion is questionable.08
304. Id at 1043; see also Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 R Supp. 49, 55 (D.D.C. 1997)
(admitting causation opinions ostensibly based on differential diagnosis even though the defen-
dants did not dispute the diagnosis of the plaintiffs disease, and thus the medical experts'
differential diagnosis was not at issue, only their causation analysis); Cutip v. Norfolk S. Corp., No.
02-1051 (Ohio App. Apr. 11, 2003) (holding that a sound differential diagnosis obviates the need
for dose-response evidence or threshold dose data in determining admissibility of general causa-
tion evidence).
305. Henifin et al., supra note 276, at 472; see also Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 E3d 269,
275 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998) ("In other words, determining the etiology of a disease-its cause-
involves the same scientific exercise, whether the decision is made by a clinician, an epidemiolo-
gist, or other scientist.").
306. So-called signature diseases present an exception to this principle. See infra notes 315-
318 and accompanying text.
307. 172 F Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
308. Id (citations omitted). The court then held that the physician's differential diagnosis
was unreliable because the "ruling in" step--the determination that the drug at issue, Parlodel, is
capable of causing intracerebral hemorrhage-involved unreliable and unsupported extrapola-
tions, analytical leaps, and loose application of scientific causation standards. Id at 1048-53.
Similarly, in National Bank of Connmere v. Dow Chemical Co., the court mislabeled an expert's causa-
tion assessment as a differential diagnosis, but reached the correct conclusion. 965 E Supp. 1490,
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Similarly, in Wynacht v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., the court grasped
the distinction between differential diagnoses and causation analy-
ses: "The ability to diagnose medical conditions is not remotely the
same ... as the ability to deduce, delineate, and describe, in a scien-
tifically reliable manner, the causes of those medical conditions.0
0 9
To summarize, a reliable causation analysis depends on a proper
diagnosis by a physician. Then, given the diagnosis, the causation
expert must address the issue of general causation (that is, whether
the subject agent is capable of causing the diagnosed disease) and
specific causation (that is, whether the agent in fact caused the dis-
ease in the person diagnosed with the disease). In brief, a reliable
differential diagnosis is necessary, though insufficient, evidence of
causation. In Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the court explained:
Differential diagnosis is a patient-specific process of elimina-
tion that medical practitioners use to identify the "most likely"
cause of a set of signs and symptoms from a list of possible
causes. However, differential diagnosis does not by itself prove the
cause, even for the particular patient. Nor can the technique speak
to the issue of general causation. Indeed, differential diagnosis as-
sumes that general causation has been proven for the list of
possible causes it eliminates:
"The process of differential diagnosis is undoubtedly impor-
tant to the question of 'specific causation.' If other possible
causes of an injury cannot be ruled out, or at least the possi-
bility of their contribution to causation minimized, then the
'more likely than not' threshold for proving causation may
not be met. But, it is also important to recognize that a fundamen-
tal assumption underlying this method is that the final, suspected
'cause' remaining after this process of elimination must actually be
capable of causing the injury. That is, the expert must 'rule in' the
suspected cause as well as 'rule out' other possible causes. And, of
1513 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (recognizing that colon cancer "has many risk factors: diet, obesity, expo-
sure to environmental hazards, and genetics" that the plaintiff's causation expert failed to nile
out, but mislabeling this ruling out process as differential diagnosis even though the expert's
causation assessment was at issue, not the physician's diagnosis of colon cancer). Despite the mis-
nomer, the Caraker and NationalBank of Commetre courts reached the correct decision because they
did not defer to the physicians' causation analyses.
309. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1205,1209 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
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course, expert opinion on this issue of 'general causation'
must be derived from scientifically valid methodology."
3 10
If there is no scientific evidence linking the subject agent with the
type of injury at issue, then a so-called differential diagnosis cannot
supply it.31 On the other hand, causation analysis must address the
issue of general causation, the sine qua non of specific causation.
3 12
Although differential diagnoses generally do not require physi-
cians to form conclusions regarding causal agents, 5 there are rare
310. 947 F Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996) (first and second emphases added) (quoting
Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 E Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd on this ground, rev'd on other
grounds, 100 E3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996)).
311. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Black v. Food
Lion, Inc., 171 E3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming trial court's exclusion of physician's causa-
don opinion based on a differential diagnosis linking plaintiff's fall with her fibromyalgia because
physician lacked evidence that trauma can cause that disease); Glastetter v. Novartis Pharms.
Corp., 107 F Supp. 2d 1015, 1027 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (citing Ha/, 947 E Supp. at 1413) (stating that
differential diagnosis addresses specific causation, not general causation), affd 252 E3d 986 (8th
Cir. 2001); Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *24 (Ariz. Super. Ct.June
1, 1998) (stating that differential diagnosis is "unequivocally rejected by the scientific community"
as a means of determining causation); Valentine v. PPG Indus., No. 03CA17 (Ohio App. Aug. 20,
2004) (rejecting expert's differential diagnosis that chemical exposures caused plaintiff's glioblas-
toma multiforme because the only proven cause of the condition is ionizing radiation); Kent,
supra note 290, at 532 ("Testimony based on differential diagnosis is never admissible with regard
to whether a certain substance can generally cause the disease in question because it fails to satisfy
both the reliability and relevance requirements of Daubert."). But see Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l,
Inc., 128 E3d 802, 807-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (reversing trial court's exclusion of physician's causation
opinion based on a differential diagnosis even though physician produced no scientific literature
evidencing an association between the agent and plaintiff's cognitive problems).
312. See Fabrizi v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., No. 01-289, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9859, at "31-32.
(W.D. Pa. June 2, 2004) (finding that there was no need to reach the issue of admissibility of ex-
pert's specific causation opinion since the expert's general causation opinion was inadmissible);
Ha1 947 F Supp. at 1413 (holding that testimony regarding specific causation is irrelevant unless
general causation is established).
313. Bruce R. Parker, Understanding Epidetiolog and Its Use in Drug and Medical Device Litiga-
tion, 65 DEF. Cous. J. 35, 57 (1998); see also Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36
Hous. L. REv. 743, 866 (1999) ("When doctors treat patients, they may not need to reach a con-
clusion on causation. Only when causation is part of the physician's normal professional
conclusion (because a causation finding significantly alters the course of treatment) does the
physician utilize the same methodology in his or her practice as he or she does in preparing ex-
pert testimony...." (citation omitted)). As Professor Capra points out, "[a]n expert cannot be
expected to research a question of specific causation outside the context of litigation. Indeed, to
impose such a requirement would lead to the exclusion of every doctor who diagnoses a patient
for purposes of litigation." Capra, supra note 186, at 709. In contrast, issues of general causation
are independent of litigation. Experts should reach general causation opinions as scientists, not
witnesses. Id. Another commentator distinguished "opinion-based" medicine and "evidence-
based" medicine, explaining that most clinicians' practices do not reflect the principles of evi-
dence-based medicine but rather are based upon tradition, their most recent experience, what
they learned years ago in medical school, or what they have heard from their friends. John M.
Eisenberg, What Does Evidence Mean? Can the Law and Medicine Be Rec ?, Mar. 1, 2004,
http://www.ahcpr.gov/clinic/jhppl/eisenberg.htm.
The archetype of the physician who practices without a foundation of evidence-based
medicine is depicted by the old saw about the doctor who describes the rationale for his
decisions. When he says "in my experience," he means he has taken care of one patient
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exceptions. Some diseases are "pathognomonic," meaning that the
patient's signs and symptoms or diagnostic test results are "signa-
tures" of a disease caused by a particular agent. One prominent
example is angiosarcoma, a rare type of liver cancer, associated
314
with substantial occupational exposure to vinyl chloride. A diag-
nosis of "lead poisoning" defines the causative agent, insofar as it
requires demonstration of elevated lead levels in bone or blood.
Another signature disease, asbestosis, is diagnosed by the presence
of "ferruginous bodies" in lung tissues caused exclusively by asbes-
tos inhalation.31 5 In the rare pathognomonic disease case, general
316
causation is by definition not the issue. 6 The issue at bar in such a
case is the physician's diagnosis."7
A court should be very careful, however, when asked to accept a
signature disease as proof of causation. First, some signature
diseases are not as pathognomonic as once thought. Experts
like this. If he says "in my series of cases," he means he has taken care of two. And if he says
"in case after case after case," he means he has seen three.
314. In addition, there may be a fingerprint for vinyl chloride-induced angiosarcoma. Spe-
cific chromosomal mutation patterns appear to occur in VC-induced angiosarcoma. Sheri Stuver
& Dimitrios Trichopoulos, Cancer of the Liver and Biliay Tract, in TEXTBOOK OF CANCER EPIDFMI-
OLOGY 212, 224 (Hans-Olov Adams et al. eds., 2002).
315. See Piero Mustacchi, Lung Cancer Latency and Asbestos Liability, 17J. LEGAL MED. 277, 283
(1996) ("[Mesotheliomas] are so rare that, clinically speaking, any case occurring after a well
attested and substantial asbestos exposure is commonly accepted as being caused by that expo-
sure."); see also Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F Supp. 1490, 1513 (E.D. Ark.
1996) ("Mesothelioma is a 'signature' disease: The injury points directly to the substance that
caused it" (quoting David Levy, Scientific Evidence After Daubert, A.BAJ. LrrsG., Fall 1995, at 48
(1995))). Note the Bayesian thinking applied in signature disease causation analysis. Given the
overwhelming proportion of the disease caused by the subject agent, a very crude test-merely
observing the disease-is sufficiently specific to be a reliable predictor of causation.
316. See, e.g., Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court's
admission of physician's "manganese encephalopathy" diagnosis based on plaintiff's symptoms,
his occupational exposure to manganese fumes, and magnetic resonance imaging consistent with
manganese in plaintiffs brain); Reynolds v. S&D Foods, Inc., 162 FR.D. 661, 669-70 (D. Kan.
1995) (concluding that dog owners failed to demonstrate salmonella-contaminated dog food
caused injuries to their dogs in part because, according to one expert, the symptom displayed by
the injured dogs was pathognomonic of distemper unrelated to the salmonella). Compare
Klinglesmith v. HHS, No. 90-677V, 1991 WL 160321, at *2 (Cl. CL Aug. 1, 1991) (concluding that
vaccine shot did not cause patient's seizure, relying in part on medical expert's opinion that signs
displayed by patient" 'are almost pathognomonic of Herpes simplex meningoencephalitis' and a
strong indication that other causes of the encephalopathy [such as the vaccine shot] should be
excluded" (citation omitted)), andWilliams v. HiS, No. 94-1005V, 1997 WL 803112 (Fed. C3. Dec.
10, 1997) (concluding that patient's lymphocytosis was not pathogonomic of vaccine-induced
neurologic condition and thus "lymphocytosis has little or no probative value in establishing the
DPT's [diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccination's] causative role"), with Brennan, supra note 6, at
500 ("When a rare tumor is closely associated with a toxic substance, courts generally take the
causation issue as a given. This is the case in the asbestos litigation as well as in the diethylstil-
besterol/vaginal adenocarcinoma cases." (citations omitted)).
317. See, e.g, Hose, 70 E3d 968 (contesting plaintitfs medical expert's diagnosis of manga-
nese encephalopathy).
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believed that mesothelioma, mentioned in the previous paragraph,
resulted almost exclusively from asbestos exposure. Now, research
shows that mesothelioma is a sequella of exposure to simian virus
40 (SV 40), a contaminant of some polio vaccine batches.15 In
addition, there is a concern that the diagnosis itself may be a self-
fulfilling prophecy. For example, a physician, aware of the patient's
alleged occupational exposure to silica, may on the strength of that
allegation diagnose the patient's pulmonary fibrosis as silicosis.
Likewise, a physician may deem, post hoc, a pulmonary fibrosis as
asbestosis in a patient claiming prior asbestos exposure, or as
"black lung" (coal-workers pneumoconiosis, or CWP) in a patient
who is a coal miner. It is tautological that, if one defines the disease
by the associated agent, then the agent caused the disease. In a
putative signature disease case in which the plaintiff asks the court
to accept the disease itself as proof of causation, the court should
decline the invitation unless the specific diagnosis is beyond
genuine dispute.
b. The Independent Link of General Causation-Probability in the
fields of medicine and toxicology is more difficult than in the con-
text of statistics. While the term "probable" in essence means the
same thing as in statistics and the law, that is, P > 0.5, the quantifi-
cation of a biological response as the "possible" or "probable"
outcome of an exposure is difficult due to the inherent complexity
of biological systems, the uncertainties in the extrapolations from
species to species, and the physical and physiological variations
among individuals in a given species.3 19 How, then, is a court to de-
termine whether the plaintiff's expert has reliable scientific
evidence demonstrating the high probability that the subject agent
318. See generally NJ. Vogelzang, Emerging Insights into the Biology and Therapy of Malignant Meso-
the/ioma, SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY, Dec. 2002, Supp. 18, at 35, 35-42.
319. See Eaton & Klaassen, supra note 117, at 24-26 (discussing numerous factors inher-
ent in biological systems that influence responses to toxic agents). Courts recognize the
inherent weaknesses in animal studies as proof of causation due to "the fact that different
species of animals react differently to the same stimuli for reasons not entirely understood.
Immune systems, nervous systems, and metabolism (i.e., physical processing of chemical
compounds) may differ greatly between species." Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 959
F.2d 1349, 1359 (6th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted); see also In Ye Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.,
35 F.3d 717, 743 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[Animal studies may be methodologically acceptable to
show that chemical X increases the risk of cancer in animals, but they may not be method-
ologically acceptable to show that chemical X increases the risk of cancer in humans.");
Farber, supra note 228, at 1228 ("Animal studies, although useful, generally involve much
higher doses that are difficult to extrapolate to low doses over prolonged periods; there is
also the question of whether extrapolation of results between species is valid."); Hall & Sil-
bergeld, supra note 66, at 443 ("[Toxicological studies] are generally viewed with more
suspicion than epidemiological studies, because they require making the assumption that
chemicals behave similarly in different species.").
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is capable of causing the plaintiff's injury?32 0 At this point, the
courts must turn to the Bradford Hill criteria.3
As discussed in subsection V(A), an epidemiology study show-
ing a statistical association between an agent and a disease is
not by itself proof of a causal association. Researchers apply
the Bradford Hill criteria, or a variant of these criteria,
to determine whether a statistical association is in fact causal. 22
320. At this point of the court's scrutiny of the expert's causation analysis, the court
should defer the "dose" issue. So long as the expert has scientific evidence that the subject
agent is capable of causing the specific disease at any dose, the expert's evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable to pass this step of the Daubert analysis. Although consideration of dose is
crucial for a reliable causation analysis, the court should defer consideration of dose until
reaching the "specific causation" phase of the analysis, see infra Part VIII.D.3.d, thereby pre-
serving the "general causation" inquiry as an independent link. The court should note the
dose or exposure level found in epidemiologic and toxicological studies that elicits the spe-
cific disease, then consider whether the plaintiff's dose or exposure was sufficient to elicit
the disease at the subsequent specific causation step of the court's inquiry.
321. See supra Part V.A (discussing the Bradford Hill criteria).
322. The scientific community widely accepts the Bradford Hill criteria as the measure
of a general causation determination. See, e.g., Guidelines for Classification of Occupational Car-
cinogenicity, in AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS,
DOCUMENTATION OF THE THRESHOLD LIMIT VALUES AND BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE INDICES, at
i (7th ed. 2001) (relying on many of the Bradford Hill criteria for interpreting epidemiol-
ogical data, particularly: (1) consistency with other epidemiologic studies, (2) specificity or
risk associated with work areas having high exposures, (3) strength of statistical association,
(4) dose-response relationship, (5) coherence with known biological mechanism,
(6) temporal relationship between exposure and disease, and (7) statistical significance);
INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 60
JARC MONOGRAPHS ON THE EVALUATION OF CARCINOGENIC RISKS TO HUMANS: SOME IN-
DUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 19-20 (1994) (adopting the Bradford Hill criteria for causality, relying
upon the criteria of a strong association, the replication of findings from study to study, the
need for increasing exposure to lead to increasing disease, the specificity of the association,
and the necessity to control for bias and confounding); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGENIC RISK ASSESSMENT, EPA/630/P-03/001F, at 2-11 to
2-15 (2005) (following the Bradford Hill criteria for establishing potential causal associa-
tions in the course if its regulatory analyses, requiring specifically: (1) the establishment of a
temporal relationship; (2) the magnitude of the association, exposure, and dose considera-
tions; (3) the specificity of the association and biological plausibility; and (4) coherence);
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH CRITERIA No. 72: PRINCIPLES OF
STUDIES ON DISEASES OF SUSPECTED CHEMICAL ETIOLOGY AND THEIR PREVENTION 40-48
(1987) (reiterating most of the Bradford Hill criteria as the necessary elements for establish-
ing a potential causal association).
Numerous textbooks authored by various epidemiologists adhere to the Bradford Hill cri-
teria as the methodological basis for evaluating causality. See, e.g., Elaine M. Faustrnan &
Gilbert S. Omenn, Risk Assessment, in CASARE-r & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE
OF POISONS, supra note 117, at 83, 90-91;JUDITH S. MAUSNER & SHIRA KRAMER, EPIDEMIOL-
OGY: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 180-93 (1985); RICHARD R. MONSON, OCCUPATIONAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 99-103 (1980); Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Causation and
Causal Inference, in MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 7, 24-28 (Rothman & Greenland eds., 2d ed.
1998).
Finally, a number of occupational medicine textbooks describe these criteria as the
method by which to evaluate epidemiological evidence. Ellen A. Eisen & David H. Wegman,
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Courts do the same.
A judge need not "don the scientist's cap" to scrutinize the reli-
ability of an expert's general causation opinion. In some cases, the
causation expert will have no support in the scientific literature for
the proposition that the subject agent causes the subject disease. 24
That is, the expert will have no epidemiologic studies suggesting a
relationship between the agent and the disease, and no toxicologi-
cal studies showing that animals exposed to the agent develop the
disease. In such cases, the judge should bar the proffered general
causation testimony as unreliable.
Other cases may present some minimal but still insufficient data
to support admissibility. For example, the expert may point to one
or more epidemiologic studies showing an elevated risk of disease
associated with the agent, but the risk is "statistically nonsignifi-
cant." 25 Perhaps the expert will have a toxicological study or two in
which mammals exposed to the agent display the subject disease at
a statistically greater rate than controls, but no epidemiologic sup-
port.326 Or perhaps the expert will point to a study showing the
agent causes a different, but related, disease, or that an agent
chemically similar to the subject agent causes the disease at issue
(the so-called "analogy" argument) . As a rule, such minimal gen-
eral causation evidence does not satisfy a reasonable application of
Epidemiology, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND PREVENTING WORK-RELATED
DISEASE AND INJURY 143, 143-60 (Barry S. Levy & David H. Wegman eds., 4th ed. 2000);
Joseph K. McLaughlin & Loren Lipworth, Epidemiology and Biostatistics, in A PRACTICAL AP-
PROACH TO OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL MEDICINE 571, 579-80 (Robert J.
McCunney ed., 3d ed. 2003); OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 534-54 (Joseph LaDou ed., 1990).
The consensus opinion in the scientific and medical community is that the Bradford Hill
criteria form the cornerstone for the scientific method of establishing general causation.
Courts must do the same.
323. See, e.g., Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 2d 147, 168
(E.D.N.Y. 2001), affid, 303 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).
324. See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming trial
court's exclusion of physician's causation opinion based on a differential diagnosis that
linked plaintiffs fall with her fibromyalgia because physician lacked evidence that trauma
can cause that disease); Marsh v. W.R. Grace & Co., Nos. 98-1943, 98-1944 & 98-1945, 2003
WL 22718177, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2003) (affirming trial court's summary judgment in
favor of defendant in part because plaintiffs' causation expert lacked epidemiologic evi-
dence that agent can cause cancer and instead "started from the conclusion that picloram
caused the plaintiffs' cancers and then generated, without testing, the hypothesis to support
that conclusion").
325. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing statistical significance); see also supra note 103 (cit-
ing cases in which the plaintiffs' causation experts relied on epidemiology studies showing
statistically insignificant risks in support of their general causation theories).
326. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing "biological plausibility"); see also supra note 117 (cit-
ing cases in which plaintiffs' causation experts relied on animal studies as a method of
establishing general causation).
327. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing the "analogy" argument).
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the Bradford Hill criteria. Rarely should a court allow an opinion
based on such minimal data to reach the factfinder.
Although courts require reliable evidence of general causation
at the Daubert phase, the type of general causation evidence that
courts will admit into evidence may depend on the natures of the
alleged exposures and the injury. In cases involving acute expo-
sures followed immediately by injury, many courts are less
demanding of epidemiologic data in support of the general causa-
tion theory.2 Toxicologic data or clinical case reports may suffice
to demonstrate that the agent can cause the injury in acute expo-
sure-response cases. Conversely, courts are more demanding of
epidemiologic data in support of general causation theories in
cases involving chronic exposures followed by latency periods prior
to manifestation of injuries. 9 In chronic exposure-response cases,
the causal nexus between the agent and the injury is more obscure
than in acute exposure-response cases, compelling courts to re-
quire more exacting proof of the nexus, often in the form of
epidemiologic data showing an association. 3 " Also weighing in the
328. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming
trial court's admission of causation testimony because a strong temporal relationship be-
tween occupational exposure to talcum powder, sinus problems, and a physician's
differential diagnosis, and the undisputed fact that talcum powder irritates mucous mem-
branes, were sufficient to overcome lack of scientific evidence that talcum powder can cause
severe sinus infection); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 E3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming
trial court's admission of testimony that drug overdose caused plaintiff's fatal liver disease
despite lack of scientific support that drug was linked with liver disease when the overdose of
drug immediately caused serious symptoms and plaintiff was diagnosed with fatal liver dis-
ease within months of first dose); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(reversing trial court's exclusion of expert's opinion that mother's ingestion of drug caused
birth defects in child exposed in utero despite lack of statistically significant studies associat-
ing drug with infant's birth defects); Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 66 F.3d 1378 (4th Cir.
1995) (affirming trial court's admission of expert's causation testimony despite lack of epi-
demiologic support for expert's opinion that drug caused liver damage when plaintiff
consumed drug for five days before entering hospital near death in a coma and underwent a
liver transplant two days later); Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174
(N.D. Ala. 2000) (denying defendant's motion to exclude plaintiffs causation evidence
despite lack of epidemiologic support for expert's opinion when plaintiff suffered myocar-
dial infarct shortly after ingesting drug).
329. For an explanation of what is meant by "acute," "chronic," and things in between,
see Eaton & Klaassen, supra note 117, at 14 (defining "acute" exposures as continuous for
one day or less, "subacute" exposures as repeated for one month or less, "subchronic" expo-
sures as repeated for one to three months, and "chronic" exposures as repeated for more
than three months).
330. The pre-Daubert Agent Orange cases present an excellent and important example
of the use of epidemiology in chronic exposure cases. Agent Orange was a defoliant used by
American forces in the Vietnam War. Veterans and their families filed numerous lawsuits
against the manufacturers of Agent Orange alleging various ailments as a result of exposures
to the agent, and the cases were consolidated in Judge Weinstein's court. In 7eAgent Orange
Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 E Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). As summarized by Daniel Farber:
Toxic Tort Cases
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mix are considerations of whether the particular disease at issue
occurs in the absence of exposure to the agent, and whether there
is a reasonable biological explanation as to how the agent may
cause the disease.331
In the former group of "acute" cases appears Heller v. Shaw In-
dustries, Inc. 32 In that case, homeowners claimed that organic vapor
emissions from their new carpeting caused their respiratory ill-
nesses.33 The wife's symptoms arose within two weeks of the carpet
installation; the husband's symptoms, however, preceded the car-
pet installation.334 The homeowners' retained medical expert
concluded that the emissions from the new carpet caused the res-
piratory problems based in part on the strong temporal association
between the exposures and the onset of symptoms. 3 3 5 Nevertheless,
the trial court barred this medical testimony in part because the
medical expert had no research demonstrating that the organic
vapor emissions from the carpet could cause such respiratory
symptoms.3 3 6 On this point, the Third Circuit disagreed, finding
that under the circumstances a valid differential diagnosis and a
strong temporal relationship can overcome a lack of research in
support of general causation.337 "[I]f a person were doused with
The weakness of the plaintiffs' causation evidence persuaded Judge Weinstein to ap-
prove a $180 million settlement, which was considered highly favorable to the
defendants.... The key flaw in the plaintiffs' case was that governmental epidemiol-
ogical studies showed no statistical link between Agent Orange exposure and
significant health effects.... In a companion case, involving opt-outs or individuals
never included in the class, Judge Weinstein was forced to rule on the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims. [Lilley v. Dow Chem. Co (In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Litig.),
611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ]. In these cases, he granted summaryjudgment for
the defendants despite the plaintiffs' tender of expert testimony linking Agent Or-
ange with health effects. The epidemiological studies played a key role in these
decisions .... Judge Weinstein ruled the plaintiffs' expert testimony inadmissible, and
then granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs had no admissible evidence to
counter the defendants' epidemiological studies.
Farber, supra note 228, at 1234-36 (footnotes oinitted).
331. SeeLofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 9-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *14 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 1, 1998) (holding epidemiologic support crucial in non-Hodgkin's lymphoma cases
because "doctors and scientists have little knowledge about the etiology of the diseases, have
identified other causes of them, or know that all of the diseases occur in the absence of
exposure to TCE [the alleged causative agent]").
332. 167 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999).
333. Id. at 149.
334. Id. at 150.
335. Id. at 153-54.
336. Id. at 154.
337. Id. Note that at several points in its analysis, the Heller court confused the medical
expert's causation analysis with his differential diagnosis. 1d at 153-57; see also infra Part
VIII.D.3.a (discussing the consequences of this frequent error committed by courts in toxic
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chemical X and immediately thereafter developed symptom Y, the
need for published literature showing a correlation between the
two may be lessened. ' s The Heller court's holding is limited to
acute exposure situations where the "temporal relationship" be-
tween the alleged exposure and the injury is "valid and strong."0
3 9
At the opposite end of the dose-response spectrum is the
"chronic" case of Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc. 34° Mitchell involved a hema-
topoietic cancer (chronic myelogenous leukemia, or CML)
allegedly caused by a long-term chemical exposure. The plaintiffs
experts lacked epidemiologic evidence that the chemicals at issue
(toluene, xylene, hexane, and haptene) were capable of causing
CML.34' To fill the void, the plaintiff's experts relied on the "chemi-
cal analogy" argument. They argued that a chemical (benzene)
structurally similar to the chemicals at issue can cause leukemia
and, by analogy, the chemicals at issue can cause leukemia.342 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the
defendant, making short work of the plaintiff's experts' lack of
epidemiologic support. Without scientific data supporting their
conclusions that chemicals similar to benzene cause the same
tort cases). The court confused the means by which the medical expert diagnosed the
homeowners' injuries-medical tests and examinations, personal and medical histories,
possible allergenic exposures, etc.-with the expert's means of determining the cause of the
diagnosed illness--environmental tests and temporality. Heller, 167 F.3d at 153-57. One
should read the court's conclusion-that a valid differential diagnosis coupled with strong
temporality between the exposure and the onset of symptoms may suffice as general causa-
tion evidence-as a medical differential diagnosis, not a causation analysis. Otherwise, the
conclusion is a mere tautology, and a valid causation analysis suffices as evidence of causa-
tion.
338. Id. (quoting Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 774 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd in
relevant part, 100 F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996)). As this generality suggests, cases in which
a valid diagnosis and strong temporality suffice for general causation purposes should be
limited to those "dousing" cases in which the exposures are not genuinely disputed.
339. Id. at 154. The appellate court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the plaintiffs'
medical causation expert because, among other reasons, the temporal nexus between the
exposure and the symptoms was not strong enough. Id. at 158 ("[W]e have no problem
concluding that the temporal relationship between the exposure to the Shaw carpeting and
the onset of Heller's illness was questionable at best and exculpatory at worst."). The appel-
late court noted, as did the trial court, that: (1) the wife's symptoms were delayed for two
weeks or so after installation of the carpet; (2) the homeowners experienced renewed symp-
toms after returning home almost a week after removal of the carpeting; and (3) the
husband actually began experiencing symptoms prior to the installation of the carpet. Id. at
157.
340. 165 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1999).
341. Id. at 781-82.
342. Id.
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problems as benzene, the analytical gap in the experts' testing is
simply too wide for the opinions to establish causation.343
Even in an acute exposure-response case, a court should require
the plaintiff to come forward with some reliable evidence of general
causation, or at least an excuse for its absence. We disagree with
the Heller view that a valid diagnosis and strong temporality without
corroborating published research may be sufficient to admit gen-
eral causation evidence in an acute exposure-response case. In
such a case, a court should also require the plaintiff to produce a
convincing explanation for the lack of published research before
allowing into evidence a novel general causation theory. For exam-
ple, a valid excuse for a lack of supporting research could be that
the alleged exposure is rare or perhaps among the first. It would
follow that relevant epidemiologic studies, toxicologic studies, and
case reports would not be available. The Heller court alluded to
such a situation when it observed that a strict requirement for pub-
lished, peer-reviewed research in support of a general causation
theory "would doom from the outset all cases in which the state of
research on the specific ailment or on the alleged causal agent was
in its early stages .... This point is true, but the plaintiff should
bear the burden of explaining the absence of such research.345
Conversely, the existence of research refuting general causation
should doom the plaintiff's cause even if the diagnosis is undis-
puted and temporality is strong.
343. Id. at 782; see also Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 893 E2d 1149, 1154 (10th
Cir. 1990) ("This lack of epidemiological proof for the Wilsons' claims is particularly signifi-
cant in light of recent decisions of federal courts of appeals granting judgment n.o.v for
Merrell Dow based upon the absence of epidemiological evidence showing a causal relation-
ship between Bendectin use and birth defects." (citations omitted)); Cerna v. S. Fla.
Bioavailability Clinic, Inc., No. 3D00-2126, slip op. at *3, 7-9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2002) (affirming exclusion of ophthalmologist's opinion that ingestion of drugs caused
plaintiffs blindness whcre the expert lacked epidcmiologc evidence that drugs could cause
blindness in humans at a normal dosage).
344. Heller, 167 E3d at 155. This view excusing a lack of epidemiologic evidence may
also apply in chronic-exposure cases. See Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49
(D.D.C. 1997). In Lakie, the court admitted the general causation testimony of the plaintiffs
medical experts despite the paucity of epidemiologic evidence linking benzene exposure
with the plaintiff's chronic disease. Id. at 56. The court accepted the experts' analogy be-
tween the plaintiffs bone marrow disease and other bone marrow diseases associated with
benzene because, among other reasons, the plaintiff's bone marrow disease was "extremely
rare" and therefore "has not been included in any of the epidemiological studies on ben-
zene exposure." Id.
345. See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545, 1554 (D. Colo. 1990) (rec-
ognizing that epidemiology is required in toxic tort cases "where collection of such evidence
is possible"), aff'd, 972 F.2d 304, 307 (10th Cir. 1992).
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c. The Independent Link of Temporality-Although post hoc, ergo
propter hoc is a logical fallacy, 46 "post hoc" is a necessary prerequisite
for the determination that exposure to an agent caused the injury.
That is, the exposure must precede the injury. This link in the
plaintiffs causal chain, if true, is easy to demonstrate and is not
often challenged by the defendant. In such cases, the court can
accept the link as proven, with probability "P" equal to one.
There are exceptions. The most common challenge to the tem-
porality link involves cases in which there is a recognized "latency
period" of years, or maybe decades, between the initial exposure
and clinical recognition of the disease. For example, causation
analyses of cancers require consideration of latency periods.3 4 '7 De-
fendants in toxic tort cases will challenge the temporality link in
those cases where the alleged latency period between the initial
exposure to the agent and the diagnosis of the injury is too brief.
Indeed, courts have viewed truncated latency periods as a factor
weighing against the reliability of causation testimony.
346. See infra note 399 and accompanying text (discussing the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fal-
lacy).
347. For most cancers, the time from initial exposure to onset of disease is many years,
even decades. SILVA, supra note 93, at 260. For example, adenocarcinomas of the vagina
develop fifteen to thirty years after in utero exposure of female fetuses to diethylstilbestrol.
KennethJ. Rothman & Charles Poole, Causation and Causal Inference, in CANCER EPIDEMIOL-
OGY AND PREVENTION, supra note 125, at 3, 7. "A toxic tort claim alleging a shorter time
period between cause and effect is scientifically untenable." Goldstein & Henifin, supra note
292, at 426. Appropriate "time-lag" periods are incorporated with the statistical analysis of
epidemiological studies so that the exposure data "refer to the relevant etiological period
(for example, 10-20 years before the development of cancer)." SILVA, supra note 93, at 260;
see, e.g., M. H. Ward et al., Drinking Water Nitrate and the Risk of Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, 7
EPIDEMIOLOGY 465, 467 (1996) (incorporating a lag time of five years "since exposuresjust a
few years before diagnosis are unlikely to be related to cancer risk").
348. See, e.g., Medalen v. Tiger Drylac, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1133 (D. Minn. 2003)
("Without knowing the latency period, between the Plaintiffs exposure to one carcinogen,
or another, and the onset date of her basal cell carcinoma-and Dr. Martinez provides nei-
ther-there is no logical way that the doctor could conclude that a temporal relationship
existed between the Plaintiffs non-acute exposure to powdered coatings, as opposed to her
exposure to liquid paints, or sunlight, to name but two other complicating environmental
agents, and the incurrence of her basal cell carcinoma."); Burleson v. Glass, 268 F. Supp. 2d
699, 707 (W.D. Tex. 2003) (granting defendant's motion to exclude plaintiff's expert testi-
mony in part because two-year latency period from alleged exposure to onset of cancer was
unusually short given the scientific literature indicating typical latency of ten to fifteen years
for the tumor type); Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, 22 F. Supp. 2d
942, 975 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (excluding expert testimony because an unusually short latency
period "creates one more negative for the plaintiffs"), affd, 191 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999);
Goewey v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 1268, 1280-81 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that plaintiff
failed to establish causation where scientist's testimony concerning latency period conflicted
with his research). But see Ruff v. Ensign-Bickford Indus., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1283-86
(D. Utah 2001) (allowing plaintiffs' causation expert to testify that the plaintiffs' exposure to
nitrates in drinking water caused their non-Hodgkin's lymphoma [NHL]).
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d. Specific Causation and the Dependent Links-At this stage, the
court addresses the causation expert's method of extrapolating
from the scientific data to the conclusion that the subject agent
caused the specific disease at issue. Here, the court asks: 1) what
was the plaintiff's dose or exposure level; 2) does the scientific evi-
dence demonstrate that the plaintiff's dose or exposure level can
cause the specific disease in humans so exposed; and 3) did the
expert explain on a quantitative basis how he or she eliminated
other potential causes of the plaintiffs disease and determined
that the subject agent is the most likely cause?
Step three of this inquiry is the point at which Bayes' Law comes
into play.3 49 The reliability of the causation expert's specific causation
analysis depends on the specificity of the analysis-that is, how well
does the method detect those in the population with the disease not
caused by the agent-and the base rate of the agent-induced disease
in the relevant population.' 50 Opinions that fail to take into account
the specificity of the analysis and the base rate of the agent-induced
injury are inherently unreliable.
As noted in the introduction to this Article, we know of no toxic
tort case in which the court engaged in a Bayesian analysis of the
proffered specific causation testimony, taking into account the base
In Ruff the court failed to mention the issue of temporality associated with one of the
plaintiffs, whose NHL developed possibly within eighteen months after her first potential
exposure to the nitrates in her well water. See id. at 1283-86. The defendants challenged the
plaintiffs' expert's specific causation opinion on the ground that the latency period was too
short for that particular plaintiff. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment and Daubert Motion to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Dennis Weisenburger
at 72-74, Ruff 168 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (No. 2:99CV0120B). In fact, the defendants pointed out
that the expert had co-authored an epidemiologic study of nitrates in drinking water that
incorporated a "lag time" of five years "since exposures just a few years before diagnosis are
unlikely to be related to cancer risk." Id. at 73 (quoting Ward et al., supra note 347, at 467).
Despite this published statement in direct conflict with the expert's litigation opinion, the
court admitted the expert's specific causation opinion as to that plaintiff. Ruff 168 E. Supp.
2d at 1283-86. In fact, as mentioned, the court did not discuss this contested latency issue.
See id.
349. Bayesian analysis also bears on the issue of diagnosis. Physicians should, and do,
take into account the base rate of the disease in the population when determining the most
likely disease afflicting an individual based on the signs and symptoms presented. Henifin et
al., supra note 276, at 467 ("[P]hysicians frequently rely on the principles of Bayesian reason-
ing when deciding on a diagnosis. Doctors combine probabilities of disease (prevalence)
with their knowledge of the frequency of signs and symptoms in a given disease and compet-
ing diseases to progressively modify and ultimately arrive at their view of the likelihood of
the disease under consideration.").
350. Two commentators have mused of 100% specificity. See Hall & Silbergeld, supra
note 66, at 442. "In a perfect world, science would be able to locate the people whose injury
was caused by a chemical and distinguish them from people whose suffering from a similar
disease was caused by other factors." Id. In reality, "[h]owever, the etiology of most chemi-
cally induced disease will never afford us such precision." Id. (citing GARY FRIEDMAN,
PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 1-4 (2d ed. 1980)).
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rate of the disease and the specificity of the expert's methods. Nev-
ertheless, there are examples of courts engaging in a crude type of
analysis indicating an inchoate understanding of the importance of
base rates and specificity. For example, in Wade-Greaux v. Whitehall
Laboratories, Inc., the court recognized that there are numerous
agents capable of causing birth defects such as the plaintiff's, in-
cluding genetic and chromosomal abnormalities, bacterial and
viral infections, chemicals, radiation, drugs and "unknown"
causes.3 51 Although the court did not conduct a Bayesian analysis
per se, it noted the probabilities that these alternative agents may
have caused the plaintiff's defect by noting that such birth defects
are common and that "environmental agents" may account for ten
to twenty percent of human malformations. The court held that
the plaintiffs causation experts did not account for these alterna-
tive agents, rendering unreliable their proffered specific causation
testimony.
5 3
Although courts such as Wade-Greaux may not be thinking in
terms of Bayes' Law, the requirement that the causation expert ad-
dress alternative explanations for the injury is a rudimentary
approach to the base-rate problem. Courts have held that the fail-
ure of a health expert to address alternative causes of a plaintiffs
injury is grounds for excluding the expert's specific causation tes-
timony.4 Generally, the more alternative possible causes there are
351. 874 F. Supp. 1441, 1449, 1483, 1485 (D.V.I. 1994), affd, 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir.
1994).
352. Id. at 1449.
353. Id. at 1485; see also Newton v. Roche Labs., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W.D. Tex.
2002) (barring specific causation testimony that acne drug caused plaintiff's schizophrenia
in part because expert failed to rule out other risk factors for schizophrenia such as a family
history of schizophrenia in plaintiffs mother, sister, and uncle, plaintiffs personal history of
malnutrition, and her father's age of sixty when she was born).
354. See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem. Co., 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming
trial court's finding that plaintiff's causation theory was unreliable because, among other
reasons, expert did not account for plaintiffs personal habits and medical history as alterna-
tive explanations for plaintiffs disease); Claar v. Burlington N. R.R., 29 F3d 499, 502 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding doctor's testimony inadmissible because doctor failed to rule out alter-
native possible causes for plaintiffs' injuries, even though the doctor admitted that this step
is standard procedure before each diagnosis); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry
Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 610 (D.NJ. 2002) (excluding plaintiff's medical causation
testimony because, among other reasons, expert failed to address plaintiff's smoking history
and family history of cancer as alternative causes of plaintiffs cancer); Wills v. Amerada Hess
Corp., 98 Civ. 7126(RPP), 2002 WL 140542 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2002) (excluding toxicologist's
proffered testimony that decedent's occupational exposures caused his cancer because, among
other reasons, expert failed to explain how he eliminated decedent's cigarette smoking as a
possible cause of decedent's cancer even though cigarette smoking was a major risk factor for
decedent's type of cancer); Cloud v. Pfizer, 198 F Supp. 2d 1118, 1136 (D. Ariz. 2001) (exclud-
ing psychiatrist's opinion that drug caused decedent to commit suicide because, among other
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for the injury, or the more likely an alternative possible cause ex-
plains the injury, the more explanation (specificity) courts should
require from the causation expert as to why the subject agent is the
probable cause. The causation expert's failure to address a major
cause of the disease in the population,5 5 or failure to consider
idiopathic disease, should be fatal to the plaintiff's claim. If there
are other risk factors present in a case, courts should require the
causation expert to conduct reliable quantitative risk analyses to
demonstrate the most likely causal factor. When there is epidemi-
ologic evidence available, the risk analyses can, and should, include
Bayesian analysis to determine the most likely cause of the injury
among the potential agents.
e. The Exposure Links: Actual Exposure and Hazardous Exposure-
"All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison.
The right dose differentiates a poison from a remedy. 357 So said
Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim,
known as Paracelsus, the Renaissance man in the history of science
and medicine. Paracelsus was speaking of a "threshold" dose re-
quired for an observable biological response, whether remedial or
toxic.3s " To demonstrate that an exposure to an agent caused a
reasons, psychiatrist did not fully explore other potential causes of the suicide, such as alco-
hol consumption and family problems); Aldridge v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1010, 1024 (D. Md. 1999) (excluding causation testimony because experts did not
explain how they concluded that a particular chemical caused the particular disease when
other occupational and environmental exposures have similar effects); Reiff v. Convergent
Techs., 957 F. Supp. 573, 583 (D.N.J. 1997) (excluding expert's testimony because expert
was unable to discount alternative causes and did little, if anything, to rule them out); Diaz v.
Johnson Matthey, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 376-77 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 760 (3d Cir. 1994)) (holding that expert's opinion on specific causa-
tion was unreliable because expert failed to account for alternative causes); Praytor v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App. 2002) (barring plaintiff's causation experts because
they failed to rule out possible causes of plaintiff's asthma other than the chemicals in the
deployed air bag).
355. See, e.g., In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 508 F. Supp. 897, 906-07
(D. Colo. 1981) (barring experts' proffered testimony that swine flu caused plaintiff's neuro-
logical disorder in part because experts failed to account for plaintiffs pre-existing viral
infection, a risk factor of the illness), aff'd sub nom., Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502, 507
(10th Cir. 1983).
356. See discussion supra Part VIII.C.3.a. Many courts do not require physicians to ex-
plain their causation analyses. Instead, these courts incorrectly label the physicians'
causation analyses as "differential diagnoses." See supra note 286. Then, these courts apply no
scrutiny at all to the physicians' causation analyses, believing that "diagnoses" by physicians,
even those reached in the course of litigation, are inherently reliable and seldom wrong. See
supra note 302 and accompanying text. Such judicial deference to physicians' causation
analyses is the most glaring abdication of the courts' gatekeeping duty routinely found in
toxic tort cases.
357. Michael A. Gallo, History and Scope of Toxicology, in CASARETI' & DOULL's ToxICOL-
OGY, supra note 117, at 3, 4.
358. Eaton & Klaassen, supra note 117, at 13.
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deleterious response in an exposed person, one must be able to
demonstrate that the dose received by the person was sufficient to
cause the response. The burden of proof in a toxic tort case re-
quires the plaintiff to show with reasonable certainty that the
subject exposures resulted in a dose sufficient to produce the in-
jury suffered. 9
To survive Daubert scrutiny, the plaintiff must have reliable sci-
entific evidence that the exposure to the subject agent exceeded
the level of exposure sufficient to cause the injury. For example,
in Sutera v. The Perrier Group of America, Inc., the plaintiff claimed
that his leukemia, a type of cancer, resulted from his consump-
tion of the defendant's bottled water that contained low levels of
benzene.3 60 The plaintiff's medical expert was prepared to opine
that the benzene in the bottled water caused the plaintiffs leu-
kemia.6 ' The plaintiff's medical theory in Sutera was based on the
"no threshold" model, which holds that there is no safe level of ex-
posure to a carcinogen and, therefore, any exposure to a
362
carcinogen no matter how low is sufficient to cause leukemia.
The Sutera court found that the no-threshold model "cannot be
359. See supra note 131 (discussing the differences between "dose" and "exposure").
The distinction between dose and exposure is important in many toxic exposure cases, par-
ticularly in those cases in which the agent is poorly absorbed by the human body, resulting
in low doses despite high exposures. For example, while lead is a well-recognized toxin, the
human intestines absorb some forms of lead so poorly that exposures via ingestion to such
forms of lead present low health risks. See generally Ilene Danse et a., Blood Lead Surveys of
Communities in Proximity to Lead-Containing Mill Tailings, 56 AM. INDUS. HYGiENE ASS'N J. 384
(1995); Martha J. Steele et al., Assessing the Contribution from Lead in Mining Wastes to Blood
Lead, 11 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 158 (1990). Consequently, despite heavy soil
lead contamination in some communities surrounding lead mines, the levels of lead in the
blood of children remain surprisingly low. See generally Danse et al., supra; Stelle et al., supra.
360. 986 E Supp. 655, 657-58 (D. Mass. 1997). Perrier's troubles began in January 1990
when laboratory workers in North Carolina, using Perrier water as a quality control for
analysis, got some odd readings from their spectrometer. Perrier Woes Began with Blip on Caro-
lina Screen, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1990, at A18. The "pure" French mineral water contained
benzene at levels ranging from 12.3 to 19.9 parts per billion, in excess of the five parts per
billion standard set for public drinking water by the EPA. G. James, PerrierRecalls Its Water in
U.S. AflerBenzene Is Found in Bottles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1990, at Al. Although the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) emphasized that the risk presented by the low levels of
benzene in water was small, Perrier recalled its entire inventory of over seventy-two million
bottles. Barry Meier, Perrier Production Halted Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at A26.
Then-Senator Al Gore stated: "I am not going to be satisfied until thousands of rats have
consumed millions of bottles of Perrier and survived." Maureen Dowd, What, No Perrier?
Status Bubble Bursts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1990, at A26. It turned out that benzene was natu-
rally present in the spring from which Perrier drew its water. Barbara Wickens, Bursting the
Bubble, MACLEAN'S, Feb. 26, 1990, at 34, 34.
361. Sutera, 986 F Supp. at 656-57.
362. Id.
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falsified, nor can it be validated." sts Since the plaintiff in Sutera
had no testimony that his low-level exposure to benzene is haz-
ardous to humans other than his expert's unproved "no
threshold" theory, the court excluded this unreliable testimony
and granted summary judgment for the defendant.
36
Courts do not require claimants to prove the exact dose or ex-
posure. Courts do require, however, evidence that the alleged
exposure was sufficient to cause the injury at issue. 5 In the best
of circumstances, actual dose data are available. For some agents,
scientists can determine the actual dose by measuring the agent
or its metabolite in biological tissue such as blood, urine, or hair.
In most circumstances, however, actual dose data are unavailable,
and the experts must use whatever exposure information is
366available as a surrogate for dose. Sometimes exposure meas-
urements from which an industrial hygiene or toxicology expert
can extrapolate reliable dose or exposure estimates are available.
In other cases, experts can estimate historical exposures based on
data and testimony less reliable than actual exposure measure-
ments, but reliable enough for present purposes. Experts can
extrapolate reliable exposure estimates from data and testimony
such as duration of exposure; distance from the source of the
agent; volatility of the agent; environmental conditions such as
temperature and wind speed and direction; presence or
absence of mechanical ventilation; extent of skin contact with
the agent and dermal permeability to the agent;3 67  odor
363. Id. at 667 (quoting Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 25 (D. Mass.
1995)); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (stating that
scientific status of a theory stems from its falsifiability because testing a hypothesis to see if it
is false is the method that distinguishes science from other fields of inquiry).
364. Sutera, 986 F. Supp. at 667-68; see also Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 98 Civ.
7126(RPP), 2002 WL 140542, at *8, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2002) (excluding the plaintiff's
causation expert's "oncogene theory," where a single exposure is sufficient to initiate cell
transformation leading to cancer, which is both untested and untestable); supra Part V.A.7
(summarizing cases in which the courts have demanded information concerning plaintiff's
levels of exposures to the alleged causative agent).
365. Id. (discussing the "threshold dose" concept).
366. See ENVIRONMENTAL & OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE 40 (William N. Rom ed., 3d ed.
1998) ("In most instances, doses and dose rates cannot be measured directly, and surrogate
measures must be developed from data on exposures observed in the environment external
to the worker. Exposure concentration or intensity is used as a surrogate for dose rate
367. Sound logic dictates that reliable dose data trump exposure estimates. Compare
Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965 F. Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1997) (admitting plaintiffs expert's
benzene dose estimates based on the skin absorption rate of benzene through human skin,
the concentration of benzene in defendant's dental adhesive, and the frequency of plain-
tiffs use of the product), with Bourne v. E.1. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 189 F. Supp. 2d
482, 499-501 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (excluding as unreliable plaintiffs expert's dermal absorp-
tion rate estimate based on the permeability of rat skin because, among other things, the
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thresholds;36 the quantity of the agent present and the concentra-
tion of the agent in mixtures;369 whether the agent is heated; and
other data and testimony. Whatever the means of estimating
doses, a transparent and valid scientific methodology, not exacti-
tude, is required.370
There is a temptation to assume that the dose was sufficient to
cause the injury because the plaintiff displayed injury after the ex-
posure. This circular logic is akin to the post hoc, ergo propter hoc
fallacy sometimes used to justify a finding of general causation
where epidemiologic evidence is lacking.37' Where causation is at
expert failed to adjust for the lower permeability of human skin as compared with rat skin),
affd, 85 F. App'x 964 (4th Cir. 2004), Mancuso v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 56 F. Supp. 2d
391, 399-401 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (excluding plaintiff's expert's opinion based in part on the
assumption that the plaintiffs came in skin contact with PCB-contaminated mud and water
"on pretty much a daily basis" because the assumption did not fit the facts of the case and a
better measure of the plaintiffs dose was available-blood tests indicated that the plaintiffs'
PCB body burden was less than the typical New York adult), affd in relevant part, 216 F.3d
1072 (2d Cir. 2000), and Leija v. Marathon Oil, No. 96-617531 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 15, 2000)
(excluding plaintiffs benzene dose estimate based on an unreliable dermal absorption
model used by plaintiffs experts).
368. See, e.g., Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 614
(D.N.J. 2002) (holding that the method of estimating concentrations of air contaminants by
use of published odor thresholds "has been subject to peer review and is a generally ac-
cepted way of estimating exposure levels in the absence of air sampling").
369. See, e.g., Amorgianos v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 137 F. Supp. 147, 158
(E.D.N.Y. 2001) (calculating potential xylene exposure levels based on the amount of paint
used, its xylene content, the volume of the containment area in which the plaintiff worked,
and other factors because measurements of the xylene concentration in air were lacking).
370. One commentator disagrees. John Hein, When Reliable Is Reliable Enough: The Use of
Expert Testimony After Kumho v. Carmichael, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 223, 231-33 (2001)
(citing Goeb v. Tharaldson, No. CX-98-2275, 1999 WL 561956 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 21,
1999), affd, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000)) ("In toxic substance exposure litigation, an
expert's failure to identify the precise exposure dose level can be fatal to an expert's qualifi-
cation and to the plaintiff's case."). Contrary to Hein's analysis, however, the Goeb court did
not apply so strict a test. Pursuant to the Frye "general acceptance" standard as applied by
the Minnesota courts, the Goeb court excluded the plaintiffs' causation experts for a plethora
of reasons, the inexactitude of the experts' exposure quantification not being one of them.
Goeb, 1999 WL 561956, at *3. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in affirming the exclu-
sion of the plaintiffs' experts, eschewed the "exposure level" issue and relied instead on the
remaining shortcomings in the experts' methodologies, including their failure to review the
plaintiffs' medical records before reaching their causation opinions or produce medical and
scientific support for their diagnostic techniques. Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 815-16. Neither the
district court, the appellate court, nor the Minnesota Supreme Court required the Goebs to
present evidence of their exact exposures, an impossible evidentiary hurdle. See also Lakie,
965 F. Supp. at 58 (rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiffs dose expert's opinion was
unreliable because he did not know plaintiffs precise exposure level) ("The law does not
hold the plaintiff to such an exacting standard of proof.").
371. See, e.g., Marsh v. W.R. Grace & Co., Nos. 98-1943, 98-1944 & 98-1945, 2003 WL
22718177, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2003) (affirming trial court's summary judgment in favor
of defendant in part because plaintiffs' causation expert lacked epidemiologic evidence that
agent can cause cancer, instead "start[ing] from the conclusion that picloram caused the
Toxic Tort Cases
Universy of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
issue, sound science does not allow the retroactive calculation of
dose based on the injury. To do so is a self-fulfilling prophecy, as
recognized in Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc. In Wright, the
court found that the testimony of plaintiffs' experts, including an
industrial hygienist, "failed to produce evidence that they were ex-
posed to a hazardous level of formaldehyde .... .The industrial
hygienist in Wright offered testimony about the levels of formalde-
hyde that might be expected to cause symptoms like the ones thatS 37,
plaintiffs claimed to have experienced. Such testimony was insuf-
ficient evidence of the level of formaldehyde the plaintiffs
incurred. The court stated:
It is therefore not enough for a plaintiff to show that a certain
chemical agent sometimes causes the kind of harm that he or
she is complaining of. At a minimum, we think that there must be
evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was
exposed to levels of that agent that are known to cause the kind of
harm that the plaintiff claims to have suffered. We do not require a
mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with
levels of harm, but there must be evidence from which a rea-
sonable person could conclude that a defendant's emission
has probably caused a particular plaintiff the kind of harm of
which he or she complains before there can be a recovery. 75
Similarly, in O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., a nuclear
power plant worker sued the plant licensee alleging that occupa-
tional exposures to radiation caused his cataracts. 376 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion in limine to exclude the testimony
plaintiffs' cancers and then generated, without testing, the hypothesis to support that con-
clusion"); see also Ballentine v. The Terminix Int'l Co., No. 98C-836, slip op. at 11 (Tenn. Cir.
Ct. June 25, 2004) ("Here, Dr. Calabrese formed his [causation] opinion and only when the
weaknesses and, perhaps, scientific invalidity of his opinions were exposed in his deposition
did he do any serious research. it was too little, too late, to convince the Court of his reliabil-
ity.").
372. 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir. 1996).
373. M at 1107.
374. Id.
375. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Marsh, 2003 WNL 22718177, at *5
(affirming trial court's summary judgment in favor of defendant in part because plaintiffs'
causation expert could not state the "no effect" level of the subject agent or whether plain-
tiffs' exposures exceeded that level, instead "assum[ing] the plaintiffs had received adequate
exposure to picloram to cause cancer"); Payne v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 8:00CV337, slip op. at
11-12 (D. Neb. Oct. 9, 2001) (quoting Wright, 91 E3d 1105, and granting defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to produce evidence of his level of
exposure to creosote).
376. 807 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (C.D. 111. 1992), affd, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994).
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of the plaintiff's ophthalmologist.3" The O'Conner court found that
the ophthalmologist's methodology was "to first uncritically accept
what Mr. O'Conner told him about receiving a high dose and then
to assume that radiation induced cataracts are pathognomonic."0
78
The court found that "[b]oth parts of [the ophthalmologist's]
methodology are errors and are not a methodology which any rea-
sonable expert in radiation doses or radiation effect on humans
would use." 79 The Court elucidated the flaw in the expert's meth-
odology, noting:
Dr. Scheribel failed to assess properly O'Conner's radiation
dose before concluding that the radiation caused his cata-
racts. As set forth previously, any expert with even
rudimentary knowledge of this field would know that radia-
tion induced cataracts require a certain threshold dose and
would carefully seek to discover the exact dose involved before
giving a causation opinion. Dr. Scheribel did the opposite: he
presumed that the cataracts were radiation induced, and then
presumed that the plaintiff must have somehow been exposed
to a high enough dose to exceed the threshold in order to
have caused the cataracts, thereby justifying his initial diagno-
sis. This is circular reasoning....
An expert in radiation induced cataracts would require
knowledge of a patient's radiation dose before finding causa-
tion. He would not rely only on the story told by the patient to
determine the patient's radiation dose. Rather, the expert
would review the patient's actual dosimetry records, and ex-
amine (or perform) the appropriate medical tests to
determine the dose received. He would also review the scien-
tific literature to learn the threshold dose of radiation and
380minimum latency period required to cause cataracts.
Courts tend to be more lenient when considering the plaintiff's
exposure evidence in acute exposure cases where the agent is well
377. Id. at 1404. Since the remaining evidence was insufficient for plaintiff to establish
the essential elements of his negligence claims, the court also granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Id.
378. Jd. at 1397.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 1396 (citations omitted) (emphases added).
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known to cause the injury and the manifestation of the injury is
immediate, or nearly so.38' For example, in Louderback v. Orkin Ex-
terminating Co., the plaintiffs suffered symptoms following
accidental exposure to an organophosphate pesticide with well-
known, acute toxic properties.382 The plaintiffs' causation expert
could not estimate the levels of exposures to the pesticide, nor did
he consider known safe levels of exposure for the pesticide.383 The
district court recognized that the expert's failure to quantify the
exposures and hazard weighed against admission of the proffered
testimony. Nevertheless, under the facts of that case, the district
court determined that this failing was not crucial. The well-known
toxic properties of the chemical, the strong temporality of symp-
toms, and the expert's "differential diagnosis" overcame the
expert's lack of dose-response data.384
Falling somewhere between the chronic and acute exposure sce-
narios are cases such as Amorgianos v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.3 15 In that case, a railroad worker and his wife sued the worker's
employer, claiming that he suffered permanent neurological dam-
age as a result of intermittent occupational exposures to xylene (and
maybe other organic solvents) during a 30-day period of spray-
painting a bridge. 8 6 The worker's exposures fit into the "sub-acute"
category. 387 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs in the
amount of $2.3 million. The trial court subsequently granted the
railroad's motion for a new trial, "finding that the verdict was 'fun-
damentally against the overwhelming weight of the evidence' and
represented a 'miscarriage of justice.'3 8 8 Subsequently, another
judge granted the railroad's motion to exclude the proffered
testimony concerning the worker's permanent neurological
381. See supra Part VIII.D.3.b (discussing the analogous view that a court's scrutiny of
general causation evidence may be lenient in acute exposure/acute effects cases).
382. 26 E Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (D. Kan. 1998).
383. Id. at 1305-06.
384. Id. at 1306. Compare id. at 1298 (admitting causation expert's opinions in "strong
temporality" case even though expert did not quantify exposures or risk), with Polaino v.
Bayer Corp., 122 E Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D. Mass. 2000) (excluding the causation experts' opin-
ion in a "strong temporality" case because they had failed to conduct reliable exposure
estimates or demonstrate that the plaintiff had actually been exposed to the subject toxins
even though the injury followed soon after the putative exposure).
385. 137 F Supp. 2d 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 303 F3d 256 (2d Cir. 2002).
386. Id. at 150-51, 177. The worker's wife joined him as a plaintiff. Id. at 149.
387. See supra note 329 (citing Eaton & Klaassen, supra note 117, at 14) (defining
"acute," "subacute," and "chronic" exposures).
388. Amorgianos, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (quoting Trial Transcript Sept. 29, 1998 at 67,
Amorgianos, 137 E Supp. 2d 147 (No. CIV A. CV-96-2745 (DGT))).
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conditions.389 In part, the court excluded this causation testimony
because the court found unreliable the plaintiffs' industrial hy-
giene expert's exposure estimates.3 9 0 Despite the close temporality
of the worker's sub-acute exposures and the onset of his neurologi-
cal symptoms, the Amorgianos court demanded reliable scientific
support for the worker's claim that his exposures to the organic
solvents were sufficient to cause the alleged neurological dam-
391age.
Why did the Amorgianos court demand strict proof of exposure
levels and duration despite the strong temporality between the sub-
acute exposures and the symptoms? Since the exposures were sub-
acute, the Amorgianos court could have followed the lenient Louder-
back model and excuse the plaintiffs' weak exposure evidence.
Instead, it followed the Wright model and demanded more exact-
ing evidence relating to exposures. One reason may be the many
weaknesses in the worker's evidence that he suffered permanent
neurological damage, casting in doubt the diagnosis of neurological
damaged reached by the plaintiff's medical experts. While the
worker complained of worsening neurological symptoms, supported
by his wife's testimony, all the objective neurological tests were either
negative or, if positive, had a more plausible explanation.9  In
389. Id. at 191. The court denied the defendant's motion insofar as it attempted to
exclude testimony concerning the plaintiff's claim that he suffered acute effects during the
few days following his exposures, including eye irritation, nausea, and fever. Id. The court,
however, demanded reliable estimates of the plaintiff's exposures to support these claims of
acute effects. Id. The court granted the plaintiff leave to supplement the industrial
hygienist's report to give that expert a chance to perform a "proper exposure assessment."
Id. at 175, 191. If the plaintiff failed to submit a supplemental report addressing the issue of
exposures, the court would grant leave to the defendant to move for summary judgment on
the acute claims. Id. at 191.
390. Amorgianos, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 170-77, 188-90. In addition, the court found the
proffered expert testimony unreliable and inadmissible because the expert lacked scientific
evidence of a causal link between the alleged exposures and permanent neurological dam-
age-that is, the expert lacked evidence of general causation. Id. at 177-91.
In many cases in which the plaintiff alleges that occupational exposures caused the inju-
ries, experts in the field of industrial hygiene provide exposure testimony. The industrial
hygienist may offer opinions as to the level and extent of exposure based on actual exposure
monitoring data or, if such data is unavailable, exposure models using principles of chemis-
try and physics; in either case, the industrial hygienist's methods must pass the court's
scrutiny for reliability. See, e.g., Nook v. Long Island R.R., 190 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (excluding exposure estimates offered by industrial hygienist because he did not
validate his estimates by collecting data); Castellow v. Chevron USA, 97 F Supp. 2d 780, 787-
93 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (excluding industrial hygienist's exposure model testimony under
Daubert because industrial hygienist revised his estimates several times during the course of
litigation and admitted at one point that his estimates were improbable).
391. Amorgianos, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 169-78.
392. Id. at 154-59.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
addition, surveillance videotape showed the plaintiff walking about
town with no apparent difficulty, in direct conflict with his testi-
393mony. Finally, emergency room medical records following a car
accident, which occurred after the subject exposures, indicated
that the worker was suffering no neurological problems, again in
direct conflict with the plaintiffs' testimony. For these reasons,
the court appeared skeptical of the medical experts' diagnoses.395
An analysis of the Amorgianos case and other toxic tort cases in
which doses are at issue suggests a concordance. The plaintiffs
claim will pass Daubert scrutiny without direct exposure (dose) data
only where the temporality of the exposures and the symptoms is
strong, general causation is well established, and the medical ex-•• 396
pert's differential diagnosis is valid. In other words, strong
temporality, well-established general causation, and a valid diagno-
sis are sufficient proof of harmful dose in toxic exposure cases.
This view does not suggest that plaintiff need not produce reliable
evidence of exposure at the Daubert stage. Rather, this view suggests
that the plaintiffs evidence of exposure may be indirect, but never-thelss elialein lmitd "391
theless reliable, in limited circumstances. In generic toxic tort
cases, direct evidence of exposure is required.
The same leniency arguably applies in a few chronic, "weak
temporality" cases involving "signature" diseases.98 If the disease is
393. Id. at 156. The trial judge cited this videotape as a basis of his decision to grant the
railroad's motion for a new trial. Id. at 159.
394. Id. at 155. The trial judge also cited these emergency room medical records as a
ground to allow the railroad a new trial. Id. at 159.
395. Id. at 157-59.
396. In Amorgianos, the lack of a reliable diagnosis doomed the plaintiffs case. There
was evidence refuting the plaintiffs claim that he actually incurred neurological damage. See
supra notes 392-395 and accompanying text. This doubtful diagnosis proved an insufficient
basis for the plaintiffs indirect proof of his dose.
397. For a similar analysis, see Note, supra note 6, at 1476 (suggesting that toxic tort
cases involving close temporality coupled with reliable diagnoses present a situation more
akin to "slip and fall" cases than "generic" toxic tort cases and therefore justify relaxed rules
of admissibility bearing on causation opinions). On the flip side of the coin are the so-called
"trauma cancer" cases, which are "slip and fall" cases more akin to "generic" toxic tort cases.
See supra note 202.
Bocanegra v. Vicmar Services, Inc. presents an interesting corollary of the "indirect proof of
dose" view. 320 E3d 581 (5th Cir. 2003). In Bocanegra, the appellate court reversed a "take-
nothing" verdict, holding that the trial court should have admitted a toxicologist's testimony
concerning the defendant motorist's mind-altering dose of marijuana prior to a traffic acci-
dent. Id. at 590. Addressing the trial court's view that the toxicologist did not know the
defendant's dose of marijuana, the appellate court noted that marijuana users smoke until
they achieve the desired mind-altering dose, a view with which defense experts agreed. Id. at
588-90. A truism--dopers smoke dope until they are doped-was sufficient corroboration
of the toxicologist's dose opinion.




rarely, or never, caused by anything other than the subject agent,
proof of dose may be unnecessary. In such cases, the reasoning that
the disease proves the sufficiency of the exposure is reliable, at
least reliable enough to establish the plaintiffs prima facie case.
Since the presence of a signature disease, correctly diagnosed,
proves specific causation, it follows that it proves sufficiency of the
dose, an element of specific causation, at least so long as the plain-
tiff can establish some threshold exposure to the agent.
In any event, most toxic tort cases involve no signature disease,
meaning that there are many possible causes of the subject injury.
In such cases, courts should, and do, bar evidence based on post
hoc, ergo propter hoc logic (that is, circular reasoning) that the per-
son's exposure must have been sufficient to cause the disease
because the person developed the disease after the alleged expo-
399sure.
f The Most Likely Cause-Finally, at the Daubert stage the causa-
tion expert must address alternative causes of the subject disease,
and explain through a reliable quantitative analysis the predomi-
nance of the subject agent as the most likely cause of the disease. It
is at this specific causation stage that Bayesian analysis applies.
Crucial to this quantitative analysis is consideration of the base rate
of the agent-induced disease.
Good scientific methodology requires that a scientist conduct a
valid risk assessment to arrive at an opinion concerning causation
of disease. " [T] he question for causation purposes is: At what levels
of exposure do what kinds of harm occur?" 00 Risk assessment re-
quires a determination of what dose-response relationship exists
399. See, e.g., Washburn v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 99-9121, 2000 WL 528649, at *2 (2d
Cir. 2000) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony based "on little more than temporal
correlation between [plaintiff's) vaccination and the onset of symptoms" (citing Cavallo v.
Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd in relevant part, 100 E3d 1150 (4th Cir.
1996); Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 804 E Supp. 972, 1023 (S.D. Ohio 1992), afftd, 24
F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1994))); Austin v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 95-3880, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22329, at *7 (6th Cir. July 26, 1996) (citing Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867,
875 (6th Cir. 1990); Hasler v. United States, 718 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1983)) (finding that
temporality alone is not sufficient to create a material issue of causation); Cerna v. S. Fla.
Bioavailability Clinic, Inc., 815 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("Expert causation
theories based solely on the temporal proximity between an ingested pharmaceutical and
the resulting injury are not methodologically sound."); Hannan v. Pest Control Servs., Inc.,
734 N.E.2d 674, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (excluding plaintiffs' experts' testimony because
they "were relying on a mere temporal coincidence of the pesticide application" and the
plaintiffs' alleged illnesses).
400. Cartwright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 900, 906 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
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between the substances and injuries in question. As explained in
Cavallo v. Star Enterprise
[T]here are certain scientific principles and methods upon
which a toxicologist must rely in forming an opinion regard-
ing whether exposure to specific chemicals could cause
certain maladies in individuals. Specifically, the methodol-
ogy... endorsed by the World Health Organization, the
National Academy of Sciences, and various agencies of the
United States Government, calls for the following "risk as-
sessment":
[ (1) ] First, an evaluation is made of the chemicals to which
the individual might have been exposed, and of the concen-
trations of these chemicals in air breathed by the individual.
[ (2) ] The second step involves an evaluation, based on the
published scientific literature, of the exposures necessary to
produce the adverse effects associated with the chemicals to
which individuals may be exposed. [ (3) ] These two evalua-
tions are then combined in the final step of the risk
assessment to provide an estimate of the likelihood that any of
the harmful properties of any or all of the chemicals might
have been expressed in the exposed individual.
... [A] 11 chemicals can cause health problems at some level
or concentration of exposure, but they vary widely in the types
of harm caused and in the levels of exposure required to trig-
ger those harms. In addition, all chemicals have thresholds of
exposure that must be exceeded before the harms will occur,
and these thresholds may be identified through scientific
studies and literature. The task of the toxicologist, therefore,
is to identify a dose-response relationship for a particular
chemical (or chemical mixture) and illness and analyze the
results to determine whether the duration and concentration
of exposure in a given instance could have caused the alleged
harms."2
Risk assessment is the sum and substance of causation evidence
offered by a scientist. A court's Daubert analysis must focus on
401. Cuevas v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 956 F. Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D.
Miss. 1997).
402. 892 F. Supp. 756, 764 (E.D. Va. 1995) (citations omitted), affd in relevant part, 100
F.3d 1150, 1159 (4th Cir. 1996).
[VOL. 38:4
SUMMER 2005]
whether the scientist conducted a valid risk assessment to reach his
or her conclusions.
E. An Example: Lakie v. Smithkline Beecham
The toxic tort case Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham presents facts well
suited for application of the Daubert technique suggested in this
Article. 3 In that case, a denture wearer claimed that she developed
myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS) 5 q-minus, a rare type of bone
marrow disorder, due to benzene contamination in the defendant
manufacturer's denture adhesive.4 The plaintiff's "dose" expert
calculated that plaintiff absorbed between 550 and 4200 milligrams
(mg) of benzene from the denture adhesive over a six-year period
of use.' ° The plaintiff's causation experts determined that this cal-
culated, cumulative benzene dose was sufficient to cause, and did
cause, the plaintiffs disease.4 6 The defendant moved the court for
summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs proffered
causation testimony was inadmissible pursuant to Daubert.4°7 The
court denied the defendant's motion.0 8
Use of the Daubert technique suggested in this Article likely
would have led the Lakie court to grant the defendant's summary
judgment motion. The proffered causation testimony would fail
because one of the three independent causal links-temporality-
lacked the requisite scientific support. In addition, the plaintiff's
experts produced no scientific substantiation of their specific cau-
sation analysis. That is, there is no quantitative risk analysis set
forth in the court's opinion supporting the experts' opinion that
the plaintiff's benzene dose from the dental adhesive most likely
caused her disease.
The analysis begins with consideration of the three independent
links in the plaintiffs causal chain: diagnosis, general causation,
and temporality. Then, the analysis turns to a consideration of the
dependent links of specific causation-that is, whether 1) the
actual dose 2) exceeded the level generally considered harmful
403. 965 E Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1997).
404. Id. at 51.
405. Id. at 57.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 54.
408. Id. at 58.
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and 3) was sufficient to conclude that the subject agent was the
most likely cause of the injury, considering all potential causes.
1. Diagnosis-The defendants did not challenge the "differen-
tial diagnosis" that the plaintiff had MDS 5 q-minus. Unchallenged,
one can accept the truth of the diagnosis beyond a reasonable
doubt, with probability (P) equal to 1.0.
2. General Causation-In contrast, the defendants genuinely
challenged the scientific adequacy of the plaintiffs experts' gen-
eral causation opinions. The experts had scant epidemiologic
evidence demonstrating an association between benzene exposures• 409
and MDS 5 q-minus. Instead, the experts relied on the analogy
argument 40 that benzene is associated with other, related bone
marrow diseases.41' In addition, the court excused the paucity of
epidemiologic evidence offered by the experts on the ground that
the plaintiffs disease was rare, and had just recently been recog-
nized as a distinct disease entity.412 This evidence in support of the
plaintiff's general causation argument does not place the issue be-
yond genuine dispute, but arguably provides sufficient evidence of
a probable causal association between benzene exposure and MDS.
Lack of evidence that benzene causes the "5 q-minus" variant of
the disease is troubling, though excusable for the reasons the court
gave. The best (from the plaintiffs view) that one can reasonably
409. Id. at 56. The court noted that there was one Chinese epidemiologic study demon-
strating an association between occupational exposure to benzene and MDS, though
apparently not the 5 q-minus variant displayed by the plaintiff. Id. at 56 & n.10 (citing Lois
B. Travis et al., Hematopoietic Malignancies and Related Disorders Among Benzene-Exposed Workers
in China, 14 LEUKEMIA & LYMPHOMA 91 (1994)). There was no discussion in the court's
opinion concerning the comparison between the exposures of the workers in the study and
the plaintiff's exposures, an important consideration for the "exposure/dose" causation
link. See supra note 224 (discussing "external validity").
410. See supra Part V.A.4 (discussing the analogy argument as a means of establishing
general causation).
411. Lakie, 965 F. Supp. at 55-56. The analogy argument adopted by the experts, and
accepted by the court, was as follows:
[S]ince the types of biological lesions which cause leukemia are very similar to the le-
sions which cause MDS, [one] would expect that what causes one lesion would cause
the other. Drs. Swerdlow and Hess also claimed that a significant percentage (10-
30%) of leukemia patients undergo a myelodysplastic syndrome before they progress
to leukemia.
Id. at 56. The defendants' experts agreed that benzene is a bone-marrow toxin. Id. at 55. A
well-respected textbook states that "[b]enzene, in particular is known to induce MDS as well
as leukemia." Id. at 55 n.7 (quoting Andrew Deiss, Non-neoplastic Diseases, Chemical Agents, and
Hematologic Disorders that May Precede Hematologic Neoplasms, in 2 WINTROBE'S CLINIcAL HE-
MATOLOGY, supra note 125, at 1946, 1949).
412. Id. at 56. This is a valid excuse. See supra Part VIII.D.3.b.
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conclude is that benzene is probably capable of causing the plain-
tiffs disease.
Accepting the probability of the general causation link, the
plaintiff's claim can survive the tripartite "independent link" in-
quiry if the experts can substantiate the temporality link to a clear
and convincing degree.
3. Temporality-At this point of the Daubert analysis, however,
the plaintiffs claim begins to erode. There was no dispute that
there was an exposure to the defendant's product and it occurred
before the development of the plaintiffs MDS. But there is a prob-
lem with temporality when one considers the latency period.413 The
plaintiff claimed that she began to use the defendant's product in
the spring of 1985.414 In February 1989 she was diagnosed with
macrocytic anemia, then in October 1990 she was diagnosed with
MDS 5 q-minus.415 Thus, the "latency period" as measured from the
time of the first exposure was five and a half years, an unlikely and
brief latency period under the circumstances. The low-level,
chronic benzene dose alleged by the plaintiff is unlikely to result in
a shorter latency period than observed in the acutely and massively
416exposed survivors of the Hiroshima nuclear detonation. It is notimpossible that benzene-induced MDS could occur within five and
413. See supra Part VIII.D.3.c (discussing the latency period concept).
414. Lakie, 965 E Supp. at 51.
415. Id.
416. Shorter latency periods are possible following massive, acutely toxic doses of the
causative agents. For example, survivors of the Hiroshima nuclear detonation displayed six-
to-ten-year latencies for MDS. Richard M. Stone, Acute Leukemias, in HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN
HEMATOLOGY BOARD REVIEW MANUAL, HEMATOLOGY SPECIAL ISSUE 1, 2 (Arthur T. Skarin
ed., 1998). Similarly, certain chemotherapeutic agents may cause MDS in treated patients
with a latency period of three to eight years. Id. It is well recognized in the medical and
toxicological communities that latency periods are inversely proportional to the dose of the
causative agent. See, e.g., Masayuki Arai et al., Long Term Dose Response Study of N-[4-(5-Nitro-2-
Furyl)-2-Thiazolyl] Formamide-Induced Urinary Bladder Carcinogenesis, 18 CANCER LETTERS 261
(1983) (showing an inverse relationship between dose of agent in laboratory animals and
latency period for bladder cancer); Wolfgang H. Fischer & Werner K. Lutz, Influence of Diet
Restriction and Tumor Promoter Dose on Cell Proliferation, Oxidative DNA Damage and Rate of Papil-
loma Appearance in the Mouse Skin After Initiation with DMBA and Promotion with TPA, 98
TOXICOLOGY LETTERS 59 (1998) (showing that the median latency time (t50) for the ap-
pearance of skin papilloma in the high-, intermediate-, and low-dose groups fed cancer
agent was 9, 15.5, and 23.5 weeks, respectively); E.J. O'Flaherty & M.L. Dourson, Relationship
Between Urethan Dose Rate and Adenoma Latency: Relevance of Tumor Growth Rate and Target Cell
Number, 69 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 859 (1982) ("The relationship between dose per unit
time, or DR, and time (tl) needed for the development of a mean of one observable tumor
per mouse was: DR x tin = k, where k and n are constants."). More particularly, this inverse
relationship between the extent of the dose and the length of the latency period holds for
MDS. See Deiss, supra note 411, at 1956 ("Latency may decrease as a function of the intensity
of treatment [in relation to medical treatment-induced MDS].").
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a half years of the first exposure, but it is unlikely.417 There is no
discussion of this latency issue in the court's opinion and no ap-
parent substantiation of the plaintiffs theory that benzene caused
her disease despite this truncated latency. The "temporality" link of
the plaintiffs causation chain fails.
4. Specific Causation--At this point the inquiry focuses on the
dependent links of specific causation. The specific causation links
are: 1) the actual exposure/dose 2) exceeded the level generally
considered harmful and 3) was sufficient to conclude that the sub-
ject agent was the most likely cause of the injury, considering all
potential causes.
In Lakie, the dose expert did estimate the plaintiffs dose to ben-
zene as somewhere between 550 and 4200 mg over the six years the
plaintiff used the defendant's dental adhesive. Although the de-
fendant challenged the dose estimates of the plaintiffs expert, the
expert's estimates were defensible. The expert relied on the plain-
tiffs use history and documents demonstrating the concentrations
of benzene in the dental adhesive through the years of the plain-
tiffs use.4 8 The expert assumed that the plaintiff absorbed all of
the benzene in the adhesive she applied. This plaintiff-friendly as-
sumption seemed reasonable, given animal studies on which the
expert relied showing the high permeability of skin to benzene.419
417. Although scientists customarily measure latency periods from the time of first ex-
posure, this method is probably inappropriate for low-level, chronic exposures such as
presented in the Lakie case.
For exposures that are continuous or intermittent, there remains the difficulty in de-
termining when the exposure acts etiologically. Customarily, epidemiologists measure
induction periods from the time of first exposure, because the relevant time of action
is unknown, whereas the time of first exposure can usually be determined. A better
practice, however, is to choose an arbitrary accumulation of exposure, and determine
the time at which that level is reached.
Rothman & Poole, supra note 347, at 7.
Applying the "cumulative exposure" approach to determine commencement of the la-
tency period in the Lakie case, one could decide arbitrarily to commence the latency period
at the time the plaintiff's cumulative benzene exposure resulted in an Attributable Risk
(AR) of one in one hundred (0.01), a very plaintiff-friendly approach. Using the formula
derived in the Rinsky Study, see supra text accompanying note 157, and the risk calculations
discussed in the next subsection, it would take the plaintiff eight years to absorb enough
benzene to achieve an AR of 0.01, assuming the plaintiff's actual dose equaled the highest
dose estimated by her expert. Thus, using the more appropriate "cumulative dose" ap-
proach for determining commencement of the latency period, the plaintiff's disease
manifested itself prior to the time that the latency period began, in contravention of the
essential temporality criterion of causation.
418. Lakie, 965 F. Supp. at 57-58.
419. The "dose" expert reasoned that highly vascularized human gum and mouth tissue
would be less resistant to absorption than skin. Id at 58.
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The "dose" expert's conclusions were a rational inference based on
the data.
Was the calculated dose sufficient to cause the plaintiffs disease,
as the plaintiffs causation experts concluded? As mentioned, the
plaintiff's "dose" expert calculated that plaintiff absorbed between
550 and 4200 milligrams (mg) of benzene from the denture adhe-
sive over a six-year period of use.42° But what scientific evidence did
the experts present to substantiate their specific causation conclu-
sion that this dose caused the plaintiffs disease? There is no
scientific support cited in the court's decision. The conclusion ap-
pears to be the ipse dixit (bare authority) of the plaintiffs experts.
Failing to present the court with any scientific substantiation for
their "harmful dose" conclusion, the court should have granted
judgment in favor of the defendant.
4 2 1
It was not the defendant's burden at the Daubert stage to come
forward with scientific evidence to substantiate its defense that the
plaintiff's estimated benzene dose was unlikely the cause of her
disease. To the contrary, it was the plaintiffs burden to demon-
strate that her proffered opinion testimony was admissible.422 We,
however, present here an analysis that the defendant could have
offered to substantiate its defense. This analysis demonstrates the
type of quantitative risk assessment and Bayesian inquiry that
courts should demand of an expert offering specific causation tes-
timony. In the Lakie case, a quantitative analysis demonstrates that
the plaintiff's specific causation theory was unsubstantiated for a
reason.
As discussed above, benzene is arguably the most studied chemi-
cal toxin.423 There are data available to make a scientific judgment
as to the level of risk presented by the dose estimate calculated in
the Lakie case. As a scientific basis of this analysis, we turn again to
the Rinsky Study, an epidemiologic study in which the researchers
reconstructed the cohort's benzene exposures and, based on these
calculated exposures, estimated the risk of contracting leukemia
per unit cumulative exposure of benzene as measured in parts per
420. Id. at 57.
421. Courts should not accept an expert's unsubstantiated assertions. The purpose of
the Daubert inquiry is to require the experts to come forward with their scientific evidence in
support of their assertions. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.10
(1993). There is no discussion in the Lakie opinion concerning any scientific support for the
opinion that the plaintiff's dose was sufficient to cause her disease, rendering the opinion an
unreliable ipse dixit.
422. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (addressing the burden of proof at the
Daubert stage).
423. See supra Part VI (discussing benzene toxicology and epidemiology).
Toxic Tort Cases
University of Michigan Journal of Law ReformV
millionoyears (ppmoyrs) . The researchers derived the following
formula for determining the Odds Ratio (OR) of contracting leu-
kemia:
O R = (0.01
26  . p m.y )
There are two obstacles to clear before using this formula to cal-
culate the Lakie plaintiffs risk. First, the variable "ppmeyrs" in this
formula involves cumulative occupational inhalation exposure in
terms of air concentration, while the plaintiffs exposure was oral.
There is, however, a valid method to convert the cumulative oral
dose estimated for the Lakie plaintiff to ppmoyrs, and then plug
this calculated dose equivalent into the Rinsky Study formula to
derive a risk associated with the plaintiffs accumulated dose. The
second obstacle to clear is the fact that the Rinsky Study research-
ers calculated an exposure risk for leukemia, not for the plaintiffs
disease, MDS 5 q-minus. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to use the
Rinsky Study formula to calculate the plaintiffs risk, given the
plaintiff's general causation theory based on the "analogy" argu-
ment that benzene likely causes MDS because it causes leukemia.
The Rinsky Study presents the best available risk analysis for use in
this case, certainly better than the plaintiffs unsubstantiated the-
ory.
The plaintiff's estimated cumulative dose was between 550 and
4200 mg of benzene during six years of use.42 ' Taking the highest
estimated cumulative dose, the plaintiffs average annual dose was
700 mg per year (mg/yr) .426 Her corresponding estimated average
daily exposure was 1.92 mg/day 2 7 ; however, since the objective is to
convert the plaintiff's dose to an equivalent occupational dose, one
should divide the annual dose not by 365.25 days, but by 200
"working days" per year. Following this procedure, the plaintiffs
428
daily occupational dose equivalent comes out to 2.7 mg/day.
The challenge at this point is to convert a daily oral dose of 2.7
ing into a daily occupational inhalation exposure. In other words,
the question is what concentration of benzene in air will result in a
daily dose of 2.7 mg benzene in a worker so exposed? This step re-
quires knowledge of a basic rule-of-thumb used in the fields of
industrial hygiene and toxicology, to wit: an average worker breathes
424. Rinsky et al., Risk Assessment, supra note 155, at 1048.
425. Lakie, 965 F. Supp. at 57.
426. I.e., 4200 mg divided by six years.
427. I.e., 700 mg/yr divided by 365.25 days per year.
428. I.e., 700 mg/yr divided by 200 working days per year.
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about ten cubic meters of air during an eight-hour workshift.
4 9
Based on this breathing air volume, and assuming that an exposed
worker absorbs one hundred percent of the benzene from inhaled
air,430 the plaintiffs calculated occupational dose equivalent of 0.27




Since the Rinsky Study formula uses units of parts per million
(ppm), one must next convert the concentration of 0.27 mg/m s
into ppm. This step is simple, since it is known that one ppm of
benzene in air is equivalent to 3.2 mg benzene per cubic meter of
air (mg/m3 ).432 As a consequence, 0.27 mg/m 3 benzene in air
equals about 0.1 ppm benzene in air. The Lakie plaintiff's high-
end estimated dose of 4200 mg benzene over six years converts to a
daily occupational exposure of 0.1 ppm benzene in air. The equiva-
lent cumulative exposure over six years is 0.6 ppmeyrs.
429. Hon-Wing Leung, Methods For Setting Occupational Exposure Limits, in HUMAN AND
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 647, 654 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed., 2002) ("A volume of 10
m' of inspired air per 8-hour work shift has been most frequently used for OEL [occupa-
tional exposure limit] calculations. This figure is derived by assuming that a man engaging
in light-duty work has a tidal volume of 1000 cm' and a breathing rate of 20 breaths per
minute for 8 hours." (citation omitted)).
430. This is a fair assumption, given the dose expert's assumption that Mrs. Lakie ab-
sorbed 100% of the benzene in the defendant's product. Lakie v. SmithKline Beecham, 965
F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D.D.C. 1997).
431. I.e., 2.7 mg/day divided by 10 m3 breathed per day.
432. The formula for converting parts per million (ppm) of a vapor or gas in air to mil-
ligrams per cubic meter of air (mg/m3) is:
ppm = [ (mg/m3) (24.45)] gram molecular weight of the substance.
See AMERICAN CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL INDUSTRIAL HYGIENISTS, 2002 THRESHOLD
LIMIT VALUES FOR CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND PHYSICAL AGENTS & BIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE
INDICES 11 (2002). The gram molecular weight of benzene is 78.11. Id. at 16. Thus, the
gram-weight equivalent of 1 ppm benzene in air is 3.2 mg/m3.
433. I.e., 0.27 mg/m3 benzene divided by 3.2 mg benzene per ppm benzene.
434. I.e., 0.1 ppm benzene over six years. In comparison, the epidemiologic literature
indicates benzene-induced blood dyscrasias occurs only at much higher levels of exposure.
E.g., Muzaffer Aksoy & Sakir Erdem, Followup Study on the Mortality and the Development of
Leukemia in 44 Pancytopenic Patients with Chronic Exposure to Benzene, 52 BLOOD 285, 288 (1978)
("[A]I1 pancytopenic patients in whom leukemia developed were heavily exposed to ben-
zene during long working hours. Although in one of these patients the duration of exposure
was only 6 mo, his daily exposure was over 8 hr at a benzene concentration of 150 ppm.").
A six-month occupational exposure at 150 ppm, as seen in the Aksoy & Erdem study, re-
sults in a cumulative dose of 75 ppmeyears. Thus, the lowest cumulative exposure in the
Aksoy & Erdem study among patients who developed leukemia is 125-fold higher than Ms.
Lakie's highest estimated cumulative exposure. Furthermore, the benzene levels in all the
workplaces examined by Aksoy & Erdem were 150 ppm or greater. Id. Consequently, there is
no "fit" between the plaintiffs allegation of a benzene-induced MDS and the relied-on data.
See supra note 224 (discussing "external validity" and the need to explain how the plaintiffs
exposure circumstances were similar to those examined in the relied-upon epidemiology
studies). Ironically, to find that benzene is capable of causing MDS, the Lakie court quoted
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Plugging the plaintiff's equivalent inhalation cumulative expo-
sure into the Rinsky Study formula yields a Relative Risk (RR) of
1.008. The Attributable Risk (AR) 43 associated with this RR is
0.008. Accepting this AR as the true measure of benzene-induced
MDS at this dose, eight out of one thousand persons with MDS
who received the same benzene dose as did the plaintiff developed
their disease as a result of their benzene dose.436 Applying Bayes'
Law, this base rate of benzene-induced MDS among comparably
exposed persons would require the plaintiff's causation experts to
apply tests with a specificity of over 99% to conclude that the plain-
tiff's disease was more likely than not caused by that benzene
dose.437 In other words, the plaintiffs experts must be able to iden-
tify more than 99%of those persons with MDS exposed to benzene
as was the plaintiff whose disease was not caused by benzene. Such
specificity is impossible to achieve without an immunologic test for
benzene-induced MDS or some other "fingerprint" of benzene-
induced MDS.
45
In Lakie, the plaintiff's experts failed to explain how they were
able to conclude that the plaintiffs benzene dose was sufficient to
academic text that later cites the Aksoy and Erdem study. Lakie, 965 F. Supp. at 55 n.7 (quot-
ing Deiss, supra note 411, at 1949); Deiss, supra note 411, at 1949 n.128 (citing Aksoy &
Erdem, supra).
435. See supra Part V.B (discussing AR).
436. Approaching this quantitative risk estimate from another angle, one could ask how
long it would take for the plaintiff to absorb enough benzene to yield an AR for benzene-
induced MDS of 50% (0.5, correlating to an RR > 2.0). Based on the Rinsky Study formula
and the plaintiffs highest estimated dose, and applying the same risk analysis as discussed in
this Part, it would take 550 years for the plaintiff to absorb enough benzene to exceed an AR
of 0.5.
437. The required specificity is determined by applying a base rate of 0.01 in the for-
mula derived in Part VII. See supra Part VII. Note that, in reaching this risk estimate, the
authors applied the highest dose calculated by the plaintiff's experts. Given that it is the
plaintiff's burden to prove admissibility of her proffered expert opinions, it is arguable that
a court should use the lowest, reliable, calculated dose in a quantitative risk estimate. in
Lakie, the lowest calculated benzene dose was 550 milligrams total dose, which would lead to
a calculated Attributable Risk of 0.0002, or two benzene-induced cases out of 10,000 indi-
viduals exposed at the same level as was the plaintiff. Lakie, 965 F. Supp. at 57. With an AR of
0.0002, the specificity required to achieve "more likely than not" reliability is greater than
99.9%.
438. Note the 99.8% specificity of the test for HIV, a highly specific immunologic test.
Cleary et al., supra note 37, at 1758; see also supra text accompanying notes 37-40. Even if the
plaintiff's experts had an immunologic test for benzene-induced MDS with a specificity of
98%, a positive test result would not be sufficient to prove that the plaintiff had benzene-
induced MDS under these circumstances-that is, a base rate of less than 0.01. Applied to
this population, a test with 98% specificity would yield more false positives than true posi-




cause her MDS.4 s9 To the contrary, a quantitative causation analysis
shows that the plaintiffs MDS was probably, almost certainly, not a
result of her benzene exposure. Regardless of this quantitative
analysis, the failure of the plaintiff's causation experts to provide
substantiation of their causation opinion warranted summary
judgment for the defendant.40 Most toxic exposures do not pro-
vide an opportunity to conduct a causation analysis as precise and
as well-studied as benzene. Nevertheless, all toxic tort cases present
the plaintiff's causation experts with the burden to substantiate in
a quantitative way their opinions that the dose of the agent at issue
more likely than not caused the plaintiffs injury.
IX. CONCLUSION
Daubert introduced a new era of sophisticated court scrutiny of
proffered scientific and technical testimony. No longer are federal
courts and state courts following Daubert to exclude proffered ex-
pert opinions simply because the relevant scientific community
generally does not accept the expert's methods and conclusions.
Instead, the courts are to examine directly the reliability of the ex-
pert's methods and conclusions by considering the underlying
scientific data. The Frye "generally accepted" test, a useful surro-
gate for reliability of scientific and technical testimony, is no longer
the court's sole gatekeeping tool.
This Article describes Bayes' Law and its impact on the reliability
of causation testimony in the context of toxic tort cases. This Arti-
cle also discusses the impact of other uncertainties attendant to
expert opinion testimony in toxic tort cases and how these uncer-
tainties compound to make the proffered causation opinions less
reliable. Then, this Article suggested a probabilistic approach for
439. There is no explanation in the court's opinion. It appears that the court simply ac-
cepted the expert's ipse dixit that the plaintiff's benzene dose was sufficient to cause the
plaintiffs MDS.
440. Given the failure of the plaintiffs causation experts to present a transparent quan-
titative causation analysis, there is no need to consider the presence or absence of
alternative risk factors. It is noteworthy, however, that most cases of MDS 5 q-minus are eld-
erly females with macrocytic anemia. Deiss, supra note 411, at 1949, 1953. Ms. Lakie was
diagnosed with macrocytic anemia in February 1989, approximately twenty-one months
prior to her diagnosis with MDS. Lakie, 965 ESupp. at 51. The court stated that Ms. Lakie
was sixty-eight years old, though the reference date is unclear. Id. Thus, Ms. Lakie displayed
risk factors for MDS 5 q-minus-sex, age, and macrocytic anemia-auguring against a find-
ing of benzene causation.
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use by judges or their appointed special masters for evaluating the
reliability of proffered expert causation opinions in toxic tort cases
pursuant to FRE Rules 104 and 702, and Daubert. The suggested
approach calls for recognition of these uncertainties and evalua-
tion of the reliability of proffered causation opinions based on
fundamental scientific principles. At the Daubert stage, the expert
asserting a causal link between an exposure and an injury has the
burden to show that there is reliable scientific data supporting the
opinion that each causal factor (diagnosis, dose, temporality, gen-
eral causation and specific causation) analyzed independently is
true to a high probability. The expert's failure to produce reliable
scientific evidence supporting each causal link between the subject
toxic agent and the plaintiff's injury renders the expert's opinions
unreliable and inadmissible.
It is time for the courts to take the next step in sophisticated
analysis of expert testimony. Courts must consider the impact of
sequential uncertainties and Bayes' Law on the reliability of the
proffered causation opinions in toxic tort cases. Aware of these
fundamental scientific principles, courts can dispatch at the
Daubert stage toxic tort cases lacking reliable evidence and direct
judicial resources to tenable claims of harm caused by toxic sub-
stances.
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